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(2) is of a character to which the employee may have
had substantial exposure outside of employment or to
which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not
itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not
itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated,
or m any way contributed to by an occupational disease.
1997

34A-3-111.

Compensation not additional to that provided for a c c i d e n t s .
The compensation provided under this chapter is not in
addition to compensation that may be payable under Chapter
2, and in all cases when injury results by reason of an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment and compensation is payable for the injury under Chapter 2, compensation
under this chapter may not be payable.
1997
34A-3-112. Employee's willful misconduct.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this chapter, an
employee or dependent of any employee is not entitled to
receive compensation for disability or death from an occupational disease when the disability or death, wholly or in part,
was caused by the purposeful self-exposure of the employee.
(2) Except in cases resulting in death:
(a) Compensation provided for in this chapter shall be
reduced 15% when the occupational disease is caused by
the willful failure of the employee:
(i) to use safety devices when provided by the
employer; or
(ii) to obey any order or reasonable rule adopted by
the employer for the safety of the employee.
(b) Except when the employer permitted, encouraged,
or had actual knowledge of the conduct described in
Subsections (2XbXi) through (iii), disability compensation
may not be awarded under this chapter to an employee
when the major contributing cause of the employee's
disease is the employee's:
(i) use of illegal substances;
(ii) intentional abuse of drugs in excess of prescribed therapeutic amounts; or
(iii) intoxication from alcohol with a blood or
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater
as shown by a chemical test.
1997
CHAPTER 4
HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICE FOR DISABLED
MINERS
Section
34A-4-101.
34A-4-102.

Who entitled.
Application for benefits.

34A-4-101. Who entitled.
(1) Certain disabled miners meeting the requirements of
Section 34A-4-102 shall be entitled to, and shall receive, the
free hospital and medical service provided for in this chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), in the event occupational diseases are made compensable under Chapter 2 or 3,
no employer or insurance carrier shall be permitted to evade
payment under Chapter 2 or 3 by compelling a disabled miner
to avail himself of the benefits provided for in this chapter.
1997

34A-4-102. Application for benefits.
To be entitled to the free hospital and medical service
provided for in Section 34A-4-101, a disabled miner applying
for benefits shall be required to establish under oath the
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following facts, which shall be conditions precedent to the
granting of the free service provided for in this chapter:
(1) that he is and has been a resident of this state for a
period of two years immediately preceding the filing of his
application;
(2) that he has been employed in the mines of this state
for a period of at least five years and that the disability
from which he is suffering and for which he is in need of
hospital and medical treatment is due to such employment;
(3) that he is physically incapable of entering remunerative employment and holding a job;
(4) that his disability is such that hospital and medical
attention is necessary: and
(5) that he is financially unable to secure and pp** for
hospital and medical service
1997
CHAPTER 5
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT
Section
34A-5-101.
34A-5-102.
34A-5-103.
34A-5-104.
34A-5-105.

34A-5-106.
34A-5-107.

34A-5-108.

Title.
Definitions.
Repealed.
Powers.
Antidiscrimination and Labor Advisory Council — Membership — Appointment — Term
— Powers and duties — Chair.
Discriminatory or unfair employment practices — Permitted practices.
Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim —
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings
— Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination.
Judicial enforcement of division findings.

34A-5-101. Title.
This chapter shall be known as the "Utah Antidiscrimination Act."
1997
34A-5-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Apprenticeship" means a program for the training
of apprentices including a program providing the training
of those persons defined as apprentices by Section 35A-6102.
(2) "Bona fide occupational qualification" means a characteristic applying to an employee:
(a) that is necessary to the operation; or
(b) is the essence of the employee's employer's
business.
(3) "Court" means:
(a) the district court in the judicial district of the
state in which the asserted unfair employment practice occurred; or
(b) if this court is not in session at that time, a
judge of the court described in Subsection (3Xa).
(4) "Director" means the director of the division.
(5) "Disability" means a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of an individual's
major life activities.
(6) "Division" means the Division of Antidiscrimination
and Labor.
(7) "Employee" means any person applying with or
employed by an employer
(8) (a) "Employer" means(1) the state;
(ii) any political subdivision;
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(iii) a board, commission, department, institution, school district, trust, or agent of the state or
its political subdivisions; or
(iv) a person employing 15 or more employees
within the state for each working day IL each of
20 calendar weeks or more in the current or
preceding calendar year.
(b) "Employer" does not include:
(i) a religious organization or association;
(ii) a religious corporation sole; or
(iii) any corporation or association constituting a wholly owned subsidiary or agency of any
religious organization or association or religious
corporation sole.
(9) "Employment agency" means any person:
(a) undertaking to procure employees or opportunities to work for any other person; or
(b) holding itself out to be equipped to take an
action described in Subsection (9Xa).
(10) "Joint apprenticeship committee" means any association of representatives of a labor organization and an
employer providing, coordinating, or controlling an apprentice training program.
U l ) "Labor organization" means any organization that
exists for the purpose in whole or in part of:
(a) collective bargaining;
(b) dealing with employers concerning grievances,
terms or conditions of employment; or
(c) other mutual aid or protection in connection
with employment.
(12) "National origin" means the place of birth, domicile, or residence of an individual or of an individual's
ancestors.
(13) "On-the-job-training" means any program designed to instruct a person who, while learning the
particular job for which the person is receiving instruction:
(a) is also employed at that job; or
(b) may be employed by the employer conducting
the program during the course of the program, or
when the program is completed.
(14) "Person" means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
trusts or trustees, receivers, the state and all political
subdivisions and agencies of the state.
(15) "Presiding officer" means the same as that term is
defined in Section 63-46b-2.
(16) "Prohibited employment practice" means a practice specified as discriminatory, and therefore unlawful, in
Section 34A-5-106.
(17) "Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action by
an employer, employment agency, labor organization, apprenticeship program, on-the-job training program, or
vocational school against one of its employees, applicants,
or members because the employee, applicant, or member:
(a) has opposed any employment practice prohibited under this chapter; or
(b) filed charges, testified, assisted, or participated
in any way in any proceeding, investigation, or hearing under this chapter.
(18) "Vocational school" means any school or institution
conducting a course of instruction, training, or retraining
to prepare individuals to follow an occupation or trade, or
to pursue a manual, technical, industrial, business, commercial, office, personal services, or other nonprofessional
occupations.
199»
34A-5-103.

Repealed.

i«w

34A-5-104

34A-5-104. Powers.
(1) (a) The commission has jurisdiction over the subject of
employment practices and discrimination made unlawful
by this chapter.
(b) The commission may adopt, publish, amend, and
rescind rules, consistent with, and for the enforcement of
this chapter.
(2) The division may:
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators
and other employees and agents that it considers necessary for the enforcement of this chapter;
(b) receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging:
(i) discrimination in:
(A) employment;
(B) apprenticeship programs;
(C) on-the-job training programs; and
(D) vocational schools; or
(ii) the existence of a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice by:
(A) a person;
(B) an employer;
(C) an employment agency;
(D) a labor organization;
(E) the employees or members of an employment agency or labor organization;
(F) a joint apprenticeship committee; and
(G) vocational school;
(c) investigate and study the existence, character,
causes, and extent of discrimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job training programs, and
vocational schools in this state by:
(i) employers;
(ii) employment agencies;
(iii) labor organizations;
(iv) joint apprenticeship committees; and
(v) vocational schools;
(d) formulate plans for the elimination of discrimination by educational or other means;
(e) hold hearings upon complaint made against:
(i) a person;
(ii) an employer;
(iii) an employment agency;
(iv) a labor organization;
(v) the employees or members of an employment
agency or labor organization;
(vi) a joint apprenticeship committee; or
(vii) a vocational school;
(f) issue publications and reports of investigations and
research that:
(i) promote good will among the various racial,
religious, and ethnic groups of the state; and
(ii) minimize or eliminate discrimination in employment because of race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, age, or disability;
(g) prepare and transmit to the governor, at least once
each year, reports describing:
(i) its proceedings, investigations, and hearings;
(ii) the outcome of those hearings;
(iii) decisions the division has rendered; and
(iv) the other work performed by the division;
(h) recommend policies to the governor, and submit
recommendation to employers, employment agencies, and
labor organizations to implement those policies;
(i) recommend any legislation concerning discrimination because of race, sex, color, national origin, religion,
age, or disability to the governor that it considers necessary; and
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(j) within the limits of any appropriations made for its
operation, cooperate with other agencies or organizations,
both public and private, in the planning and conducting of
educational programs designed to eliminate discriminatory practices prohibited under this chapter.
(3) The division shall investigate alleged discriminatory
practices involving officers or employees of state government if
requested to do so by the Career Service Review Board.
(4) (a) In any hearing held under this chapter, the division
may:
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance at the hearing;
(ii) administer oaths and take the testimony of any
person under oath; and
(iii) compel any person to produce for examination
any books, papers, or other information relating to
the matters raised by the complaint.
(b) The division director or a hearing examiner appointed by the division director may conduct hearings.
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena
issued by the division, the division may petition the
district court to enforce the subpoena.
(d) In the event a witness asserts a privilege against
self-incrimination, testimony and evidence from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 22b,
Grants of Immunity.
1999
34A-5-105. Antidiscrimination and Labor Advisory
Council — Membership — A p p o i n t m e n t —
Term — P o w e r s and d u t i e s — Chair.
(1) There is created an Antidiscrimination and Labor Advisory Council consisting of:
(a) 17 voting members appointed by the commissioner
as follows:
(i) four employer representatives;
(ii) four employee representatives;
(iii) two representatives of persons who seek to
rent or purchase dwellings as denned in Section
57-21-2;
(iv) two representatives of persons who:
(A) sell or rent dwellings; and
(B) are subject to Title 57, Chapter 21, Utah
Fair Housing Act; and
(v) five representatives of the general public; and
(b) the commissioner or the commissioner's designee as
a nonvoting member of the council.
(2) In making the appointments under Subsection (1), the
commissioner shall consider representation of the following
protected classes:
(a) race;
(b) color;
(c) national origin;
(d) gender;
(e) religion;
(f) age;
(g) persons with disabilities;
(h) familial status as defined in Section 57-21-2; and
(i) source of income as defined in Section 57-21-2.
(3) The division shall provide any necessary staff support
for the council.
(4) (a) Except as required by Subsection (4Kb), as terms of
current council members expire, the commissioner shall
appoint each new member or reappointed member to a
four-year term.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection
(4Xa), the commissioner shall, at the time of appointment
or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure
that the terms of council members are staggered so that
approximately half of the council is appointed every two
years.
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(5) (a) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired term.
(b) The commissioner shall terminate the term of a
council member who ceases to be representative as designated by the original appointment.
(6) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees
shall receive no compensation or benefits for their
services, but may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of the member's official
duties at the rates established by the Division of
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for their service,
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from
their agency for their service may receive per diem
and expenses incurred in the performance of their
official duties from the council at the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for
their service.
(7) (a) The advisory council shall offer advice on issues
requested by the commission, division, and the Legislature and also make recommendations to the commission
and division regarding issues:
(i) of employment discrimination;
(ii) housing discrimination; and
(iii) related to the administration by the commission of:
(A) the provisions of Title 34, Labor in General, that are administered by the commission;
(B) Title 34A, Chapter 5, Utah Antidiscrimination Act; and
(C) Title 57, Chapter 21, Utah Fair Housing
Act.
(b) The council shall confer at least quarterly for the
purpose of advising the commission, division, and the
Legislature regarding issues described in Subsection
(7Xa).
(8) The commissioner or the commissioner's designee shall
serve as chair. The chair is charged with the responsibility of
calling the necessary meetings.
2000
34A-5-106. D i s c r i m i n a t o r y or unfair e m p l o y m e n t practices — Permitted practices.
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
to take any action described in Subsections UXa) through (f).
(a) (i) An employer may not refuse to hire, promote,
discharge, demote, or terminate any person, or to
retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters
of compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any person otherwise
qualified, because of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions;
(E) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older;
(F) religion;
(G) national origin; or
(H) disability.
(ii) An applicant or candidate for any job or position may not be considered "otherwise qualified,"
unless the applicant or candidate possesses the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity,
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disposition to work, adherence to reasonable rules
and regulations, and other job related qualifications
required by an employer for any particular job, job
classification, or position to be filled or created,
(iii) (A) As used in this chapter, "to discriminate in
matters of compensation" means the payment of
differing wages or salaries to employees having
substantially equal experience, responsibilities,
and skill for the particular job.
(B) Notwithstanding Subsection (lXaXiiiXA):
(I) nothing in this chapter prevents increases in pay as a result of longevity with
the employer, if the salary increases are
uniformly applied and available to all employees on a substantially proportional basis; and
(II) nothing in this section prohibits an
employer and employee from agreeing to a
rate of pay or work schedule designed to
protect the employee from loss of Social
Security payment or benefits if the employee
is eligible for those payments.
(b) An employment agency may not:
(i) refuse to list and properly classify for employment, or refuse to refer an individual for employment,
in a known available job for which the individual is
otherwise qualified, because of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin;
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or
(H) disability;
(ii) comply with a request from an employer for
referral of applicants for employment if the request
indicates either directly or indirectly that the employer discriminates in employment on account of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin;
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older, or
(H) disability.
(c) A labor organization may not exclude any individual
otherwise qualified from full membership rights in the
labor organization, expel the individual from membership
in the labor organization, or otherwise discriminate
against or harass any of its members in full employment
of work opportunity, or representation, because of:
(i) race;
(ii) sex;
(iii) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions;
(iv) religion;
(v) national origin;
(vi) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older;
or
(vii) disability
(d) Unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or required by, and given to, an agency of government for security reasons, an employer, employment
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agency, or labor organization may not print, or circulate,
or cause to be printed or circulated, any statement,
advertisement, or publication, use any form of application
for employment or membership, or make any inquiry in
connection with prospective employment or membership
that expresses, either directly or indirectly:
(i) any limitation, specification, or discrimination
as to:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) religion;
(D) sex;
(E) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions;
(F) national origin;
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or
(H) disability;
(ii) the intent to make any limitation, specification,
or discrimination described in Subsection (lXdXi).
(e) A person, whether or not an employer, an employment agency, a labor organization, or the employees or
members thereof, may not:
(i) aid, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of an act
defined in this section to be a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice;
(ii) obstruct or prevent any person from complying
with this chapter, or any order issued under it; or
(iii) attempt, either directly or indirectly, to commit any act prohibited in this section.
(f) An employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school, providing, coordinating, or controlling apprenticeship programs, or providing,
coordinating, or controlling on-the-job-training programs,
instruction, training, or retraining programs may not:
(i) deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person,
the right to be admitted to, or participate in any
apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training
program, or other occupational instruction, training
or retraining program because of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin;
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or
(H) disability;
(ii) discriminate against or harass any qualified
person in that person's pursuit of such programs, or
to discriminate against such a person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of such programs, because of:
(A) race;
(B) color,
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin;
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or
(H) disability; or
(iii) print, publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employment by the employer, or membership in or any
classification or referral for employment by a labor
organization, or relating to any classification or refer-
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ral for employment by an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination based on race, color, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion,
national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older, or disability except that a notice or
advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancyrelated conditions, age, national origin, or disability
when religion, race, color, sex, age, national origin, or
disability is a bona fide occupational qualification for
employment
(2) Nothing contained in Subsections (l)(a) through (1Kf)
shall be construed to prevent
(a) the termination of employment of an individual who
is physically, mentally, or emotionally unable to perform
the duties required by that individual's employment,
(b) the variance of insurance premiums, of coverage on
account of age, or
(c) a restriction on the activities of individuals licensed
by the liquor authority with respect to persons under 21
years of age
(3) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice
d) for an employer to hire and employ employees,
for an employment agency to classify or refer for
employment any individual, for a labor organization
to classify its membership or to classify or refer for
employment any individual or for an employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual
in any such program, on the basis of religion, sex,
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or disability in those
certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older, national
origin, or disability is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise,
(n) for a school, college, university, or other educational institution to hire and employ employees of a
particular religion if the school, college, university, or
other educational institution is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of the school,
college, university, or other educational institution is
directed toward the propagation of a particular religion,
(m) for an employer to give preference in employ
ment to
(A) the employer's
(I) spouse,
(II) child, or
(III) son-in-law or daughter in law,
(B) any person for whom the employer is or
would be liable to furnish financial support if
those persons were unemployed,
(C) any person to whom the employer during
the preceding six months has furnished more
than one-half of total financial support regardless of whether or not the employer was or is
legally obligated to furnish support, or
(D) any person whose education or training
was substantially financed by the employer for a
period of two years or more

532

(b) Nothing in this chapter applies to any business or
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect
to any publicly announced employment practice of the
business or enterprise under which preferential treatment is given to any individual because that individual is
a native American Indian living on or near an Indian
reservation
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, vocational school, joint labor-management committee, or apprenticeship program subject to this chapter
to grant pieferential treatment to any individual or to any
grour because of the race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or disability of the individual or group on
-account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or disability
employed by any employer, referred or classified for
employment by an employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor
organization, or admitted to or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of that race,
color, rehgior, sex, age, national origin, or disability in
any community or county or in the available work force in
any community or county
(4) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice with
respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide senir-ity
system or any bona fide employment benefit plan such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan that is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of this chapter, except t h a t no such
employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire an
individual.
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (4), or any other statutory
provision to the contrary, a person may not be subject to
involuntary termination or retirement from employment on
the basis of age alone, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older, except
(a) under Subsection (6),
(b) under Section 67-5-8, and
(c) when age is a bona fide occupational qualification
(6) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement
of an employee who has attained at least 65 years of age, and
who, for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is
employed in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking
position, if
(a) that employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from the employee's
employer's pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred
compensation plan, or any combination of those plans,
and
(b) the benefit described in Subsection (6Xa) equals, in
the aggregate, at least $44,000
1999
34A-5-107. Procedure for aggrieved person to file
claim — Investigations — Adjudicative proc e e d i n g s — Settlement — Reconsideration —
Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may, or that
person's attorney or agent may, make, sign, and file with
the division a request for agency action
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified
under oath or affirmation
(c) A request for agency action made under this section
shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship
committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse to comply with this
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chapter may file with the division a request for agency action
asking the division for assistance to obtain their compliance
by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the division shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between the
parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations
made in the request for agency action.
(cVThe division and its staff, agents, and employees
shall conduct every investigation in fairness to ai) parties
and agencies involved, and may not attempt a settlement
between the parties if it is clear that no discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice has occurred.
(d) An aggrieved party may withdraw the request for
agency action prior to the issuance of a final order.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence
during the investigation to support the allegations of a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out
in the request for agency action, the investigator shall
formally report these findings to the director or the
director's designee.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director or the director's designee may issue a determination
and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the Division
of Adjudication for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the director's or the director's designee's determination and order within 30 days of the date the determination and order for dismissal is issued.
(d) If the director or the director's designee receives no
timely request for a hearing, the determination and order
issued by the director or the director's designee becomes
the final order of the commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during the investigation to support the allegations of a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out
in the request for agency action, the investigator shall
formally report these findings to the director or the
director's designee.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director or the director's designee may issue a determination
and order based on the investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the Division of
Adjudication for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo
the director's or the director's designee's determination
and order within 30 days of the date the determination
and order is issued.
(d) If the director or the director's designee receives no
timely request for a hearing, the determination and order
issued by the director or the director's designee requiring
the respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved
party becomes the final order of the commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding to review the director's
or the director's designee's determination that a prohibited
employment practice has occurred, the division shall present
the factual and legal basis of its determination.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the
party filing the request for agency action may reasonably and
fairly amend any allegation, and the respondent may amend
its answer. Those amendments may be made during or after a
hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding
officer finds that a respondent has not engaged in a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the
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presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the request for agency action containing the allegation of a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent
be reimbursed by the complaining party for the respondent's attorneys' fees and costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding
officer finds that a respondent has engaged in a discriminatory
or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall
issue an order requiring the respondent to:
(a) cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice; and
(b) provide relief to the complaining party, including
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees
and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file with the Division of Adjudication a written request for review before the commissioner or Appeals EJoard of the order issued by the
presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12 and
Chapter 1, Part 3, Adjudicative Proceedings.
(b) If there is no timely request for review, the order
issued by the presiding officer becomes the final order of
the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (HXa) is
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16 and
Chapter 1, P a r t 3, Adjudicative Proceedings.
(13) The commission shall have authority to make r u k r
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(14) The commission and its staff may not divulge or make
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation, or proceeding before the commission except
as provided in Subsections (14Xa) through (d).
(a) Information used by the director or the director's
designee in making any determination may be provided to
all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for
and participation in proceedings before the commission.
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed
provided the identities of the individuals or parties are
not disclosed.
(c) Information maty be disclosed for inspection by the
attorney general or other legal representatives of the
state or commission.
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and
reporting requirements of the federal government.
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination
based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth,
or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin,
or disability.
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for
relief based upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the
commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding
before the commission in connection with the same claims
under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection is intended to
alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision
set forth in Subsection (15).
1999
34A-5-108. Judicial enforcement of division findings.
(1) The commission or the attorney general at the request of
the commission shall commence an action under Section
63-46b-19 for civil enforcement of a final order of the commission issued under Subsection 34A-5-107Q2) if:
(a) the order finds that there is reasonable cause to
believe that a respondent has engaged or is engaging in
discriminatory or prohibited employment practices made
unlawful by this chapter;
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(b) counsel to the commission or the attorney general
determines after reasonable inquiry that the order is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law;
(c) the respondent has not received an order of automatic stay or discharge from the United States Bankruptcy Court; and
(d) (i) the commission has not accepted a conciliation
agreement to which the aggrieved party and respondent are parties; or
(ii) the respondent has not conciliated or complied
with the final order of the commission within 30 days
from the date the order is issued.
(2) If the respondent seeks judicial review of the final order
under Section 63-46b-16, pursuant to Section 63-46b-18 the
commission may stay seeking civil enforcement pending the
completion of the judicial review.
1997
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Section

34A-6-302.
34A-6-303.

34A-6-304.

34A-6-305.
34A-6-306.
34A-6-307.

publication of reports and information —
Division rules.
Citations issued by division — Grounds —
Posting — Limitation.
Enforcement procedures — Notification to employer of proposed assessment — Notification to employer of failure to correct violation
— Contest by employer of citation or proposed assessment — Procedure.
Procedure for review of order enteral by administrative law judge — Continuing jurisdiction of commission.
Injunction proceedings.
Disclosure of trade secrets — Protective orders.
Civil and criminal penalties.

CHAPTER 6
UTAH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

PARTI

Part 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

General Provisions

34A-6-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Occupational Safety and
Health Act."
1997

Section
34A-6-101.
34A-6-102.
34A-6-103.
34A-6-104.

34A-6-105.
34A-6-106.
34A-6-107.
34A-6-108.
34A-6-109.
34A-6-110.

34A-6-111.

Title.
Legislative intent.
Definitions.
Administration of chapter — Selection of administrator — Powers and duties of commission — Application of chapter and exceptions.
Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings.
Occupational Safety and Health Advisory
Council — Appointment.
Research and related activities.
Collection, compilation, and analysis of statistics.
Educational and training programs.
Requirements of other laws not limited or
repealed — Workers' compensation or rights
under other laws with respect to employment injuries not affected.
Federal aid.
Part 2
D u t i e s and S t a n d a r d s

34A-6-201
34A-6-202.

34A-6-203.
34A-6-204.

Duties of employers and employees.
Standards — Procedure for issuance, modification, or revocation by division — Emergency
temporary standard — Variances from standards — Statement of reasons for administrator's actions — Judicial review — Priority
for establishing standards.
Discharge or discrimination against employee
prohibited.
State agencies and political subdivisions to
establish programs.
Part 3
Enforcement

34A-6-301.

Inspection and investigation of workplace,
worker injury, illness, or complaint — Warrants — Attendance of witnesses —
Recordkeeping by employers — Employer
and employee representatives — Request for
inspection by employees — Compilation and

34A-6-102. Legislative i n t e n t
The intent of this chapter is:
(1) to preserve human resources by providing for the
safety and health of workers; and
(2) to provide a coordinated state plan to implement,
establish, and enforce occupational safety and health
standards as effective as the standards under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 651 et seq.
1997
34A-6-103. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Administrator" means the director of the Division
of Occupational Safety and Health.
(2) "Amendment" means such modification or change in
a code, standard, rule, or order intended for universal or
general application.
(3) "Commission" means the Labor Commission.
(4) "Council" means the Utah Occupational Safety and
Health Advisory Council.
(5) "Division" means the Division of Occupational
Safety and Health.
(6) "Employee" includes any person suffered or permitted to work by an employer.
(7) "Employer" means:
(a) the state;
(b) each county, city, town, and school district in
the state; and
(c) every person, firm, and private corporation,
including public utilities, having one or more workers
or operatives regularly employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under
any contract of hire.
(8) "Hearing" means a proceeding conducted by the
commission.
(9) "Imminent danger" means a danger exists which
reasonably could be expected to cause an occupational
disease, death, or serious physical harm immediately, or
before the danger could be eliminated through enforcement procedures under this chapter.
(10) "National consensus standard" means any occupational safety and health standard or modification:
(a) adopted by a nationally recognized standardsproducing organization under procedures where it
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
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/ S A L T LAKE COUNTY

By

heaths

Deputy Clerk

ROBERT H. WILDE #3466
BLAKE A. NAKAMURA #62 8 8
ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
935 East South Union Avenue Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 2 55-4 774
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ANGELA BYERS,

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,

vs .
C lvil No.
CREATIVE CORNER, INC. AND LYN
PELTON,
Defendants.

Judge

(Atdk^y

oo
Plaintiff alleges:
1.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah.
2.

Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah Corporation

in good standing doing business in Salt Lake County.
3.

Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant

Creative Corner, Inc., and the person who made all relevant
decisions and took all relevant actions alleged herein.
4.

All actions alleged herein took place in Salt Lake

County and venue and jurisdiction are appropriate in Salt Lake
C \IN\byers2

1

County.
5.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant Creative

Corner, Inc. at a rate of $11.00 per hour plus a $200.00 per
month car allowance.
6.

The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day of

October, 1999.
7.

Defendant Pelton said that Plaintiff was terminated

because she was pregnant and unable to lift.
8.

Plaintiff specifically discussed lifting with her

doctor and was able to lift all items she had been required to
lift during her employment with Creative Corner, Inc.
9.

Plaintiff was terminated because she was pregnant.

10.

At the time Plaintiff was terminated Defendants

employed fewer than 15 employees.
CAUSE OF ACTION
WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
11.

The Plaintiff's employment was terminated by the

Defendants because of her sex, i.e., because she was pregnant.
12.

The actions of Defendants in terminating Plaintiff

constituted wrongful termination in violation of public policy in
that Plaintiff was terminated because of her sex and that there
is a strong public policy against taking employment actions
towards employees because of their sex found in both the statutes

of the State of Utah and of the United States and violation of
the that public policy gives rise to a claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
13.

That public policy is set forth, among other places, in

both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act.
14.

As a result of the actions of Defendants in wrongfully

terminating the Plaintiff in violation of public policy
Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for all damages arising
therefrom including the Plaintiff's lost wages, consequential
damages arising therefrom, and for the Plaintiff's emotional
distress and pain and suffering, punitive damages and attorneys
fees in such amounts as may be shown by proof at the time of
trial.
15.

Among the consequential damages suffered by the

Plaintiff which the Defendants should have reasonably foreseen
are the attorneys fees incurred by the Plaintiff and the value of
the time expended by counsel for the Plaintiff on the Plaintiff's
behalf.
16.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful termination of

the Plaintiff Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for her
attorney's fees incurred herein and that a reasonable amount for
attorneys fees is $25,000.00 or such greater amount as may be

shown by proof at the time of trial.
17.

The wrongful termination of Plaintiff by Defendants is

a tort and accordingly Defendant Pelton is personally liable for
the damages suffered by Plaintiff.
Wherefore Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants as
follows:
1.

For the Plaintiff's unpaid wages;

2.

For compensatory damages resulting from the loss of

Plaintiff's employment in an amount to be shown by proof at the
time of trial;
3.

For general damages in an amount to be shown by proof

at the time of trial;
4.

For Plaintiff's attorneys fees;

5.

For interest on the foregoing and for such other relief

as the court deems just and equitable.
DATED this

lQ

day of November 1999.

ROBERT H. WILDE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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E. PAUL WOOD (3537)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorney for Defendant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo-

ANGELA BYERS,
MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT AND FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES

Plaintiff,
v.

CREATIVE CORNER, INC., and
LYN PELTON,
Defendant.

Case No. 990911231
Judge Tyrone Medley

-ooOoo-

Defendants, Creative Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton, by and through their
undersigned attorney of record, E. Paul Wood, hereby move this Court pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Complaint based upon Plaintiff
having failed to state a claim against the Defendants upon which relief may be granted.
This Motion is based upon the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the pleadings on
file herein.

DATED this _0_ day of December, 1999.

LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

L iuJ((kanJ(

E. Paul Wood
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this ^
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION '

\d\ of December, 1999, I caused a true and
IMIIKUMI'I

\IMI \ NI» M 11>'

ATTORNEYS FEES, to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Robert H. Wilde
Blake A. Nakamura
Attorneys for Plaintiff
935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047

wll\creative.pld
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E. PAUL WOOD (3537)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorney for Defendant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
v n r<np Q A T T T A,KE C O U N T V STATE ^ T™
-ooOooANGELA BYERS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS COMPLAINT

v.
CREATIVE CORNER, INC.,
LYN PELTON,

Case No. 990911231
Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendant.

-ooOoo-

Defendants, Creative Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton, siihiml Ihis Menu
Points and Authorities in support of their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. This
Memorandum shall show the honorable Coun thai the cause o
Complaint is preempted by the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act ( " U A D A J ^ u h Code Ann.
Sections 34A-* 101 -

1

08) (as amended, 1997).
iM'kODLCHON

Plaintiff Angela Byers sues her former employer, Creative Corner, Inc , a Utah
Corporation and its President Lyn Pelton, claiming one cause of action, i.c "winiigful
termination in violation of public policy". (Complaint, para. 12) However, the Utah

Legislature has propounded comprehensive legislation under the UADA which preempts a
common law claim for wrongful termination based upon public policy.
For purposes of this Motion, this Memorandum shall assume that Plaintiffs
allegation in the Complaint are true. The pertinent allegations verbatim from the Complaint
are:
2.

Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah Corporation in good standing doing

business in Salt Lake County.
3.

Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., and

the person who made all relevant decisions and took all relevant actions alleged
herein.
6.

The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day of October, 1999.

9.

Plaintiff was terminated because she was pregnant.

10.

At the time Plaintiff was terminated Defendants employed fewer than 15

employees.
11.

The Plaintiffs employment was terminated by the Defendants because of her

sex, i.e., because she was pregnant.
12.

The action of Defendants in terminating Plaintiff constituted wrongful

termination in violation of public policy in that Plaintiff was terminated because of her
sex and that there is a strong public policy against taking employment action towards
employees because of their sex found in both the statutes of the state of Utah and the
2

United States and violation of that policy gives rise to a claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy
LEGAL ..ANALYSIS
I.
PLAINTIFFS

COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON

1 1ICH RELIEF MAY

BE GRANTED A G A I N S T D E F E N D , ^ I ;,.
Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendants upon which relief
iii.n hi f i j a i i k ' d in ili.iiiii ilit; s o l e i Liiin 101 n / l i n is [tin/iiifii'Ofl lin, ink 1 I , " \ I I A .

A.

Utah Law on Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). When

considering a Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to take

drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Prows v. State 822 P. 2d
76 1 (I Jta h 1 991); VV hippie v. American Fork Irrigation Company '
1996). The Court shall dismiss a claim only in the event that the Plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of her claim. Colman v. Utah State Land Board 795 P. 2d 622 (Utah
1 990); ft right v. V ernal IJniv ei sity of Utah, 8 ; - 5 I "' 380 (I !l : h C I - * { >p 199 = I ]
B.

The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. The Utah Legislature enacted the

I Jtah < \ iiti Discrimination / i ct in 1969

1 1 le pui pose of the let vv as to eliminate

discrimination in the payment of wages based solely on the basis of sex, where men and
women are doing the same or similar work under all of the same conditions. Kopp v. Salt
3

Lake City. 29 Utah 2d 170, 506 P. 2d 809 (Utah 1973). The UADA creates a statutory
cause of action against an employer for discrimination based upon protected categories which
is enforceable by the State of Utah through the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor.
Section 35A-5-107.
Section 34A-5-102, the definitional section of the Act defines "Employer" as follows:
(8)(a)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

"Employer" means:
The state;
Any political subdivision;
A board, commission, department, institution, school district, trust, or
agent of the state or its political subdivisions; or
A person employing 15 of more employees within the state for each
working day in each of the 20 calendar weeks or more in the current or
proceeding calendar year.

A person or entity which does not meet the threshold definitions of "employer" is not
subject to the UADA.
Section 34A-5-106, defines a set of "Discriminatory or unfair employment practices",
which in penitent part states:
(1)
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice to take any action
described in subsections (1) (a) through (f).
a(i). An employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge, demote or terminate
any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of compensation
or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any person otherwise
qualified, because of:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

Race;
Color;
Sex;
Pregnancy, child birth, pregnancy related conditions;

4

Section 34A-5-107 provides the procedure for "an aggrieved person to file 013™"
which requires that the aggrieved person file with the I Jtah < Viiti Discriminatory Commission
a i ecp lest for agencj T ** %i h vn within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice, rhereafter, the commission shall investigate the claim and make
appropriate attempts i

:\k i\v i laiui .unl in llie LM ml sddnnnH u unsuu fv lul m

adjudication of the claim shall occur.
The exclusive remedy section of U<\DA hectic-: 54 A

r-t/i I i) states:

The procedures contained in mis Secuor: diL me exclusive remedy under state law for
employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, child
birth, or pregnancy related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or disability.

^-"

L
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vii2Ai^.-j-...Jtii.'-; ¥ IVJV- - ijii^ ^-»-^^>i»^ i'viiiv,j) iv-. wUiniib I \ I S J C Lipvu. a j . ' otected

classification. The identical issue which is now before this Court, i e , uhetln- the UADA
preempts a common law claim based upon termination of an emplo> ee i esulting in <: n alle g id
violation of a substantial public policy of the State of Utah has been decided in the
affirmative by the I Jtah Supreme Court in Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the

Debrah S. Retherford sued her former employer, AT&T, for wrongful discharge claiming

policy announced in the Liah Anti-Discrimination Act. (Utah Code Ann §§ 34-35 1 to
8,)(1988 as amended, 1 ° ° ° x

The trial Court granted Al.v : - Motion for Summary

5

Judgment under the theory that the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act preempted Retherford's
common law causes of action, including the claim for violation of public policy; the Plaintiff
appealed. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial Court's granting Summary Judgment.
Since the version of the UADA in effect at that time did not specifically include a
prohibition against retaliation for sexual harassment, the Utah Supreme Court was first
required to determine, as a matter of statutory construction, whether retaliation for
complaints of sexual harassment were included in the UADA. Justice Zimmerman stated:
Our analysis of this questions breaks down into two subsidiary issues. First, does the
UADA preempt common law causes of action for retaliation against an employee for
complaints of sexual harassment? Second, if the UADA does have this preemptive
effect, do the causes of action Retherford alleges fall within the UADA's preemptive
scope? Retherford at 956.
Justice Zimmerman initially recited the statutory section of the UADA indicating that
"the exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination because of race, color,
sex, age, religion, national origin, or handicap" is the UADA. The Court then held:
Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, we find that the version of the UADA
in effect at the time of Retherford's firing was the exclusive remedy for the employer
retaliation against an employee who complained of sexual harassment. We hold that
the UADA preempts common law causes of action for discharge in retaliation for
complaints of employment discrimination, (citations omitted) Retherford at 956.
The next issue addressed by the Retherford Court was deciding which common law
causes of action are within the UADA's preemptive effect. The initial issue was to decide
upon an analytical model to determine when an exclusive statutory cause of action preempts a
common law claim, based on the same facts. The Utah Supreme Court decided upon the
6

"indispensable element" test as an analytical model "for determining when a legislative
enactments appno. un elusive icmcJy for a certain wrong. "Retherford ai •• i."
The Court then held that the I IAD.A preempted Retherford's claim for violation of
public policy stating:
We begin with Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy. In order
to prove this tort, Retherford must show that AT&T discharged her in a manner or for
a reason that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy" of the state of Utah, a
public policy rooted in I Jtah's Constitution or statute, (citation omitted) The only
possible source in Utah's statutes or constitution for a clear and substantial public
policy allegedly violated by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition of
retaliation based on good faith complaints of employment discrimination, (citing Utah
Code Ann. Section 34-35-2(15) of the UADA) Without deciding that the statute at
issue rises to the level of a clear and substantial public policy, we fmd that in the
absence of this public policy declaration, Retherford would be unable even to allege an
action for this tort. Simply put, if there were no UADA policy against retaliation,
there could be no tort for discharge in violation of this public policy. Applying the
Mounteer test (the "indispensable element" test) it is plain that the harm the UADA
addresses is an indispensable element in Retherford's tort cause of action; therefor,
the UADA must preempt this claim. Retherford at 965-66.
The Mffth .Siipiniif Coin) upheld Ihr finl unii'l'1, f'jafiliiij.' nf the employer's Motion
for Summary Judgment holding that the breach of public policy claim based upon the
,.

language of the I h VI) \ is pi eempted arid the excli isi\ e remed> is foi ind \ * itl lin the

statutory framework of the UADA.
No Utah case has overruled Retherford.
D.

Byeiv> ua:ii un ;,. ^L_.\_i2.i_i>i*i--^ili-iLL^i---. preempted by the UADA.

The Plaintiff Byers sole cause of action \h based uncr .t protected category contained
ii 1 the "I JAD A I he Coi i lplaint in pertinent pai t states:
7

11. The Plaintiffs employment was terminated by the Defendants because of her sex,
i.e., because she was pregnant.
12. The action of the Defendants in terminating Plaintiff constituted wrongful
termination in violation of public policy in that Plaintiff was terminated because of her
sex and that there is a strong public policy against taking employment action towards
employees because of their sex found in both the statutes of the state of Utah and the
United States and violation of that policy gives rise to a claim for wrongful
termination in violation of this public policy.
Section 34A-5-106(1) UADA specifically prohibits discriminatory employment
practices, including demoting or terminating any person, based upon race, color, sex,
pregnancy, etc. (emphasis added) In the Complaint, Angela Byers' reference to Utah law in
support of the public policy claim is the UADA.
The holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Retherford clearly and squarely applies to
Angela Byers' claim of breach of substantial public policy based upon discrimination in
employment: "Without deciding that the statute at issue rises to the level of a clear and
substantial public policy, we find that in the absence of this public policy declaration,
Retherford would be unable even to allege an action for this tort. Simply put, if there were
no UADA policy against retaliation, there would be no tort for discharge and violation of
this public policy. Applying the Mounteer test, it is plain that the harm the UADA addresses
is an indispensable element in Retherford's tort cause of action; therefore, the UADA must
preempt this claim. Retherford at 965-66.

8

The plain term of the UAL*A dictate tlvM a claim based upon "pregnancy" 01 "sex"
must be brought under the UADA. ^rhu.n ••• •»« "exclusive state remedy lor the claim,
I Iowe\ e t „ a ji irisdictional i eqii lirement c f the I J \ D A is that an employer have "15 employees
for 20 weeks during the preceding calendar year." As admitted by Plaintiff, Creative
Corner, Inc., does not
conclude that no claim exists under the UADA against Defendants.
Plaintiff cannot circumvent the exclusive remedy provision of the I J A DJ \ by claiming
hrvacli ' I i-fil I. p»ili«'\

i L I' J "' , ir.ilt • ihr fiibli. polii \ upon which the claim is based.

Plaintiff simply has no claim against the Defendants.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs sole cause of action for violation of public policy as a result of wrongful
termination based u p o n pregnancy or sex is preempted b y the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act.

Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, which is the "exclusive remedy". However, even in the event
a claim were attempted undei the Utah Anli 1 JJSCIiiiim;iin»n AM ilitu1 is mi IVHIIM

I JIIHHIU

since the Defendants do not qualify as a "employer" under the
terms of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act

The Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the

Defendants upon ( \ hich i elief n ia;; 1: e granted.
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DATED this J_ day of December, 1999.

LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

aJ/iloaJ/
EJ Paul Wood
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS COMPLAINT AND FOR ATTORNEYS FEES, to be mailed, first class, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Robert H. Wilde
Blake A. Nakamura
Attorneys for Plaintiff
935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
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DISPOSITION: Consequently, we affirm the summary
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This case is before i^ f*i, appeal from a gia
summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs comp*
Debra S. Retherford sued her former employer .* Communications, under several theories for harms arising from alleged sexual harassment by her co-employees.
Specifically, she alleged that AT&T fired her in retaliation for complaining of being sexually harassed by her
AT&T co-workers. She argued that such a discharge
violated Utah public policy barring reprisals for reports
of sexual harassment. She also contended that the discharge breached a term of her implied contract with
AT&T, which prohibited reprisal for reports of sexual
harassment and was entirely separate from the agreement between her union's collective bargaining unit and
AT&T. Retherford [**2] further asserted that AT&T was
liable for negligently employing her harassers. Finally,
Retherford sued former co-workers Cathy Bateson (aka

Cathy Bateson-Hough), Louise Johnson, and Vickie
Randall, claiming that their retaliatory conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious interference with her contractual relations with
AT&T.
Defendants moved to dismiss uu - ip;: .., J^I; g,
inter alia, that workers covered b\ ;a:t >ment contracts that prohibit discharge other than for just cause
should not be able to maintain a tort action for discharge in violation of public policy; that the Utah AntiDiscriminatory Act ("UADA") preempted Retherford's
common law causes of action, see Utah Code Ann. §§
34-35-1 to -8 (1988) (amended 1989, 1990 & 1991);
that federal labor law preempted Retherford fs common
law causes of action, see 29 U.S.C. /55(a); and that
Retherford had failed to state tort claims against her former co-workers or to bring those claims within the period fixed, by the relevant statute of limitations.
The district judge considered affidavits in support of
and in opposition to the motion to dismiss [**3] and
granted defendants summary judgment on all claims.
Retherford appeals.
To summarize our ruling today, we hold as follows: first, that both employees covered by employment contracts that limit the bases for discharge and
employees who are at-will can maintain a tort action
for [*954] discharge in violation of Utah public policy; second, that the UADA provides the exclusive remedy for Retherford'S claim for discharge in violation of
public policy but does not bar her other causes of action; third, that federal labor law preempts Retherford's
claims for breach of implied contract and malicious interference with contractual relations and partially preempts Retherford's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and fourth, that Retherford brought
her claims for emotional distress and negligent employment in a timely manner and has stated a cause of action
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r intentional infliction of emotional distress against
;r former co-workers. We therefore reverse the order
anting summary judgment and remand this case for
rther proceedings on Retherford's claim of negligent
nployment and the nonpreempted portion of her claim
r intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In [**4] reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
ew the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn there3m in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
ruth v. Bachelor, 832 P2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992);
Mns v. Petersen, 813 R2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991);
tah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power
Light Co., 776 R2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We state
e facts of the instant case-which we draw primarily
3m Retherford's affidavit submitted in opposition to
T&T's motion to dismiss-accordingly. See Sandy City
Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215 (Utah 1992).
In 1976, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Dmpany hired Retherford to work as a telephone operar in Grand Junction, Colorado. In 1983, due to the namwide restructuring of AT&T and its subsidiary commies, Retherford was transferred to AT&T's Wasatch
fice, located in Salt Lake City, where she continued
3rking as a telephone operator.
Retherford alleges that two separate agreements govned her employment with AT&T. As an AT&T emoyee, Retherford was covered by a collective [**5]
irgaining agreement between AT&T and her union,
e Communications Workers of America ("CWA").
dependent of the collective bargaining agreement,
T&T also had promulgated a code of conduct that
itlined employees' rights and responsibilities and was
ecifically brought to the attention of and acknowledged
writing by all employees. Retherford argues that the
>de of conduct created an implied employment contract
itween AT&T and its employees.
Both the collective bargaining agreement and the code
' conduct prohibited sexual harassment and outlined
ocedures for aggrieved employees to press any comaints. The collective bargaining agreement stated,
Neither the Company nor the Union shall unlawfully
scriminate against any employee because of such emoyee's race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin
' because he or she is handicapped, a disabled veteran
• a veteran of the Vietnam era." The collective bardning agreement required resort to arbitration to revive "grievances arising out of or resulting from the
>plication or interpretation of the provisions of this
greement" and "grievances arising out of or resulting
om the dismissal, suspension, or demotion [**6] of a
gular employee. . . ."

The code of conduct's provision on sexual harassment
was more detailed than that in the collective bargaining
agreement. The code of conduct read in relevant part:
Any sexually harassing conduct in the workplace,
whether physical or verbal, committed by any employee
is also prohibited. This includes: repeated offensive
sexual flirtations, advances, propositions; continued or
repeated verbal abuse of a sexual nature; graphic verbal
commentaries about an individual's body; sexually degrading words used to describe an individual; and the
display in the workplace of sexually suggestive objects,
pictures or posters.
Employees who have complaints of sexual harassment
should report such conduct to their supervisors. If this
is not appropriate, employees are urged to seek the assistance of their EEO coordinator. Where the investigation
confirms [*955] the allegations, prompt corrective action should be taken.

Any reprisal against an employee because the employee, in good faith, reported a violation or suspected
violation is strictly forbidden.
Soon after Retherford transferred to Salt Lake City,
manager Fayonne Johaiineson required Retherford meet
with [**7] her to discuss the provisions of the conduct
code and to sign a statement saying that she had read and
understood them. This procedure was repeated every
year during Retherford's tenure at the Wasatch office.
In an affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants'
motion to dismiss, Retherford termed this annual procedure "a condition of her continued employment" with
AT&T.
Among Retherford's co-workers at the Wasatch office
were Cathy Bateson-Hough, an AT&T manager, Louise
Johnson, a supervisor, Vickie Randall, a fellow employee and union steward, and Jolene Gailey, nl a fellow
telephone operator. Upon her arrival in Salt Lake City,
she noticed the sexually uninhibited atmosphere of the
Wasatch office. In her affidavit, Retherford testified that
during her first day at work, Bateson-Hough showed her
an obscene Valentine's Day card. Soon Retherford became aware that obscene jokes and foul language were
commonplace among her co-workers.
nl Retherford originally named Gailey as a defendant in this suit, but dismissed her when Gailey
declared bankruptcy.
[**8]
After approximately six months, Retherford switched
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to the night shift. At this time, she encountered a more
sexually suggestive work environment, one she found
threatening. As before, she noted that sex was a common topic of discussion. For example, in her affidavit
she described Johnson's loud accounts of an alleged sexual relationship with another AT&T employee.
For the first time, however, Retherford found herself a target of the sexually suggestive commentary.
Specifically, she alleges that Jolene Gailey subjected her
to unwelcome sexual advances. Retherford's affidavit
describes these advances as follows:
Retherford complains that Gailey touched her, made
numerous comments regarding her appearance, and regularly suggested that Retherford join her "in various activities. Gailey's friends, including defendant Johnson,
also began to congregate around Retherford, conversing frequently and explicitly about subjects of a sexual nature. As time passed, Gailey became more aggressive. When "visibly intoxicated," Gailey sat next
to Retherford, touched her affectionately on the arm,
and said, "I'm going to save you from Dave Todd,"
a male AT&T employee with whom Retherford had
[**9] been sitting at meals. Gailey subsequently asked
Retherford to pose nude while Gailey painted or sculpted
her likeness, told Retherford that she was looking for a
roommate, and informed Retherford that she hated men
and even the sound of men's voices on the telephone.
Retherford also believes that Gailey passed a note around
the office stating that Retherford was having an affair
with a male AT&T employee.
After approximately ten months of such treatment,
Gailey telephoned Retherford at home and asked her if
she intended to file an EEOC complaint about Gailey's
conduct. n2 Retherford testified in her affidavit that she
replied that she would file a complaint if Gailey continued to bother her. According to Retherford's affidavit,
Gailey responded, "I'm sorry if I offended you, but I
feel I shouldn't have to apologize for my sexuality."
n2 The EEOC, or Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, is a federal agency charged with administering complaints under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5QS).
[**10]
Retherford testified in her affidavit that after she informed Gailey that she was considering filing a complaint of sexual harassment, Gailey and other AT&T
employees began to retaliate by staring at her, making "threatening facial expressions" at her, walking extremely close to [*956] her, and following her around

the office. During March of 1984, Retherford twice
complained to her supervisor and manager of the retaliatory harassment from Gailey and other co-workers.
Two months later, she wrote manager Bateson-Hough a
letter complaining that Gailey continued to harass her
despite her requests that Gailey leave her alone. The
next day, May 10, 1984, Retherford submitted a written
complaint to AT&T's Equal Employment Opportunity
("EEO") coordinator.
About five days later, Richard Salazar, an AT&T employee and a CWA union steward, called Retherford
at home to discuss the complaint she had submitted.
Retherford testified that Salazar told her, "You're the
new kid on the block-you're not going to win this.
We don't know you very well, but we do know Jolene
[Galley], she is a respectable person in the community
and an artist." He added, "Somebody could get fired
over this." Darlene Anderson, [**11] a first-level manager of the Wasatch office, also cautioned Retherford,
saying, "Just be careful what you say and do; this is a
strong and big group that you are dealing with." Several
weeks after Retherford complained to the AT&T EEO
coordinator, she was attempting to cross the street at
1:15 a.m. when Gailey sped past her. When Retherford
reached her own car and drove away, Gailey followed
her for a few miles.
During June of 1984, Linda Johnston, an AT&T employee who Retherford says is a personal friend of
Bateson-Hough's, investigated Retherford's complaint.
Retherford said that Johnston's investigation consisted
solely of personal interviews with and submission of
written statements by Retherford and Gailey. About
one month later, Johnston submitted the EEO coordinator's report, which recommended that Retherford and
Gailey have as little contact with each other as possible.
Subsequently, Retherford received a telephone call from
Reta Pehrson, an AT&T supervisor and CWA vice president, who told her, "%u have to be satisfied with the
[EEO coordinator's] decision . . . . If anybody asks
you about it, don't tell them and don't say anything."
Pehrson added, "Cathy [Bateson-Hough] [**12] wanted
me to also tell you that if you would like a transfer, she
will transfer you to the Sundance Office."
Retherford stated in her affidavit that the harassment in
the Wasatch office did not abate following the issuance of
the EEO coordinator's report and recommendations. At
one point, Retherford overheard an AT&T employee say
to a group of co-workers, including defendant Johnson,
"Debi [Retherford] would make a good stripper-she has
big boobs." Looking directly at Retherford, Johnson
replied, "My bra size is 34B." Retherford said that
Gailey and other co-workers continued to stare at her,
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/alk close to her, follow her, and make faces at her.
the also said that on at least one occasion, Gailey and
ohnson accused Retherford of staring at them.
In late August of 1984, Retherford filed a charge letter
/ith the EEOC, alleging that some of her co-workers had
exually harassed her for a year and that AT&T had done
othing to remedy the situation. Several months later,
Lifted Aros, an EEOC investigator, called Retherford
t home to tell her that of the four witnesses he had insrviewed while investigating her complaint, three had
)ld him there was a "lesbian problem" at the Wasatch
**13] office. He said he intended to issue a warning
3 AT&T management about this situation. Around the
ame time, the AT&T EEO coordinator surveyed the
workers in the Wasatch office about sexual harassment
nd eventually issued a report concluding that employees
t the Wasatch office engaged in a great deal of sexually
riented discussion, including many obscene jokes. This
sport failed to curb the sexual atmosphere in the Wasatch
ffice. Indeed, Retherford testified in her affidavit that
fter its issuance, the obscene jokes and explicit sexual
onversations increased in frequency and offensiveness.
In late December of 1984, Retherford again delivred a written complaint to Bateson-Hough. Retherford
ays that Bateson-Hough summoned her and told her
lat the AT&T EEO coordinator had is sued a letter
tiastising both Retherford and Gailey for their contined quarreling. [*957] She refused to show Retherford
le letter. Bateson-Hough also informed Retherford that
etherford was on warning of dismissal and told her that
T&T would fire her if she continued to complain about
railey.
Retherford testified in her affidavit that the abuse by
er co-workers continued, exacerbated by the percepon [**14] that she was an informant. In Retherford's
resence, Johnson and others made various comments
imenting the fact that someone was watching them
ad would report them if they broke company rules,
bllowing one such comment, Johnson looked at
etherford and said, "Isn't that right, Debi?" Retherford
Iso said that Bateson-Hough made no effort to protect
er from this retaliation. In fact, she said, Bateson[ough rearranged the seating in the Wasatch office,
lacing Retherford next to some of her harassers and
ssigning her to "slow" work stations, which hampered
er productivity.
To cope with the stress of her work place, Retherford
egan visiting a psychiatrist and a physician in the sumler of 1985. In September of 1985, Retherford says,
ie took medical disability leave to recover from the
tress and anxiety caused by the harassment. Following
er psychiatrist's instructions that she must not work in

proximity to "the people who started the panic in her,"
she never returned to the Wasatch office.
Retherford testified in her affidavit that on or about
March 12, 1986, Douglas Erickson, group manager of
the Wasatch office, and Vickie Randall, an AT&T employee and union steward, [**15] called Retherford to
tell her that because she was medically incapable of returning to the Wasatch office, AT&T was transferring
her to its office in Ekrise, Idaho. Erickson ordered
her to report to her new assignment within ten days.
When Retherford protested that her family obligations
and medical treatment in Salt Lake City prevented her
from moving to Boise on such short notice, Randall responded, "What do you expect us to do, build you a
new building?" Erickson then advised Retherford that if
she failed to report to the Boise office within ten days,
AT&T would fire her.
Retherford did not report to Boise by the deadline, and
AT&T fired her on March 26, 1986. She filed a written
grievance with the CWA, Local 7704, on April 9th. On
September 29th, the vice president of Local 7704 told
Retherford that due to an oversight on the part of the
CWA, the union had not submitted her grievance for arbitration and that the time for processing her grievance,
as established by the bargaining agreement, had expired.
On July 21, 1988, two years and four months after
she was fired, Retherford filed suit in United States
District Court for the District of Utah, alleging federal
claims under [**16] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3, and section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S. C. § 185,
and pendent state UADA and common law claims. On
March 21, 1989, the court dismissed the federal claims
with prejudice as being untimely and dismissed the state
claims without prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdiction. Retherford v. AT&T, No. C-88-648W, slip op.
(D. Utah Mar. 16, 1989) (unpublished).
On April 7, 1989, Retherford filed suit in the Third
Judicial District Court, alleging the following: first,
that AT&T fired her in violation of Utah public policy, which bars reprisals for reporting sexual harassment; second, that AT&T's discharging her in retaliation
for complaining of sexual harassment violated a term of
an employment contract implied from AT&T's code of
conduct; third, that AT&T was liable for negligently
employing Retherford's sexual harassers; fourth, that
Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Retherford; and fifth, that
Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall maliciously interfered with Retherford's contractual [**17] relations.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing first, that Utah

rage /
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does not recognize a common law cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy; second, that even
if Utah did recognize such a cause of action, federal and
state anti-discrimination [*958] laws would preempt any
such claim; third, that as a matter of federal labor law,
the AT&T-CWA collective bargaining agreement barred
Retherford's state claims; fourth, that Retherford had
failed to timely assert her state law claims for negligent employment, breach of implied contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and fifth, that
Retherford had failed to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the conduct she
alleged did not "offend against the generally accepted
standards of indecency and immorality," as required by
Utah case law. n3
n3 AT&T also argued that Bateson-Hough could
not be liable for interference with contractual relations between Retherford and AT&T because she was
an agent of one of the contracting parties and that
Retherford's pleadings failed to state a claim that
Johnson and Randall had interfered with contractual
relations. Because of the result we reach in this case,
we have no cause to address these issues.
[**18]

Relying on affidavits in reaching its decision, the trial
court treated defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion
for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c),
56(c). The court entered judgment in favor of AT&T,
Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall, offering the following explanation for the ruling:
The Court having found that there are no genuine issues
of material fact; and the Court having further determined
that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law . . . [ , ] Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which
is being treated as a motion for summary judgment, is
hereby granted. n4
Retherford appeals.
n4 Such a blanket statement provides us with no
guidance as to the trial court's reasoning. It therefore
does not comply with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which requires trial judges to issue
brief written statements of their grounds for granting
summary judgment when multiple grounds are presented. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Although failure to issue a statement of grounds is not reversible
error absent unusual circumstances, we take this opportunity to remind trial judges that the presumption

of correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings
"has little operative effect when members of this
court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic nature of its ruling." Allen v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 190 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8, (June 22, 1992).
[**19]
Before addressing the merits, we note the applicable
standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Sandy City, 827P.2dat 217-18;
Rollins, 813 P2dat 1159; Landes v. Capital City Bank,
795 P2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). Because a summary
judgment resolves only questions of law, we give no
deference to the trial court's determinations. We affirm
only if the decision before us was correct. Sandy City,
827P2dat 218; Rollins, 813 P.2dat 1159; Landes, 795
P.2datll29.
The present appeal requires that we examine the interplay between statutory causes of action and common
law tort and contract causes of action for discharge in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. We first
address the common law. In the last decade, state courts
have shown a growing willingness to increase employer
exposure to suit for claims relating to the discharge of
employees, [**20] a trend that has taken a number of different forms. James N. Dertouzos & Lynn A. Karoly,
Labor-Market Responses to Employer Liability viii (The
RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1992). In Utah, this
court has joined the national trend by converting into
a rebuttable presumption the common law rule that absent an express agreement, employment was at-will, see
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 R2d 1033, 1044
(Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id.
at 1051-52 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result),
by recognizing implied employment contracts, see id.
at 1044-46, 1049 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.);
id. at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), and by adopting the tort of discharge in violation of public policy, see Peterson v. Browning, 832
P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992) (Durham, J., joined by
Stewart, J.); id. at 1285 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring).
See generally Janet Hugie Smith & Lisa A. Yerkovich,
Utah Employment Law Since Berube, Utah Bar J., Oct.
1992, [**21] at 15.
[*959] In making these changes to Utah's common
law, we did not address the extent to which the availability of preexisting statutory and contractual remedies
for employers' malfeasance against employees would
affect the availability of these new common law con-
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act and tort causes of action. Retherford puts this
nestion squarely before us. She asserts only comlon law tort and contract claims, apparently because
le statute of limitations has run on any claims for relief
le might have had under federal and state antidiscrimiation statutes, see 42 US.C. § 2000e-5(€)\ Utah Code
iin. § 34-35-7.1; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Green, 411 US. 792, 798, 36L.Ed.2d668, 93 S.Ct.
SI 7 (1973), and federal labor law, see DelCostello v.
iternational Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72,
6L.Ed.2d476, 103 S.Ct. 2281 (1983).
Her appeal presents the following novel questions:
irst, when an employee has a contractual right to be
red only for just cause and therefore has a breach of
3ntract claim if he or she can demonstrate discharge on
>me other ground, such as retaliation for exercising a
gal right, should we allow a common [**22] law tort
:tion for discharge in violation of public policy that is
ased on the same facts that underlie the claim for breach
f contract? Second, does the Utah Anti-Discriminatory
.ct's exclusive remedy provision preempt common law
luses of action based on the same facts necessary to
rove a cause of action under the statute, including comlon law causes of action for discharge in violation of
ublic policy, breach of implied contract, negligent emloyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
r malicious interference with contract? Third, does
xieral labor law preempt these same claims? Fourth,
" neither state nor federal statute preempts her claims
gainst her co-workers, is Retherford's assertion of these
[aims timely? Fifth, if neither state nor federal statute
reempts Retherford's claim for intentional infliction of
motional distress, is the conduct Retherford alleges sufciently severe to satisfy the standard we have set for
lis tort? We will discuss each issue in turn.
We begin with defendants' contention that we should
ot allow an employee with an employment contract
lat protects him or her from discharge without just
ause~a contract that would prohibit [**23] discharge
l violation of public policy-to maintain a common law
)rt action for discharge in violation of public policy.
)efendants argue that because the facts Retherford alsges constitute a cause of action for breach of her colxrtive bargaining agreement's just-cause provision, she
> precluded from seeking tort damages for the same
onduct.
The AT&T-CWA collective bargaining agreement proides the premise for defendants' argument. It requires
rbitration for "grievances arising out of or resulting
rom the dismissal . . . of a regular employee," and
t states that a dismissal "shall stand unless it is estabished that the dismissal. . . was effected without just

cause." (Emphasis added.) Defendants contend that the
concept of "just cause" should exclude all reasons for
discharge that are inconsistent with public policy. They
argue that because the contractual provision protecting
an employee from all but a just-cause dismissal protects
the same interests as a tort cause of action for discharge
in violation of public policy, no purpose is served by
permitting a discharged employee to proceed on the tort
claim when he or she has a contractual cause of action.
Defendants [**24] contend that the contractual provision adequately vindicates the public policy underlying
the tort claim.
We disagree. Our recent decision in Peterson, which
adopted a tort action for discharges in violation of public
policy and was decided after the briefing and argument
of the present case, requires rejection of defendants' argument. As adopted in Peterson, the tort of discharge
in violation of public policy differs in both scope and
sanction from any contractual provision that might limit
an employer's power to discharge an employee for other
than just cause. See PMerson 832 R 2d at 1282-83, 1285
(Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 1285-86
(Howe, A.C.J., concurring). Both respect for precedent
and sound public [*960] policy compel the conclusion
that the tort of discharge in violation of public policy
should be available to all employees, regardless of their
contractual status.
Our reasoning is as follows: First, the logic of
Peterson and of the earlier Berube decision indicates
that the cause of action for discharge in violation of
public policy limits the power of all employers to discharge [**25] employees, without regard to whether
the employee is at-will or protected by an express or
implied employment contract. See id. at 1287 n.2
(Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by
Hall, C.J.); Berube, 771 R2datl043 n.10 (Utah 1989)
(opinion of Durham, I , joined by Stewart, J.); id. at
1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). A primary purpose behind giving employees a right to sue
for discharges in violation of public policy is to protect
the vital state interests embodied in such policies. We
cannot fulfill such a purpose if we hinge this cause of
action on employees' contractual status and thus limit its
availability to any one class of employees. See Peterson,
832 R2d at 1287n.2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and
dissenting); see also Petermann v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Wirehousemen & Helpers of
Am., Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25,
27(Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
Second, not every discharge in violation of a contractual just-cause provision rises to the level of a violation of public policy. [**26] As Justice Durham
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pointed out in Peterson, only those public policies that
are "clear" and "substantial" and arise from statutes or
constitutions qualify for vindication through the tort of
discharge in violation of public policy. 832 P.2d at
1282. Consequently, the overlap of a contractual justcause cause of action and a public policy tort cause of
action is not as great as defendants would have us believe.
Finally, the vindication of public policy worked by
the tort cause of action cannot be accomplished by a
contractual provision that prohibits discharges for any
but just cause. Even when a contract prohibits conduct
that also would violate public policy, the remedies for
breach of that contract would satisfy only the private interests of the parties to the agreement, i.e., by restoring
a wrongfully discharged employee to his or her position and making him or her whole. There is no reason
to expect that these remedies would be as draconian as
those that might be available under the tort cause of action, remedies that are designed not only to remedy the
breach and make the employee whole, but to deter and
punish violations of vital state interests. [**27] While
any employer violating a contractual just-cause standard
of dismissal should be liable for breaking its promise
to its employee, Peterson dictates that an employer who
violates clear and substantial public policies should be
liable for the more expansive penalties of tort, a potentially harsher liability commensurate with the greater
wrong against society. When an employer's act violates
both its own contractual just-cause standard and a clear
and substantial public policy, we see no reason to dilute
the force of the double sanction. In such an instance,
the employer is liable for two breaches, one in contract
and one in tort. It therefore must bear the consequences
of both.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendants* argument. We hold that the tort of discharge in violation of
public policy is a limitation on all discharges, not merely
an exception to the at-will doctrine. See Peterson, 832
P.2d at 1287n.2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Hall, C I ) ; Berube, 771 P2dat 1043
n.10 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id.
at 1051 (Zimmerman, [**28] J., concurring in the result); see also Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 III.
2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-84, 85 III. Dec. 475
(III. 1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 909, 88 L.Ed.2d
243, 106 S.Ct. 278 (1985); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312
Md. 45, 537A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. 1988); Lepore v.
National Tool & Mfg. Co., 224 N.J. Super. 463, 540
A.2d 1296, 1301 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988),
aff d, 115 N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 954, 107L.Ed.2d 353 , 110 S.Ct. 366
(1989); cf. Johnson v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 149

Cal. App. 3d 518, 196 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (Ct. App.
1983); [*961] K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39,
732 P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (Nev. 1987).
We next turn to the UADA to determine whether it preempts Retherford's common law claims for discharge in
violation of public policy, breach of implied contract,
malicious interference with contract, negligent employment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Retherford argues that the UADA has no preemptive effect because she hopes to avoid its provisions and pursue
her common law remedies.
Our analysis of this question breaks down [**29]
into two subsidiary issues. First, does the UADA
preempt common law causes of action for retaliation
against an employee for complaints of sexual harassment? Second, if the UADA does have this preemptive
effect, do the causes of action Retherford alleges fall
within the UADA's preemptive scope? We discuss these
questions in turn.
The starting place for a determination of the preemptive effect of the UADA is the statute itself. The legislature enacted the UADA in 1969 as part of a comprehensive state labor law scheme. See 1969 Utah Laws ch.
85, §§ 160-67. As passed, the statute neither prohibited
employer retaliation against employees complaining of
discrimination nor provided that the UADA supplied the
exclusive remedy for discriminatory or prohibited employment practices. In 1985, the legislature added both
a provision barring employer retaliation against employees opposing any employment practices prohibited by the
chapter, 1985 Utah Laws ch. 189, § 3, and a provision
making the UADA's remedies exclusive, id. § 4. The
1985 exclusivity provision read as follows:
The procedures contained in this section and Section 3435-8 are the exclusive remedy under state law [**30] for
employment discrimination because of race, color, sex,
age, religion, national origin, or handicap.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(11) (1988) (amended
1990 & 1991) (current version at § 34-37-7.1 (15)).
n5 The 1985 exclusivity provision, while listing specific grounds that had been theretofore prohibited, did
not mention expressly the newly added prohibited action: employer retaliation against employees who opposed prohibited employment practices. See 1985 Utah
Laws ch. 189, § 4. In 1990, the legislature added retaliation to the listed grounds covered by the exclusivity
provision. See 1990 Utah Laws ch. 63, § 2.
n5 The exclusivity provision now reads, "The
procedures contained in this section are the exclusive
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remedy under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions,
age, relation, national origin, or handicap." Utah
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Supp. 1992).
In arguing that the UADA is not the exclusive rem[y [**3i] for employer retaliation against employees
ho oppose prohibited discrimination, Retherford seizes
>on the fact that the exclusivity provision in effect in
>86, when she was fired, did not expressly mention
taliation. She claims that this omission excepts her
>mmon law claims from the UADA's exclusivity prosion. We disagree. We find that taken as a whole, the
ain text of the statute then in e feet preempts common
w causes of action for retaliation for complaints of
nployment discrimination. Furthermore, the circumances surrounding the 1990 amendment of the statute
)lster this construction. We discuss our construction
r
the statute below.
As Retherford correctly notes, the word "retaliation"
>es not appear in the exclusivity provision in effect at
e time she was fired. She also correctly notes that
here statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this
>urt will not look beyond it to divine legislative intent.
xSchurtzv. BMW of North Am., Inc., 814P.2dll08,
F72 (Utah 1991); Allisen v. American Legion Post No.
U, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). However, she
sglects to mention that we [**32] interpret a statute as
whole, not piecemeal. See Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112;
lover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045
hah 1991); Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d
?S, 841 (Utah 1990); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d
i5, 252 n.ll (Utah [*962] 1988); Peay v. Board of Ed.
r
Provo City School Dist., 14 Utah 2d 63, 66, 377R2d
W, 492 (1962). Consequently, we begin by examining
e statute as a whole.
Although the exclusivity provision itself specifies only
liscrimination," the statute as a whole defines retaliion as "discrimination," thereby implicitly including
Oaliation within the exclusivity provision. Section 345-6(l)(a)(i) defines retaliation as a "discriminatory or
rohibited" employment practice. Utah Code Ann. §
4-35-6(1 )(a)(i). One could argue that interpreting this
rovision as defining retaliation as discrimination would
ight the importance of the words "or prohibited" in
action 34-35-6(1 )(a)(i). However, this argument fails
t light of the fact that another section of the statute
'*33] defines "prohibited" employment practices as
athing more than those "specified as discriminatory,
id therefore unlawful, in Section 34-35-6." Id. § 345-2(7). Because sections 34-35-6(1 )(a)(i) and 34-35-

2(7) together define retaliation as nothing more than a
form of prohibited employment discrimination, retaliation must fall within the section 34-35-7.1(11) direction
that the UADA's procedures "are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination." Id. §
34-35-7.1(11) (1988) (amended 1990 & 1991) (current
version at § 34-35-7.1(15)). Therefore, as a matter of
statutory construction, we find that the version of the
UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's firing was the
exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an employee who complained of sexual harassment. We hold
that the UADA preempts common law causes of action
for discharge in retaliation for complaints of employment discrimination. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County,
735 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Utah 1990); cf. Vfolk v. Saks
Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1984);
Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514,
194 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (Ct. App. 1983). [**34]
As a final matter, we recognize that the legislature's
later amendment of the exclusivity provision to prohibit
retaliation explicitly might indicate that the earlier exclusivity provision had! not included retaliation within
its scope. However, Retherford has produced no evidence that the legislature intended this amendment to
change the substantive law rather than merely to clarify
it. Our own research into the history of this amendment
has been similarly unavailing. Absent some evidence to
the contrary, we conclude that taken as a whole, the version of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's
firing defined retaliation as discrimination and provided
the exclusive remedy for this type of discrimination. In
reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of our statutory mandate to construe liberally statutes in derogation
of the common law. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2.
Having determined that the UADA is the exclusive
remedy for a claim of employer retaliation for complaints
of employment discrimination, we turn to the question
of whether Retherford's tort and contract claims come
within the scope of the UADA's preemptive effect. This
question presents us with an apparently [**35] novel
question in Utah: What analytical model should determine when an exclusive statutory cause of action preempts a common law claim based on the same facts?
Although the Code provides that courts are to construe
liberally statutes that are in derogation of the common
law, see id. § 68-3-2, and although we have considered that statute when examining the scope of statutorily created causes of action or duties, see, e.g., Asay
v. mtkins, 751 P.2d 1135, 1136-37 (Utah 1988); AAA
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d
289, 290-91 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Niblock v. Salt
Lake County, 100 Utali 573, 581-82, 777 P.2d 800, 804
(1941), we have yet to propound a generic test for de-
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termining when a statutory cause of action functions as
the exclusive remedy for the wrong, thereby foreclosing
enforcement of either a preexisting common law remedy
or a common law remedy recognized after the enactment
of the statute.
Because we lack an analytical model to answer this
question, we have looked to law outside our jurisdiction. Our research has revealed a diversity of approaches. [**36] [*963] Courts have described at least
three separate tests for determining the preemptive effect of statutes on the common law. First, in examining
the very issue that confronts us now, the United States
District Court for the District of Utah decided that the
relevant inquiry was whether the common law cause of
action was "based upon the very conduct which is necessary to prove sexual harassment or sex discrimination
under the [UADA], namely, conduct expressly prohibited by the Act. . . ." Davis v. Utah Power & Light
Co:, No. 87-C-0659G, slip op. at 12 (D. Utah Nov.
23, 1988) (unpublished).
Second, in similar contexts, other courts have articulated a test grounded on what can be termed "antecedent
existence." These courts hold that the statutory action is
the exclusive remedy if the common law cause of action
did not exist before the statutory cause of action was created. See Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843 E2d
359, 365 (9th Cir. 1988); Froyd v. Cook, 681 E Supp.
669, 674 (E.D. CaL 1988); Guevara v. K-Uart Corp.,
629 E Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D. W \b. 1986); Mahoney
v. Crocker Nat'I Bank, 571 E Supp. 287, 293 (N.D.
Cal. 1983); [**37] Register v. Coleman, 130 Ariz. 9,
633 P. 2d 418, 423 (Ariz. 1981); \hlley Drive-In Theatre
Corp. v. Superior Court, 79 Ariz. 396, 291 P.2d213,
215 (Ariz. 1955); cf. Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels
Corp., 634E Supp. 684, 688 (D. Haw. 1986).
Finally, in determining the preemptive scope of workers' compensation statutes, courts have established a
test that inquires whether the statutory scheme supplies
an indispensable element of the tort claim. See Foley
v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711,
716 (Mass. 1980); Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs
Football Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978). We have adopted this test in determining
whether the Utah workers' compensation statute supplants common law causes of action for injuries on the
job. See Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823
P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991).
Because we see no reason why the indispensable element test should not apply to the area before us as well as
to workers' compensation n6 and because the other two
approaches appear to be cumbersome and indeterminate,
[**38] we hold that the indispensable element test is the

correct analytical model for determining whether a statutory cause of action forecloses a common law remedy.
To explain this choice, we briefly outline our objections
to the other two models courts have followed in this
area.
n6 In fact, we have employed a similar analysis in
the area of governmental immunities. See Gillman
v. Department of Fin. Insts., 782 P.2d 506, 511-12
(Utah 1989).
We begin with the federal district court's test in Davis,
under which the UADA would preempt only "those common law causes of action which are based upon the very
conduct which is necessary to prove [a claim under the
act]." Slip op. at 12. We think that this test is simply too
ambiguous. First, the Davis court itself seems uncertain
as to precisely how the test should be applied. In considering whether the UADA preempted several different
claims, the court articulated the standard in varying and
not wholly consistent ways. At one point, [**39] the
court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress
"because the theoretical basis [sic] for the two claims are
separate and distinct," id. at 21, while at another, the
court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for
negligent supervision because it "may encompass more
than acts defined to be 'discriminatory or prohibited employment practices' under the Utah Act," id. at 22.
Second, we are unconvinced that inquiring whether a
common law cause of action is broader than a statutory cause of action will result in defensible distinctions
between those causes of action that are preempted and
those that are not. n7 Consequently, [*964] we decline
to adopt the Davis test as the standard for determining
preemption in this state.
n7 The Davis court's analysis of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by
sexual harassment highlights this uncertainty. The
court found that the UADA did not preempt the claim
because it went "beyond the discriminatory conduct
prohibited by the Utah Act." Davis, slip op. at 17.
Apparently, the court believed that the extra element
of outrage made the tort broader than the statutory
claim. However, it could just as well be argued that
the extra element makes the tort narrower than the
statutory claim, i.e., that the UADA covers all sexual harassment, whether or not it is inflicted in a
particularly egregious manner. Furthermore, recent
critical commentary suggests that sexual harassment
on the job always constitutes an intentional inflic-
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tion of emotional distress. W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 12, at 18
(Supp. 1988). If sexual harassment is per se outrageous and intolerable, it is difficult to see how the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can
survive the Davis test. As this example illustrates,
the Davis test is not a model of predictability or exactitude.
**40]
Similarly flawed is the test of antecedent existence,
/hich appears most developed in California. This test
ocuses on timing. The general rule is that if the common law cause of action did not exist before the statutory
ause of action was created, the statutory cause of action
•reempts the common law. See Bernstein, 843 E2d at
'65; Froyd, 681E Supp. at 674; Guevara, 629 E Supp.
it 1191; Mahoney, 571 E Supp. at 293; Register, 633
\2d at 423; \blley Drive-In Theatre Corp., 291 P.2d
it 215; Strauss, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23; Gay Law
'tudents Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d
<58, 156 Cal. P^tr. 14595 P.2d 592, 612 (Cal 1979);
\ilo Alto-Menk Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara
Zounty Transit Dist., 65 Cal. App. 3d 121, 135 Cal.
>ptr. 192, 197(1976).
We reject the test of antecedent existence for two reaons. First, we are unsure of its scope. Despite the
pparently general statement of the rule, we cannot tell
whether, in fact, the rule applies [**41] to anything other
tian a common law claim for discharge in violation of
»ublic policy, which is the usual context in which the
ule has been applied. See, e.g., Bernstein, 843 E2d at
'62-64; Froyd, 681 E Supp. at 673 & n.10; Mahoney,
'71 E Supp. at 292-93; Strauss, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
'22. The few cases in which courts have addressed
»ther common law causes of action, ostensibly under
he antecedent existence test, are so cryptic as to appear
onclusory. See, e.g., Real v. Continental Group, Inc.,
\27F. Supp. 434, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Diem v. City
I County of San Francisco, 686 E Supp. 806, 811-12
N.D. Cal. 1988). Although it is at least arguable that
he rule should not apply to such common law claims as
ireach of contract, which generally predate state antidiscrimination statutes, we have found no reasoned analysis
>f this question.
This uncertainty contributes to our second reason for
leclining to adopt the test of antecedent existence. At
ts logical extremes, the theory of antecedent [**42]
existence could infringe upon constitutional and statuory mandates. The United States Constitution protects
tgainst state interference with contracts, see U.S. Const,
ut. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the Utah Constitution's open

courts provision restricts the extent to which the state
can limit common law remedies, see Utah Const, art. I,
§ 11. If the test of antecedent existence applies to venerable common law remedies such as breach of contract
or malicious interference with contract, it might trench
upon these constitutional provisions. Conversely, if the
test of antecedent existence is limited to claims for discharge in violation of public policy, as suggested by a
case in which the court applied the test to a claim of
discharge in violation of public policy but failed to consider the test's possible application to the plaintiffs other
common law claims, see Bernstein, 843 E2d at 364-66,
we cannot reconcile it with Utah's statutory mandate to
construe liberally statutes in derogation of the common
law, see Utah Code /inn. § 68-3-2. In sum, we are
reluctant to adopt a test of uncertain scope when it may
pose constitutional questions at one [**43] extreme and
statutory questions at the other.
We now turn to what we term the indispensable element test, which we adopt as the analytical model for
determining when a legislative enactment supplies the
exclusive remedy for a certain wrong. We think that
the indispensable element model will avoid much of the
vagueness and uncertainty that plague the Davis test and
the test of antecedent existence. The indispensable element test relies on neither timing nor conduct to determine preemption. [*965] Instead, under this test, preemption depends on "'the nature of the injury for which
[the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the nature of the
defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been
responsible for that injury.'M Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716
(quoting Gambrell, 562 S.W.2dat 168).
An illustration is in order. InMounteer, 823 P.2d 1055
(Utah 1991), in which we adopted the indispensable element test in the context of workers' compensation, we
applied the test as follows: Initially, we identified the injury that the workers' compensation statute is designed to
address, i.e., only physical [**44] and mental injuries on
the job. Id. at 1057. Then we examined the elements of
the plaintiffs tort claims against his employer to determine whether physical or mental injury was a necessary
element of each cause of action. Id. at 1058-59. This
inquiry led us to the following conclusions. First, we
determined that the plaintiffs claim for slander did not
require that the plaintiff prove physical or mental injury;
it required defamation, or injury to reputation, which
was not an injury the statute addressed. Consequently,
we held that the nature of the injury was not among
those injuries protected by the statute and therefore the
Workers' Compensation Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs slander claim. Id. at
1058. Second, we determined that the plaintiffs claims
for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
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tress did require that the plaintiff prove mental injury
because " 'mental harm is the essence' of [those] tort[s]."
Id. (quoting Foley, 413 N.E.2dat 716); see id. at 1059.
Because mental injury was among [**45] those injuries
addressed by the statute and because the plaintiff could
not prove intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress without proving mental injury, we held
that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs mental distress. n8
n8 Defendants have not argued that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for Retherford's
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and negligent employment. However, we realize that
the preceding discussion may raise questions about
the application of the Workers' Compensation Act to
the present case on remand. Therefore, we take this
opportunity to clarify some potential areas of confusion. See Utah R. App. P. 30(a); State v. James,
819 R2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991); Reeves v. Gentile,
813 R2d 111, 119 (Utah 1991); Hiltsley v. Ryder,
738 R2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring).
Regarding Retherford's claim against her fellow
employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress, we have long held that an employee injured by
the intentional tort of a fellow employee may sue
the fellow employee personally. See Bryan v. Utah
Int'l, 533 R2d 892, 894 (Utah 1975). Therefore,
the Workers' Compensation Act poses no bar to
Retherford's suing her fellow employees for intentional torts.
However, the Act's applicability to Retherford's
claim against AT&T for negligent employment is
less clear. We have yet to address directly whether a
plaintiff who is mentally or physically injured by the
intentional torts of a fellow employee can sue his or
her employer for negligent employment or whether
workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for the employer's negligence. Neither the Act
itself nor judicial interpretations of it in Utah or elsewhere supply an explicit exception for the tort of
negligent employment in such an instance. Our ruling in Mounteer, based as it is on an injury-oriented
analysis rather than on an analysis centered on the
legal theory of the claim, would suggest that workers' compensation would be an exclusive remedy.
However, because the parties have neither raised nor
briefed this issue, we decline to determine whether
there is nonetheless some reason to allow the tort
claim to go forward. In the event that this issue
develops on remand, we do note that if Mounteer

does not govern and workers' compensation does not
supply an exclusive remedy, our previous case law
may provide some guidance in determining AT&T's
liability for Bateson-Hough's alleged intentionally
tortious conduct. We have already determined that a
managerial employee's tortious intent can be imputed
to his or her employer under certain circumstances.
See Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151,
157 (Utah 1991).
[**46]
Applying this analysis to the case at hand, we begin
with the task of determining what injuries the UADA is
designed to address. This purpose is revealed on the
face of the Act itself, which provides that it is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to
discharge, demote, terminate any person, or to retaliate
against, or discriminate in matters of compensation or in
terms, privileges, and conditions [*966] of employment
against any person otherwise qualified, because of race,
color, sex, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older, religion, national origin, or handicap.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(l)(a)(i) (amended 1989).
From this language, we infer that the legislature intended the UADA to address all manner of employment
discrimination against any member of the specified protected groups. As discussed above, the legislature included employer retaliation for complaining of employment discrimination within its definition of discrimination. Thus, the next step in our analysis requires us
to determine whether employment discrimination, including employer retaliation, supplies an indispensable
element of any of Retherford's [**47] causes of action.
We begin with Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy. In order to prove this tort,
Retherford must show that AT&T discharged her in a
manner or for a reason that contravened a "clear and
substantial public policy" of the State of Utah, a public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes. n9
Peterson, 832 R2d at 1281; see also Berube, 771 R2d
at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). The
only possible source in Utah's statutes or constitution for
a clear and substantial public policy allegedly violated
by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition of
retaliation for good faith complaints of employment discrimination. nlO See Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15).
Without deciding that the statute at issue rises to the level
of a clear and substantial public policy, we find that in
the absence of this public policy declaration, Retherford
would be unable even to allege an action for this tort.
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nply put, if there were no UADA policy against retalion, there could be no tort for discharge in violation of
s public policy. Applying the Mounteer test, [**48]
is plain that the harm the UADA addresses is an injpensable element in Retherford's tort cause of action;
before, the UADA must preempt this claim.
n9 In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear and substantial" to support a cause
of action for discharge in violation of public policy,
one must examine the strength of the policy as well
as the extent to .vhich it affects the public as a whole.
The very words "clear and substantial" require a lack
of ambiguity on both points. As the majority of this
court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in
a statute are not expressions of public policy. Many
statutes merely regulate conduct between private individuals or "'impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy
concerns.'" Id. at 1282 (quoting Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 47 Cal, 3d 654, 765 P,2d 373, 379,
254 Cal, Rptr. 211 (Cal, 1988)),
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a statute embodies a clear and substantial
public policy. First, one must ask whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to
the public, as opposed to the parties only. Second,
one must inquire whether the public interest is so
strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we
should place the policy beyond the reach of contract,
thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties
cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal
bargaining power. Since these are the consequences
of qualifying a policy as a basis for the tort action,
these considerations should inform the evaluation of
the policy itself. See id. at 1288 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring and dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.); see
also Foley, 765 R2d at 379-80 & n,12,
*49]
nlO The UADA defines retaliatory conduct as follows:
"Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action by an
employer . . . against one of its employees . . . because he [or she] has opposed any employment practice prohibited under this chapter or because he [or
she] has filed charges, testified, assisted, or participated in any way in any proceeding, investigation,
or hearing under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15).
Moving to Retherford's other common law causes of
:tion, the Mounteer analytical model leads to the con-

clusion that the UADA does not preempt these other
causes of action because discrimination is not an indispensable element of these claims. A more detailed
discussion of the elements of each of these claims is included in the analysis of the federal labor law preemption
issue discussed below; however, for the purposes of determining the state law preemption question, it is enough
to lay out the indispensable elements of Retherford's remaining claims and to note that none of them comprehends an injury that is the target of the UADA.
[*967] The elements of Retherford's claims [**50] are
as follows: To prevail on a claim of breach of implied
contract, Retherford must prove the existence of an implied contract, created by mutual assent, and AT&T's
failure to comply with its terms, nil See Lowe v.
Sorenson Research Co,, 779R2d668, 670 (Utah 1989);
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777R2d
483, 485-86 (Utah 1989); Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044-45;
Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program,
775 R2d 940, 942-43 (Utah Ct. App, 1989), cert, denied, 789 R2d33 (Utali 1990). To prevail on her claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Retherford
must prove that her co-workers either intentionally or
recklessly engaged in intolerable and outrageous conduct
that caused her severe emotional distress. See Samrns
v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 R2d 344, 34647(1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 R2d 1315, 1317
(Utah Ct, App, 1990), To prevail on her claim of malicious interference with contractual relations, Retherford
[**51] must prove that her co-workers, whether separately or in conspiracy, intentionally and improperly
persuaded AT&T to breach its implied employment contract with Retherford. nl2 See Leigh Furniture & Carpet
Co, v. Isom, 657 R2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982); Bunnell
v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 R2d 597, 602 (1962),
And to prevail on her claim of negligent employment,
Retherford must prove that AT&T's negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining its employees proximately
caused her harm. See Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15
Utah 2d 49, 51-52, 386R2d910, 911-12 (1963).
n i l As discussed more fully above, the UADA
does not preempt Retherford's cause of action for
breach of implied contract because none of the indispensable elements of this claim implicates an injury targeted by the UADA. However, even if there
were an overlap between the indispensable elements
of the contract claim and the injury addressed by the
statute, that overlap would not dispose of the question of preemption. When dealing with the realm
of contracts, we must add another step to our preemption analysis. First, we must examine, as we
do with all common law causes of action, whether
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the statute at issue supplies an indispensable element
of the breach of contract claim. If not, our analysis
is at an end. If so, we must proceed to the second
step, applicable only to contract claims. This step is
premised on the unique nature of contracts. Tort law
embodies statements of public policy, and therefore
it is appropriate for a statutory policy to preempt
a judicially declared policy. Contracts, by contrast,
involve voluntary private agreements that our society
endows with the force of law. Before we can interfere with the enforcement of this private agreement,
we must find that the private agreement offends the
public policy embodied in the statute, offends it so
severely that it requires striking the term or clause as
unenforceable. Consequently, the second step for determining preemption of a contract claim is whether
public policy forbids parties to contract on such a
subject, for such a remedy, or in such a manner.
[**52]
nl2 Retherford's complaint does not specify
whether she is alleging interference with her collective bargaining agreement or with her contract
implied from the code of conduct. Because the federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 785(a), would preempt any claim that defendants
interfered with Retherford's collective bargaining
agreement, see Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v.
Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647
F.2d 372, 377-78 (3d Cir. 1981), we interpret her
complaint as alleging interference with her implied
contract of employment.
Noticeably absent from this list of the indispensable
elements of the four claims is an injury that is a target of the UADA: retaliation for complaints of sexual
harassment. While it is true that all four claims arise
out of defendants1 retaliatory conduct, preemption depends on the nature of the injury, not on the nature of the
conduct allegedly responsible for that harm. See Foley,
413 N.E.2dat 716. The injuries Retherford alleges-the
broken [**53] promise, the mental anguish, the wrongful interference with her contract, and the unchecked
misconduct of her fellow employees—are distinct from
the injury of retaliation. Because Retherford would be
able to maintain these claims without alleging retaliatory
harassment, we hold that under the Mounteer test, the
UADA does not preempt Retherford's claims for breach
of implied contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, tortious interference with contract, and negligent employment.
Having determined that the UADA preempts only
Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of pub-

lic policy, we next address whether federal labor law
[*968] preempts any of Retherford's remaining causes
of action. We recap the substance of these remaining
claims. Retherford alleges that, first, AT&T's failure to prevent retaliation for her complaints of sexual
harassment breached a contract implied from AT&T's
code of conduct; second, Gailey, Randall, Johnson, and
Bateson-Hough maliciously interfered with her contractual relations, resulting in AT&T's breach of its implied
contract prohibiting reprisal for good-faith complaints
of sexual harassment; third, Gailey, Randall, Johnson,
and Bateson-Hough [**54] intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her through their retaliatory conduct;
and fourth, AT&T negligently employed Retherford's
harassers, thereby allowing them to inflict emotional
distress on her.
The legislative enactment that determines the federal preemption question is section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), which reads as
follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, §
301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 755(a) [hereinafter section 301].
On its face, it is not apparent that section 301 preempts
state law. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
208, 85L.Ed.2d206,105 S.Ct. 1904(1985). However,
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted section
301 as not only providing federal jurisdiction over controversies involving [**55] collective bargaining agreements, but also as vesting exclusive power in "federal
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements." Textile
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills ofAlabama, 353
U.S. 448, 451, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, 77 S.Ct. 912 (1957);
accord Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210; Local
174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Wzrehousemen & Helpers
of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 7
LEd.2d 593, 82 S.Ct. 571 (1962); see also Sperber v.
GaligherAsh Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1987).
The policy underlying this expansive interpretation of
section 301 is well-founded. If the terms of collective
bargaining agreements were subject to differing interpretations by state and federal courts, it could severely
disrupt both the negotiation and the administration of
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llective bargaining agreements. Lucas Flour Co., 369
S. at 103. To avoid this possibility, the Court held that
i meaning to be given to the terms of collective barining agreements must be determined exclusively by
iform federal law. Id. at 103-04; [**56] see Allisxalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210.
An elaboration on this doctrine of federal exclusivity
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
the Supreme Court's conclusion that section 301 prelpts any common law cause of action where the trial
urt, in adjudicating that cause of action, must interet the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. See
ngle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.
9, 405-06, 100L.Ed.2d410, 108S.Ct. 1877(1988).
essence, the Supreme Court has held that section 301
eempts any common law claim that is "' substantially
pendent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreesnt,'" Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
5, 96 L.Ed.2d 318, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) (quotl International Bhd. of Electric Workers, AFL-CIO v.
ichler, 481 U.S. 851, 859, 95L.Ed.2d 791, 107S.Ct.
61 n.3 (1987)), lest the common law provide a vehicle
r state courts to intrude into the exclusive federal prerve that is the interpretation of collective bargaining
reements. The justification for this expansive view
section 301 preemption is the ease with which an agieved employee otherwise could turn [**57] a suit for
each of a collective bargaining agreement into a state
rt or contract claim, thereby obtaining [*969] a state
w holding that might result in an inconsistent interetation of the collective bargaining agreement. As the
)urt has explained:
le interests in interpretive uniformity and predictabilr that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved
r
reference to federal law also require that the meaning
ven a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform
deral interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what
e parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal
nsequences were intended to flow from breaches of
at agreement, must be resolved by reference to unirm federal law, whether such questions arise in the
mtext of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate
rm over substance and allow parties to evade the retirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims
claims for tortious breach of contract.
}

lis-Chalmers Corp., 471 US. at 211.

The question before us, then, is whether resolution
* the state law claim depends upon the interpretation
*58] of the collective bargaining agreement. If it
>es, section 301 preempts the state law cause of ac-

tion, tingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06. However, "even
if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other,
would require addressing precisely the same set of facts,
as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent1 of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes."
Id. at 409-10. Under such circumstances, there is no
section 301 preemption.
Defendants argue that the Lingle test bars Retherford's
claims of breach of implied contract, tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligent employment because evaluation
of the state claims is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract/ In order
to determine whether resolution of Retherford's claims
indeed depends upon the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, we must examine the discrete elements of each claim. See Douglas v. American Info.
Technologies Corp., 877E2d565, 570 (7th Cir. 1989).
[**59]
We first address Retherford's claim for breach of implied contract. Defendants argue that section 301 bars
Retherford's implied contract claim because the state
court must interpret the collective bargaining agreement
in order to determine whether the AT&T code of conduct upon which the claim is based is separate from or
subsumed into the collective bargaining agreement. We
hold that Retherford'S implied contract claim is inactionable, but on somewhat different grounds. See Hill
v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah
1992).
Under federal labor law, only duly authorized union
representatives can bargain for the terms and conditions
of employment for those within the bargaining unit. See
29 US.C. § 759(a); cf. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at
397. The Supreme Court has held that although any employee or group of employees can reach a separate agreement with the employer, that separate contract must be
consistent with the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union. /./. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332, 339, 88 L.Ed. 762, 64 S.Ct. 576 (1944);
see also [**60] NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175, 180, 18L.Ed.2dll23
, 87S.Ct. 2001 reh'g
denied, 389 U.S. 892, 19 L.Ed.2d 202, 88 S.Ct. 13
(1967). Thus, inconsistent separate agreements are not
enforceable. See Eitmann v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 730 E2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 469
US. 1018, 83 L.Ed.2d 359, 105 S.Ct. 433 (1984).
In applying this rule, at least two federal circuits
have found unenforceable separate agreements that were
more favorable to the individual employees than the col-
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lective bargaining agreement. See Chmiel v. Beverly
Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 E2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir.
1989); Eitmcmn, 730 E2d at 362-63. For example, the
Ninth Circuit has held that an employee whose collective
[*970] bargaining agreement defined his tenure as at-will
could not enforce an implied contract for just-cause dismissal because the extra protections would contradict the
collective bargaining agreement. See Chmiel, 873 E2d
at 1285.
We think that the policy underlying these decisions is
sound. Nothing could undermine the authority of the
collective [**61] bargaining unit more thoroughly than
allowing individuals or cohorts of employees to enforce
separate contracts that were more advantageous to those
employees than was the collective bargaining agreement
itself. Although the interests of individual employees
may be slighted in the process, Congress apparently is
of the view that such sacrifices are necessary in order
to match the power of the employer with the aggregate
power of unionized employees. Cf. Lodge 76, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132, 146, 49L.Ed.2d396, 96S.Q. 2548 (1976); AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180; J.I. Case, 321
U.S. at 338-39. See generally Annotation, Collective
Bargaining Under Labor Relations Act as Related to
Freedom of Contract Between Employer and Individual
Employees, 88 L.Ed. 770 (1944). Accordingly, we decline to upset this balance by allowing individual agreements to undercut the union as the bargaining agent.
In the instant case, providing any remedy under an
implied contract when no remedy is available under
the [**62] collective bargaining agreement-because the
time for arbitration has passed—obviously would put
Retherford in a more advantageous position than AT&T
employees bound by the collective bargaining agreement, thereby undermining the collective bargaining
unit. Consequently, Retherford's alleged implied contract is unenforceable.
Our holding that Retherford's implied contract is invalid requires us to find that her claim for malicious interference with contract is similarly defective. Although
some courts have held that the contract at issue in a
case for malicious interference need not be enforceable,
courts generally agree that the contract must not be illegal or contrary to public policy. See generally 45 Am.
Jur. 2d Interference §§ 8-9 (1969 & Supp. 1992).
Allowing a plaintiff to sue for malicious interference
with a contract that is invalid would gut the federal policy
of consolidating bargaining power in union representatives. Consequently, we affirm the summary judgment
on Retherford fs claim for malicious interference with
contract, albeit on grounds different from those relied

upon by the trial court.
Having determined that the LMRA bars Retherford's
claims stemming [**63] from her implied contract, we
next consider her tort claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent employment. We begin with her claim for emotional distress because AT&T
can be held liable for negligent employment only if its
employees Randall, Johnson, Gailey, nl3 and BatesonHough are liable for an independent tort. See Focke
v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 1325, 1344 (D. Kan.
1982); Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395,
799P.2dl5, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). See generally
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958). Here,
Retherford alleges that AT&T's employees committed
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
nl3 Although Retherford stipulated to Gailey's
dismissal upon Gailey's declaration of bankruptcy,
Gailey's absence from this suit does not affect
Retherford's ability to prove Gailey's tortious conduct in order to find AT&T liable for negligent employment. It merely prevents Retherford from seeking damages from Gailey personally. Any finding
that Gailey engaged in tortious conduct would, of
course, have no preclusive effect in a subsequent
suit against Gailey herself.
[**64]
To sustain her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Retherford must show that (i) Gailey's,
Randall's, Johnson's, and Bateson-Hough's conduct was
outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality;
(ii) they intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard
of the likelihood of causing, emotional [*971] distress;
(iii) Retherford suffered severe emotional distress; and
(iv) their conduct proximately caused Retherford's emotional distress. See Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289,
293, 358P.2d344, 346-47(1961); White v. Blackburn,
787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). To decide
whether this tort claim is preempted, we must determine
whether, on the record before us, there is any basis for
concluding that defendants' conduct alleged to provide
a basis for the tort claim might reasonably implicate any
of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See
Ungle, 486 U.S. at 405-06.
A necessary element of Retherford's claim is that
Bateson-Hough's, Gailey's, Randall's, and Johnson's
behavior was outrageous [**65] and intolerable in that
it offended against the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality. See Samms, 11 Utah 2d at 293,
358 P. 2d at 347. Before analyzing this tort under the
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t for section 301 preemption, it is helpful to identify
conduct that Retherford alleges. Retherford details
conduct of each co-worker as follows: With respect
Bateson-Hough, Retherford contends that Batesonugh responded to her complaining of sexual harassnt by requiring her to sit next to Gailey, telling her she
1 a letter sanctioning her and Gailey, assigning her to
tain "slow" work stations that hampered her producity, reprimanding and criticizing her, and threatening
fire her if she continued to complain about Gailey.
Vs for Gailey, Retherford alleges that Gailey avenged
therford's complaint to the AT&T EEO coordinator
following her, making threatening faces at her, and
ceding by her late at night when she was trying to
>ss the street. nl4 As for Randall, Retherford charges
t Randall told her she must report to Boise within ten
/s or lose her job. In addition, although the record
ambiguous, Randall may [**66] have been among
iley's friends who retaliated against Retherford by
ring at her, making "threatening facial expressions"
ler, walking extremely close to her, and following her
>und the office. Finally, Johnson also may have been
ong the group of Gailey's friends who discomfited
therford by their staring and their threatening facial
sessions. The record shows that on at least one oc;ion, Johnson accused Retherford of staring at her.
therford also alleges that in her presence, Johnson
i others lamented the fact that someone was watching
sn and would report them if they broke company rules.
ter one such comment, Johnson looked at Retherford
i said, "Isn't that right, Debi?" Viewing the facts in
\ light most favorable to Retherford, as we must, see
llins v. Petersen, 813 R2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991),
\ accept for the purposes of this appeal that Retherford
s alleged at least that Randall and Johnson made a habit
following her and mocking her after she complained
Gailey's sexual harassment.
nl4 Because Retherford claims only retaliatory
harassment, not sexual harassment, we will not consider evidence of Gailey's unwelcome sexual advances.
*67]
Defendants argue that section 301 preempts
therford's claims of intentional infliction of
lotional distress because a court deciding whether
is conduct was intolerable and outrageous must
terpret the collective bargaining agreement to
:termine whether Bateson-Hough exceeded her
pervisory authority and whether Gailey's, Randall's,
id Johnson's workplace conduct was improper. We

agree in part.
In considering section 301 preemption of tort claims
alleging infliction of emotional distress by a supervisor or fellow employee, courts seem to have distinguished between situations in which the defendant has
misused his or her authority under a collective bargaining agreement to torment the plaintiff and situations in
which the defendant has inflicted the distress through
conduct that is purely personal and does not implicate
the exercise of supervisory authority. See Paradis v.
United Technologies Pratt & Whitney Div., 672 F. Supp.
67, 71 (D. Conn. 1987). Compare Douglas, 877
E2d at 571-72 and Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n,
854 E2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1988) and Truex v.
Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784E2d 1347, 1350-51 (9th
Cir. 1985) [**68] with [*972] Keehr v. Consolidated
Freightways of Delaware, Inc., 825 E2d 133, 136-38
(7th Cir. 1987) and Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
817 E2d 536, 539-40 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 484
U.S. 908, 98 L.Ed.2d 209, 108 S.Ct. 251 (1987) and
Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 E2d 1367,
1369 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 US. 1099,
85L.Ed.2d839, 105S.Ct. 2319(1985).
The Douglas and Keehr cases, both from the Seventh
Circuit, illustrate this distinction. In Douglas, the plaintiff charged her employer with "extreme and outrageous"
treatment because of the employer's allegedly arbitrary
denials of her requests for days off, an "unjustified" final warning, and "unwarranted and excessive" scrutiny
of her work. 877 E2d at 572. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that a state court would have to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement's provisions regulating
the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs employment to
determine whether the employer's actions were indeed
arbitrary, unjustified, unwarranted, and excessive. It
therefore held that [**69] section 301 barred Douglas's
state tort claim. Id. at 572-73.
In contrast, the Keehr court found that section 301 did
not preempt a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. There, Keehr complained that a company supervisor had engaged him in an altercation during
which the supervisor allegedly made outrageous comments about the sexual activities of Keehr's wife, and
the verbal abuse escalated into a fist fight. 825 E2d
at 135. The court reasoned that there was no section
301 preemption because the supervisor's abuse of the
employee could not reasonably be seen as implicating
the supervisor's authority under the collective bargaining agreement, even though it would have been possible
for Keehr to file a grievance against his supervisor for
using abusive language. Id. at 137-38.
We find that this distinction has merit and apply it
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to Retherford's emotional distress claim. Retherford's
allegations that Randall ordered her to report to Boise
within ten days or lose her job and that Bateson-Hough
reprimanded Retherford, warned her to stop complaining, told her where to sit, [**70] and assigned her certain tasks raise questions about their respective authority
under the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore,
to the extent that this conduct constitutes a ground for
the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
section 301 preempts Retherford's cause of action.
However, other allegations regarding the conduct of
Gailey, Randall, and Johnson can withstand the section
301 preemption analysis. Specifically, Retherford alleges that Gailey responded to Retherford's complaint to
the AT&T EEO coordinator with conduct ranging from
following her around the office to attempting to frighten
her as she crossed the street. She alleges that Randall and
Johnson retaliated by following her and making threatening faces at her. Such alleged behavior raises issues of
purely personal misconduct. Evaluating the severity and
the consequences of this conduct in order to adjudicate
Retherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress should require no interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. These allegations are analogous
to those in Keehr, not to those in Douglas. To the extent
that Retherford's tort claim is premised upon [**71] allegations of purely personal misconduct, as opposed to
misconduct under color of possible contractual authority,
section 301 does not preempt the cause of action.
Having determined that Gailey, Johnson, and Randall
may be held liable for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without implicating the collective bargaining agreement, we turn to the question of
whether Retherford can hold AT&T liable for Gailey's,
Johnson's, and Randall's behavior under a theory of
negligent employment without running afoul of section
301 preemption. The issue is whether, in determining
AT&T's liability under this claim, a court could avoid
determining any issue that would implicate the collective
bargaining agreement.
Negligent employment is a tort of some novelty in
Utah. Although we have recognized this cause of action, see Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 R2d 1037,
1048 [*973] (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County,
771 R2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989), Stone v. Hurst
Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 51, 386 R2d 910, 91112 (1963), our cases do not describe its elements in
detail. [**72] Consequently, we look to other jurisdictions to provide a detailed description of this tort. To
prevail on her claim of negligent employment against
AT&T, Retherford must show that (i) AT&T knew or
should have known that its employees posed a fore-

seeable risk of retaliatory harassment to third parties,
including fellow employees; (ii) the employees did indeed inflict such harm; and (iii) the employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining the employees
proximately caused the injury. nl5 See, e.g., Pruitt v.
Ravelin, 141 Ariz. 195, 685 R2d 1347, 1354-55 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984); Kassmanv. Busfield Enters., Inc., 131
Ariz. 163, 639R2d353, 356-57(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981);
Najerav. Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d634,13
Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 &n. 3 (Ct. App. 1961); Destefano
v. Grabrian, 763 R2d 275, 287-88 (Colo. 1988);
Tathamv. MbbashR.R., 412 III. 568, 107N.E.2d 735,
739 (III. 1952); Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235
Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653, 662 (Kan. 1984); LaBonte
v. National Gypsum Co., 113 N.H. 678, 313 A.2d 403,
405 (N.H. 1973);F&TCo. v. Wods, 92NM. 697, 594
R2d 745, 746-49 (N.M. 1979); [**73] \hldez v. Warner,
106 N.M. 305, 742R2d517, 519-20 (N.M. Ct. App.),
cert, quashed sub nom. Z&E, Inc. v. \hldez, 742 R2d
1058 (N.M. 1987); Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn,
Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 688 R2d 333, 339-41 (N.M. Ct.
App.), writ quashed, 685 R2d 963 (N.M. 1984); Kelley
v. Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Ore. 1, 189 R2d
105, 106-07 (Or. 1948); Chesterman v. Barmon, 82
Ore. App. 1, 727R2dl30,
131-32 (Or. Ct. App.),
aff d and remanded, 305 Ore. 439, 753 R2d 404 (Or.
1988); Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562,
246A.2d418, 419-22 (Pa. 1968); Banks v. Nordstrom,
Inc., 57 Wish. App. 251, 787 R2d 953, 960 (Wish.
Ct. App. 1990). See generally Kenneth R. Wallentine,
Negligent Hiring: The Dual Sting of Pre-Employment
Investigation, Utah Bar Journal, October 1989, at 15;
Donald K. Armstrong, Negligent Hiring and Negligent
Entrustment: The Case Against Exclusion, 52 Or. L.
Rev. 296, 298-300 (1973); Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 213 (1958); Restatement (Second) [**74] of
Torts §317 (1965).
nl5 Because the tort of negligent employment
has received little explication in our cases, we take
this opportunity to provide some background. The
causes of action variously termed "negligent hiring,"
"negligent supervision," and "negligent retention"
are all basically subsets of the general tort of negligent employment. See generally 53 Am. Jur. 2d
Master and Servant §§ 212, 422 (1970 & Supp.
1992). These variants differ only in that they arise
at different points in the employment relationship.
By way of illustration only, we offer the following: a day-care provider who knowingly or negligently hires a convicted child molester might be
liable for negligent hiring, see Broderick v. King's
Wby Assembly of God Church, 808 R2d 1211, 1221
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(Alaska 1991), while a day-care provider who unwittingly hires a convicted child molester but retains him
or her once his or her record and proclivities become
apparent might risk liability for negligent retention.
In both instances, once the day-care provider knows
of the child molester's background, it might be liable
for negligent supervision if it allows him or her unsupervised interaction with the children in its care.
See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213
(1958).
**75]
For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume
lat Retherford can prove that Gailey, Randall, and
3hnson intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon
er. Also we note that because the tort of negligent
mployment can impose liability on the employer even
'hen the employer would not otherwise be liable under
le doctrine of respondeat superior, we have no need
) consult the collective bargaining agreement to deterline whether Gailey, Randall, and Johnson were acting
l the scope of their employment. See Clover, 808 R2d
11048; Birkner, 771 R2d at 1059.
Defendants argue that a state court cannot determine
le elements of the tort-i.e., that AT&T knew or reaDnably should have known that Gailey, Randall, and
ohnson posed a hazard of such tortious conduct and
ould have taken steps to avoid this hazard—without
rferring to any provision of the collective bargaining
greement. Defendants insist that the court will have
3 resort to the collective bargaining agreement's termiation and discipline provisions to determine whether
*974] AT&T acted "appropriately" in dealing with
Jailey, Johnson, and Randall. We [**76] cannot agree
iat the record before us makes clear that the trial court
lust resort to the collective bargaining agreement to adidicate this claim.
In analyzing this issue, we first note that AT&T mismderstands the source of its duty to control the conduct
>f its employees. AT&T suggests that this obligation
rises from the collective bargaining agreement. This
s incorrect. The employer's duty toward those people
vhom its employees place in a position of reasonably
breseeable risk or injury does not stem from its private
employment contract. Cf. \bldez, 742 R2d at 519.
nstead, it is a duty imposed by the common law of the
tate. The common law of tort expresses public policy,
he scope of which is not generally determined by reference to privately contracted obligations. Certainly, we
nay vindicate some public policies by implying them
is covenants to private contracts. See, e.g., Beck v.
farmers Ins. Exch., 701 R2d 795t 801 (Utah 1985).

However, such covenants are judicial creations that express public policy and constitute public law; they are
not private agreements between private parties, and they
are not [**77] avoidable by contract. See id. at 801 n.4.
In the present case, the duty that Retherford relies
upon arises from the public law of tort, not from the private collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the existence of the duty and the determination of its scope do
not require resort to any term of the collective bargaining agreement. Other duties might be due to Retherford
and other employees by reason of the collective bargaining agreement, but their existence is not relevant to the
duty inquiry for purposes of the tort of negligent employment.
It is true, however, that in an action for negligent employment, the plaintiff must show that the employer's
failure to fulfill the duty owed the injured party in hiring, supervising, or retaining the malfeasing employee
proximately caused the injury of which the plaintiff
complains. In makhig this factual determination, a
court might have to resort to the collective bargaining agreement to discover whether contractual limitations on the power of the employer to deal with the
employee precluded it from taking steps to prevent the
harm. Although such an eventuality might raise questions of section 301 preemption, [**78] the defendants
in the present case have made no showing that the trial
court, in adjudicating this particular matter, would have
to refer to the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether AT&T could have prevented Gailey's,
Johnson's, and Randall's allegedly tortious acts. It is
not enough that we might imagine a situation where a
court might have to make such a reference. There must
be a realistic possibility that it may occur. Because defendants have not shown any such realistic possibility,
we hold that there is no section 301 preemption of the
claim for negligent employment. nl6
nl6 As this case develops on remand, it may become apparent that the trial court may have to resort
to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
If this occurs, defendants are free to raise the question of preemption with the trial court, which should
determine the issue. If the court finds section 301
preemption, the preempted portion of the claim must
be dismissed. Today, we hold only that it is improper
to find preemption on the basis of unsupported speculation as to how a case may evolve.
[**79]
To summarize the preemptive effects of state and federal statutes on Retherford's claims, the UADA preempts

rage zi
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only Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of
public policy, while the LMRA preempts Retherford's
claims for breach of implied contract and malicious interference with contract and partially preempts her claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We therefore affirm the trial court's summary judgment against
Retherford on those preempted claims. The only claims
to survive state and federal preemption are Retherford's
claim for negligent employment and the part of her emotional distress claim that alleges purely personal misconduct on the part of Gailey, Johnson, and Randall.
We now examine defendants' objections to
Retherford's nonpreempted causes of action [*975]
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligent employment.
First, defendants argue
that Retherford's claims of negligent employment
and intentional infliction of emotional distress are
untimely. Second, they argue that the conduct alleged
is insufficient as a matter of law to support a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We discuss these arguments in [**80] turn.
Defendants base their untimeliness contention on section 78-12-25(3)'s four-year period of limitations. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). Defendants argue
that the four years began to run May 10, 1984, when
Retherford's submission of a written complaint to the
AT&T EEO coordinator first indicated that she thought
she was being harassed. Because more than four years
had elapsed by April 7, 1989, when Retherford filed
her state action, defendants claim that she failed to file
her claims of negligent employment and intentional infliction of emotional distress in a timely manner. We
disagree.
The question presented is whether, taking the facts in
a light most favorable to Retherford, the statute of limitations ran before April 7, 1989. Defendants contend
that as a matter of law, the statute began to run at the
time of the first complaint. Under Utah law, the statute
of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. See id. § 78-12-1; Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc.
v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 R2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990).
A tort cause of action accrues when all its elements come
into being and the claim is actionable. Davidson Lumber
Sales, Inc., 794R2datl9; [**81] see State Tax Comm'n
v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 R2d 575, 577
(1940). In order to determine when the limitations period began to run, then, we must determine when each
of the causes of action became actionable in the courts.
We begin with Retherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because of the nature
of this cause of action, it can be difficult to determine
when all its elements-intentional, outrageous conduct

proximately causing extreme distress-have come into
being. Of particular difficulty is the element of injury-extreme emotional distress. Sometimes, to be sure, a
single outrageous incident, such as an egregiously vicious practical joke, see Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 46 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1965), results in immediate and
easily identifiable emotional distress. Often, however,
emotional distress does not so much occur as unfold-for
example, where a defendant subjects a plaintiff, not to a
single outrageous act, but to a pattern or practice of acts
tolerable by themselves though clearly intolerable in the
aggregate.
Here, Retherford alleges a pattern of retaliatory harassment. [**82] Such patterns present courts with the
difficult task of identifying when during a series of related acts the element of emotional distress "occurred."
We have been unable to locate authority that is directly
on point concerning the application of statutes of limitation to a pattern of conduct that constitutes, in the
aggregate, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
However, we find the treatment of claims of alienation
of affections instructive in this regard. In adjudicating such claims, which often allege a series of wrongful
acts over a substantial period of time, courts have determined that the statute of limitations begins to run when
the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when love and affection are finally lost. See e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 244
Ark. 327,424S.W.2d871,874(Ark.
1968);Dobrientv.
Ciskowski, 54 Wis. 2d419, 195N.W2d449, 451 (Wis.
1972); see also Flink v. Simpson, 49 Wish. 2d 639,
305 P. 2d 803, 804 (Wish. 1957); Strode v. Gleason, 9
Wish. App. 13, 510R2d250, 254 (Wish. Ct. App.
1973). Applying this standard by analogy, we hold that
the statute of limitations for intentional infliction [**83]
of emotional distress does not begin to run until the distress is actually inflicted, i.e., when the plaintiff suffers
severe emotional disturbance.
Although easy to describe, this standard is difficult
to apply, particularly because the element of emotional
distress is specific to the plaintiff in each case. Because
the tort of intentional infliction of [*976] emotional distress requires actual emotional distress, see Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965), this element is to be
gauged subjectively. nl7 A particularly hardy or calloused plaintiff may never accrue a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, even though
he or she is subjected to outrageous conduct that no reasonable person could be expected to bear. Consequently,
our task is to determine when, given these allegations,
Retherford experienced severe emotional distress, not
when an ordinarily sensitive person would have experienced such suffering.
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nl7 For the guidance of the bench and bar, we
make clear that while the standard for determining
whether a plaintiff has experienced emotional distress is subjective, the standard for determining the
outrageousness of the alleged conduct is objective.
Consequently, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must show both that a reasonable person would consider the alleged conduct
to be outrageous and that the plaintiff actually experienced subjective severe emotional anguish because
of this objectively outrageous conduct.
*84]
The record before us identifies this moment. nl8
September of 1985, after almost eighteen months
retaliatory abuse by her co-workers, during which
e repeatedly sought assistance from her immediate survisors, the AT&T EEO coordinator, and the EEOC,
^therford took medical disability leave at the instance
her psychiatrist. She never returned to her job beuse, physically and emotionally, she could not work
proximity to "the people who started the panic in
r." Retherford's dramatic steps of taking leave from
r job, seeking medical and psychiatric attention to heal
e stresses of her work place, and remaining on leave for
proximately six months because she could not bring
rself to face her harassers all support a factual inrence that the element of extreme emotional distress
d not come into existence before September of 1985.
977] This is sufficient to support the conclusion that
e statute had not run by April of 1989, when the action
as filed.
nl8 We realize that not all cases will reveal so
clearly the point at which the plaintiffs actually experienced emotional distress. Although we do not
at this time adopt their analysis, we note that courts
facing similar difficulties in adjudicating Title VII
claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, have enunciated
a theory of continuing violation in order to allow
plaintiffs to recover for patterns of employment discrimination. Like intentional infliction of emotional
distress, employment discrimination often manifests
itself as a series of small wrongful acts instead of
one dramatic injustice. Indeed, changing attitudes
toward minorities and women in the work place may
have contributed to the incidence of long-term patterns of employment discrimination because as social opprobrium of racial and sexual harassment has
increased, people may have become more subtle in
acting on or expressing their prejudices. While a defendant may be able to dismiss separate acts of subtle
discrimination as merely coincidences or attempts

at humor, an examination of these acts as a whole
often will reveal their underlying pattern of malignity. To address these patterns, courts adjudicating
Title VII claims allow recovery for an entire pattern
of employment discrimination so long as one act of
the continuing violation occurs within the statute of
limitations period. See, e.g., Berry v. Board of
Supervisors ofL.S.U., 715 E2d 971, 979 (5th Or.
1983); Nelson v. Williams, 25 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1214, 1215 (D.D.C. 1981); Williams
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 627 E Supp.
752, 756-57 (WD. Mo. 1986); Tarvesian v. Can
Div. of TRW, Inc., 407 E Supp. 336, 339 (D. Mass.
1976); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 E Supp. 1338, 1340
(D. Haw. 1974); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co.,
310 E Supp. 891, 896 (D. Me. 1970); Johnson v.
Ramsey County, 424 N.W2d 800, 810 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988). At least one state has adopted the Title
VII continuing violation theory for causes of action
brought under the state's antidiscrimination act, see
Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427Mich.
505, 398N.W.2d368, 380-81 (Mich. 1986), and at
least two states have codified the Title VII continuing
violation theory in their administrative regulations
governing employment, seetfy-\fce Food Stores, Inc.
v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W2d 512,
527 (Iowa 1990); Rock v. Massachusetts Comm'n
Against Discrimination, 384Mass. 198, 424N.E.2d
244, 248 & nn.12-13 (Mass. 1981).
In determining the existence of a continuing violation, courts focus on the following factors, which
are relevant to, but not dispositive of the existence
of, a continuing violation:
The first is subject matter. Do the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination, tending to
connect them in a continuing violation? The second
is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring (e.g.,
a biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an
isolated work assignment or employment decision?
The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of permanence. Does the act have the degree
of permanence which should trigger an employee's
awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights, or
which should indicate to the employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences of the
act is to be expected without being dependent on a
continuing intent to discriminate?

Berry, 715E2dat981.
[**85]
Of course, at trial defendants will have the opportunity to prove to the satisfaction of the finder of fact that
the element of extreme emotional distress accrued some
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time before Retherford's leave of absence. However, on
the facts before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that
it accrued before April of 1985. Consequently, the fouryear statute of limitations poses no bar to Retherford's
recovery for defendants' entire course of conduct. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).
The next question is whether Retherford's claim for
negligent employment also was filed within the four-year
statute of limitations. Before an employer can be found
liable for negligent employment, one of its employees
must have committed a tort. See Mulhern v. City of
Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 799 R2d 15, 18 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213
cmt. a (1958). Thus, as a general matter, the statute
of limitations will not begin to run on a cause of action
for negligent employment until all elements of the employee1 s tort are present. However, although the tort of
negligent employment requires the employee's tort as a
condition precedent, we note that in situations [**86]
where the victim does not accrue a cause of action until
she or he suffers a subjective harm, it may be contended
that the employer's breach of duty has become evident
long before that point, i.e., that the conduct element
of the tort, the employee malfeasance, has become sufficiently apparent that the employer should have taken
steps to correct it, even before the victim has fully accrued a cause of action. As a consequence, one might
argue that the statute of limitations against the employer
for negligent employment should begin to run before the
statute begins to run on the tort by the employee. Such
a situation might exist where, as here, the victim alleges
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We need not decide today whether such an argument
has merit or whether it applies to the facts of this case.
Defendants did not advance the argument before this
court or the trial court, we have found no legal authority
that speaks to the issue, and most important, the record
provides no basis for our concluding as a matter of law
that if the cause of action against AT&T for negligent
supervision did accrue before the cause of action against
the employees, all this occurred before [**87] April of
1985. There is therefore no basis for sustaining a summary judgment on the ground that the four-year statute
of limitations bars the negligent employment claim. See
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3).
As a final objection to Retherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Randall and
Johnson, defendants argue that the conduct alleged is insufficiently outrageous and intolerable to support such a
claim. We disagree. The standard Utah has adopted for
determining whether the conduct of a defendant is sufficiently offensive to permit recovery is whether the de-

fendant's actions "offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality." nl9 [*978] Samms
v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289\ 293, 358 R2d 344, 347
(1961).
nl9 Although Samms v. Eccles cites the second Restatement of Torts in support of this standard,
see 11 Utah 2d 289, 293 n.14, 358 R2d 344, 347
n.14 (1961), we note that Samms states a somewhat
different threshold for outrageousness than does the
Restatement. The Restatement requires that the conduct at issue be "extreme and outrageous," which it
describes as "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46,
cmt. d (1965). On the other hand, Samms holds
that conduct is considered "outrageous and intolerable" if it offends against "the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality." 11 Utah 2d at
293, 358 PM at 347 (emphasis added).
We have reviewed Samms and our subsequent
cases dealing with intentional infliction of emotional
distress and have found no evidence whatsoever that
the court intended to weaken the Restatement's standard by this formulation. Cf. Pentecost v. Harward,
699 R2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (citing both Samms
and the Restatement without mentioning distinction).
Moreover, although we recognize a theoretical difference between conduct that transgresses "all possible bounds of decency" and conduct that transgresses
only "generally accepted standards of decency," we
believe that in application, the distinction will be irrelevant, particularly in light of the Restatements
explanation that "generally, the case [of intentional
infliction of emotional distress] is one in which
the recitation of the facts to an average member of
the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'"
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d (1965)
(emphasis added). We retain Samms' formulation of
outrageousness to prevent any apprehension that we
limit the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress to conduct that offends "all possible bounds
of decency," an unrealistic and impossible standard.
However, we stress that although our formulation
differs slightly from the Restatement's, this difference is only a concession to the reality that no court
would or could establish that certain conduct exceeds
"all possible bounds of decency." We have in no way
softened the Restatements requirement of extraordinarily vile conduct, conduct that is "atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id.
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**88]
Applying this standard to the facts at bar and viewing
lose facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we can
ay as a matter of law that Retherford has alleged outigeous and intolerable conduct sufficient to support a
ause of action for intentional infliction of emotional disess. Certainly, as defendants claim, merely following
r making faces at someone, without more, does not continue conduct of such objective offensiveness that it can
ive rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
istress. However, Retherford alleges more than simple
lsult or annoyance. She alleges months of persecution
y her co-workers, during which Gailey, Johnson, and
Landall shadowed her movements, intimidated her with
ireatening looks and remarks, and manipulated circumtances at her work in ways that made her job markedly
lore stressful, all in retaliation for her good-faith comlaint of sexual harassment. Indulging all inferences in
ivor of Retherford, as we must, Rollins v. Petersen,
13 R2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991), such allegations are
nfficient to satisfy the objective conduct requirement
f the tort of intentional infliction of emotional [**89]
istress.
It is worth stating forcefully that any other conclusion
fould amount to an intolerable refusal to recognize that
ur society has ceased seeing sexual harassment in the
fork place as a playful inevitability that should be taken
l good spirits and has awakened to the fact that sexual
arassment has a corrosive effect on those who engage
I it as well as those who are subjected to it and that such
arassment has far more to do with the abusive exercise
f one person's power over another than it does with sex.
tee, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The
?
ailure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65
• Cal. L. Rev. 1399, 1399 (1992); Carol Sanger, The
Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S. Cal.
,. Rev. 1411, 1415 (1992). This consensus extends into
II sectors of our society. Indeed, although Utah Senator
)rr in Hatch never wavered from his conviction that law
>rofessor Anita Hill had fabricated her allegations that
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually
arassed her, he reportedly condemned the alleged connet in the strongest terms. Someone who would make
uch vulgar [**90] and degrading comments "would not
•e a normal person," Senator Hatch said. "That person
. . would be a psychopathic sex fiend or a pervert."
?
itzgerald at 1405.
As senator Hatch recognized, sexual harassment is
imply unacceptable in today' s society. To refuse to label
tie retaliatory conduct alleged here as outrageous and inolerable would be a travesty. Prosser and Keeton quite
properly call sexual harassment on the job "undoubtedly

an intentional infliction of emotional distress." W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §12,
at 18 (Supp. 1988). By this, we take them to mean that
the conduct generally labeled sexual harassment is outrageous and intolerable and, when performed with the
requisite intent, satisfies the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. If the conduct
that constitutes sexual harassment is per se outrageous
and intolerable, it stands to reason that retaliation for
complaining of sexual harassment must also be considered outrageous and intolerable. Retherford has stated a
claim for [*979] intentional infliction of emotional distress through retaliatory harassment, thereby meriting
the opportunity to establish [**91] all the elements of
this tort before the finder of fact. The trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on the nonpreempted portion of that claim.
In sum, we hold as follows: First, both employees
covered by just-cause employment contracts and employees who are at-will can assert a claim in tort for discharge in violation of public policy; second, the UADA
preempts only Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy; third, the LMRA preempts
Retherford's claims for breach of implied contract and
malicious interference with contract, and partially preempts her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress; fourth, the statute of limitations does not bar
Retherford's claim for negligent employment and the
nonpreempted portion of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and fifth, Retherford has
stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Consequently, we affirm the summary judgment
in part, reverse in pari,, and remand for disposition consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
CONCURBY: HOWE
CONCUR:
HOWE,
Associate
(Concurring with Reservation)

Chief

Justice:

I concur [**92] in the majority opinion with the following reservation:
I would not reach the question whether Retherford can
pursue a tort action for discharge in violation of public policy and also a claim for breach of her collective
bargaining agreement's just-cause provision. It is not
necessary to resolve this issue because assuming such
tort cause of action exists, it is preempted by UADA, as
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explained in the majority opinion.
The majority holds that Retherford could pursue both
a tort action and a contract claim, except for the preemption. Not only would this be duplicative, at least in
part, but it possibly may violate the collective bargain-

ing agreement, which requires that all grievances arising
out of or resulting from the dismissal of a regular employee must be arbitrated. I therefore prefer to reserve
judgment on this issue.
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
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HOWE, Chief Justice:
51
Plaintiff Hubert C. Burton, M.D., appeals from the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants Exam Center
Industrial & General Medical Clinic, Inc. (the "Clinic"), and
Howard Boulter in this action wherein Burton alleges that his
employment with the Clinic was terminated because of his age.
BACKGROUND
12
In July 1994, Boulter, president and chief operating
officer of the Clinic, terminated the sixty-nine-year-old Burton,
a part-time physician at the Clinic. Boulter told Burton that

the Clinic had hired a full-time physician, eliminating the need
for Burton's services. Boulter explained that the decision to
hire this new physician was made suddenly, out of necessity, and
stated: "I [Boulter] didn't know how much longer you older guys
wanted to work, and I felt that we couldn't pass up this
opportunity to employ a full-time physician."l
Burton
subsequently filed a complaint with the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division ("UADD"), alleging his termination was age related.2
The UADD responded that because the Clinic had fewer than fifteen
employees, under the terms of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
("UADA")3 the Clinic was not under the UADD7s jurisdiction. The
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 2 9 U.S.C. §§ 621 to
634 (1998) ("ADEA"), and many similar state acts typically exempt
small employers from their provisions.
13
Burton then filed this action against the Clinic and
Boulter (collectively, "Exam Center"), alleging that his firing
violated a public policy found in both state and federal statutes
against taking employment actions toward employees because of
their age and asserting that violation of that public policy

1

The parties dispute exactly what was said at that meeting;
however, in reviewing a summary judgment, it is well settled that
we relate the facts of the case and all reasonable inferences
arising therefrom in a light favorable to the nonmoving party,
see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Utah 1994), and we
do so here.
2

Burton alleged that this new doctor was a "much younger"
man. His exact age .is unclear from the record, but he was over
the age of forty.
3

At the time of Dr. Burton's termination, title 34, chapter
35 of the Utah Code embodied the UADA. Unless noted otherwise,
all references herein to the UADA will be to the 1994 statutes.
The UADA contains the following definitions:
(6) "Employee" means any person applying
with or employed by an employer.
(7) "Employer" means the state or any
political subdivision . . . , and every other
person employing 15 or more employees within
the state for each working day in each of 20
calendar weeks or more in the current or
preceding calendar year; but it does not
include religious organizations or
associations . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(6), (7).
M ^
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gives rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination.4 Exam
Center moved for summary judgment on Burton's tortious wrongful
termination allegation. After a hearing on the motion and the
submission of supplemental briefs, the trial court denied the
summary judgment, citing the existence of a factual dispute.
Upon Exam Center' s motion for reconsideration, however, the tifial
court reversed its earlier ruling and granted the summary
judgment, based on language from Retherford v. AT&T
Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), and held that the UADA
preempts any common law cause of action for tortious wrongful
termination. Burton now appeals from this grant of summary
judgment.5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
54
Before granting summary judgment, a court must, after •"•"
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, find that no disputed issues of material fact exist and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harnicher v. University of Utah Med.
Ctr. , 962 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 1998). Review of a trial court's
grant of summary judgment includes a determination of whether the
trial court correctly applied governing law, affording no
deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of
law. See Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213,
1216 (Utah 1999); Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 69.
ANALYSIS
f5

The UADA provides:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice:
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to
hire, or promote, or to discharge,
demote, terminate any person, or to

4

In addition to tortious wrongful termination, Burton's
complaint set forth two other causes of action: (1) failure to
pay wages timely upon termination, and (2) recovery of attorney
fees incurred in pursuing timely payment of those wages.
5

Upon this court's request, the Utah Manufacturers
Association ("UMA"), the Utah State American Federation of LaborCongress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), and the
American Civil Liberties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc.
("ACLU"), provided amicus briefs.
3
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retaliate against, harass, or
discriminate in matters of compensation
or in terms, privileges, and conditions
of employment against any person
otherwise qualified, because of race,
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions, aae, if
the individual is 40 years of age or
older, religion, national origin, or
handicap.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) (1994) (emphasis added).
Burton contends that in enacting the foregoing statute, the
legislature has recognized and declared a public policy against
age discrimination in employment practices including termination
of employment. He argues that because the UADA covers only
employers with fifteen or more employees, he has no
administrative remedy through the UADD and that this court should
afford him a remedy by recognizing a tort cause of action for
wrongful termination so as to put him on an equal basis with
employees of employers of fifteen or more employees. In sum,
Burton contends that we should create a cause of action to fill
the void left by the enactment of the UADD. He also asserts that
denying him a tort remedy would violate the open courts guarantee
rs-f
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We begin by observing that under our case law, there is
a presumption that an employment relationship which has no
specified term of duration is an at-will relationship, but that
presumption is subject to a number of limitations. See Fox v.
MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997). In that
case, we recognized:
An at-will employee may overcome that
presumption by demonstrating that (1) there
is an implied or express agreement that the
employment may be terminated only for cause
or upon satisfaction of another agreed-upon
condition; (2) a statute or regulation
restricts the right of an employer to
terminate an employee under certain
conditions; or (3) the termination of
employment constitutes a violation of a clear
and substantial public policy.
Id. (citations omitted). In that case, we further remarked that
not every employment termination that has the effect of violating
some public policy is actionable: "A public policy whose
contravention is achieved by an employment termination must be
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"clear and substantial7 to be actionable." Id. at 860.
Declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and
statutes, but not all statements made in statutes are expressions
of public policy. See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282
(Utah 1992). We will not repeat the review of cases made in Fox
wherein violations of public policy have and have not been found.
Suffice it to observe here that none of them have involved
termination due to the age of the employee.
11
The trial court granted summary judgment to the Exam
Center in reliance on Retherford's holding that the UADA provided
the employee the exclusive remedy for wrongful termination in
violation of the prohibited and discriminatory employment
practices enumerated therein. The employee was not allowed to
bring a tort action for wrongful discharge. However, in that
case the complaining employee was covered by the UADA because her
employer had fifteen or more employees. In the instant case, the
Exam Center has less than fifteen employees, and the UADA affords
Burton no protection or remedy. Thus Retherford's holding
arguably did not extend to small employers who were not within
the purview of the UADA. We must therefore decide whether a
public policy exists justifying the creation of a common law
cause of action for Burton against the Exam Center for allegedly
firing him due to his age.
18
In support of his position that we should create a
common law cause of action to redress his termination, Burton
relies on Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608
(1996) . In that case, the court had to decide whether a common
law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a female employee
based on sex discrimination lies against an employer with less
than fifteen employees. Like our UADD, Maryland's Fair
Employment Practices Act prohibits discrimination in employment
based on race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, sex,
age, marital status, and other grounds. The Maryland Act also
exempts from its terms employers with less than fifteen
employees. The court sustained the plaintiff's right to sue her
employer on the basis of "at least thirty-four statutes, one
executive order, and one constitutional amendment in Maryland
that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain
circumstances. Together these provisions provide strong evidence
of the legislative intent to end discrimination based on sex in
Maryland." Id. at 613-14. The court noted that the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland in Kerrigan v.
Maanum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1992), had
earlier come to the same conclusion, observing that the
employer's interpretation of the Maryland Act would mean that the
"General Assembly intended to grant small businesses in Maryland
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a license to discriminate [on the basis of sex] against their
employees with impunity." Id. at 735.
19
In reaching its decision, the Maryland court relied
upon Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St. 3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653
(1995), where the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a wrongful discharge
claim based on the public policy and a statute prohibiting
discrimination in employment from which the employer was exempt.
The court also cited with approval Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d
912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990), where the Washington Supreme Court
held that a cause of action for wrongful discharge was available
based on a statute prohibiting age discrimination but providing
no remedy. See also Williamson v. Greene, 200 W. Va. 421, 490
S.E.2d 23 (1997), where it was held that even though an employer
of less than twelve employees was not an "employer" within the
meaning of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, a discharged at- ••
will employee may maintain a common law action for retaliatory
discharge against her employer based on alleged sex
discrimination or sexual harassment because sex discrimination
and sexual harassment in employment contravene the public policy
of the state as articulated in the West Virginia Human Rights
Act. For a general discussion of these issues, see Kimberly C.
Simmons, Annotation, Preemption of Wrongful Discharge Cause of
Action by Civil Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994); Cara Yates,
Annotation, Application of State Law to Age Discrimination in
Employment, 51 A.L.R.5th 1 (1997).
510 The California Supreme Court reached the opposite
result in Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074 (Cal. 1994). In
that case, the court was considering a provision of California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), which declared a state
public policy of protecting and safeguarding the right and
opportunity to seek, obtain, and hold employment without
discrimination on various grounds, including age, defined as over
forty years. The administrative remedies provided for in the
FEHA, however, were not made available to employees whose
employer did not regularly employ five or more persons. The
court was asked to decide whether an employee to whom the
administrative remedies were not available may nonetheless
maintain a common law tort action for damages for wrongful
discharge in violation of the public policy stated in the FEHA.
The court concluded that permitting such an action would be
inconsistent with the legislative intent reflected in various
provisions of the FEHA, and particularly that provision which
restricts employer liability for violations of the FEHA age
provision to employers subject to the FEHA. The court wrote:
This exemption of small employers from the
FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted
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simultaneously to and. is inseparable from the
legislative statement of policy. For that
reason, and because no other statute or
constitutional provision bars age
discrimination, we conclude that there
presently exists no "fundamental policy"
which precludes age discrimination by a small
employer. Thus, there is no independent
basis for an action for tortious discharge in
violation of policy.
Id. at 1076.
Ull As we have earlier stated, Burton contends that the
UADA declares a public policy against the termination of
employees who are over the age of forty years and that such
public policy applies to all employees, whether employed by an
employer who has fifteen or more employees ("large employer") or
an employer who has less than fifteen employees ("small
employer"). He argues that small employers were exempted from
the UADA because of the administrative burden it would place upon
the UADD if all employers were under its jurisdiction. He points
out that nothing in the UADA prohibits legal action against small
employers who discriminate and that nationwide there are some
eleven million workers who are not included within the purview of
federal and state anti-discrimination employment acts.
112 We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public
policy which is "clear and substantial" with respect to small
employers. The California Supreme Court's reasoning in Jennings
that "the exemption of small employers from [California's] FEHA
ban on age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to, and is
inseparable from, the legislative statement of policy," id., is
sound and unanswerable. Our legislature has made a similar
decision to prohibit age discrimination in the termination of
employees only by large employers, and if, as Burton contends,
small employers should likewise be prohibited, that is a matter
that the legislature, not the court, should address. An
observation we made in Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah
1979), bears repeating here:
Due respect for the legislative prerogative
in lawmaking requires that the judiciary not
interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy
considerations and the legislative scheme
legitimate object. In matters not affecting
fundamental rights, the prerogative of the
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legislative branch is broad and must by
necessity be so if government is to be by the
people through their elected representatives
and not by judges.
513 Amicus ACLU suggests that the legislature additionally
has declared a public policy against age discrimination in
employment in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2(4), which was repealed in
1995 but was in effect at the time of Burton's termination in
1994. In that statute, the legislature declared that: in rhe
state's own employment practices, there should be equal
employment opportunity without regard to age and other
discriminatory practices. Amicus also relies on Utah
Administrative Code R606-3-2, which prohibits age discrimination
by persons contracting with the state. While arguably a public
policy can be found in that statute and Code, it obviously has no
application to a private employer. Nor do we find any federal
statute that could provide the basis for a tort action against
small employers. See Leathern v. Research Found, of City Univ. of
N.Y. , 658 F"! Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal
claim under federal statute "cannot serve as a basis to expand
employees' remedies under New York State common law of tort").
Because we can find no constitutional provision or other statute
which declares a clear and substantial public policy against age
discrimination in employment practices, we must decline to create
an exception to the general rule prevailing in this state that
employment is presumed to be on an at-will basis for both the
employer and the employee.
514 The instant case can readily be distinguished from
Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 608, one of the principal cases upon
which Burton relies. Molesworth was a case of sex discrimination
in employment. The Maryland court found "at least thirty-four
statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional amendment"
that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain
circumstances. Id. at 613-14. There is no such constitutional
or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against
discrimination on account of age in the termination of employment
of employees of small employers. The dissent in the instant case
relies on Molesworth but fails to note that in finding a public
policy against sex discrimination by small employers, the court
relied not on the anti-discrimination act that exempted them, but
on "thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one
constitutional amendment." In Utah, there is no such basis for
as to find a public policy against age discrimination in
employment. We have found no cases from other jurisdictions
recognizing a public policy against age discrimination by small
employers in a statute such as our UADA which expressly exempts
small employers.
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515 In Jennings, the California court offered an
explanation of the FEHA small employer exception. They suggested
that the legislature made the exception in the FEHA because the
framers
"believe[d] that discrimination on a small
scale would prove exceedingly difficult to
detect and police. . . .
[I]t was believed
that an employment situation in which there
were less than five employees might involve a
close personal relationship between employer
and employees and that fair employment laws
should not apply where such a relationship
existed. Finally, the framers were
interested primarily in attacking protracted
large-scale discrimination by important
employers and strong unions. Their aim was
not so much to redress each discrete instance
of individual discrimination as to eliminate
the egregious and continued discriminatory
practices of economically powerful
organizations. Thus, they could afford to
exempt the small employer.
Jennings, 876 P.2d at 1082 (quoting Tobriner, California FEPC
(1965), 16 Hastings L.J. 333, 342).
516 Several federal courts have expressed the same reasons
for the small employers exemption found in certain federal antidiscrimination statutes. See e.g. , Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66
F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (legislative history indicates
that "the protection of intimate and personal relations existing
in small business" was reason for Title VII's small employer
exemption); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587
(9th Cir. 1993) ("Congress did not want to burden small entities
with the costs associated with litigating discrimination
claims.").
1117 There is an additional reason why we should not create
a tort action against small employers. Under the UADA, a covered
employee alleging age discrimination must assert his claim within
180 days of the alleged discrimination. Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-7.1 (1) (c) (1994). The charge is filed at the UADD and is
handled administratively. Emphasis in the administrative process
is placed on conciliation and voluntary resolution. The UADA
mandates that the administrative agency "attempt a settlement
between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion."
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(3) (a). If the claimant is successful,
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the relief provided includes reinstatement, back pay and
benefits, and attorney fees, but no compensatory or punitive
damages may be awarded. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(9). This is
all done without charge by the administrative agency. In
contrast to that simplified procedure, if a small employer were
subjected to a tort action in the courts, he would have to hire
his own attorney to defend the action against him, and damages
could be awarded against him. The action presumably could be
brought within four years, not limited by the 180-day limitation
in the UADA, and a jury trial might be demanded. The dissent
would subject the small employers of this state to those burdens.
As stated by the Jennings court: "It would be unreasonable to
expect employers who are expressly exempted from the FEHA ban on
age discrimination to nonetheless realize that they must comply
with the law from which they are exempted under pain of possible
tort liability. We do not ascribe such a purpose to the
Legislature." 876 P.2d at 1083. To that sound expression, we
add that we would be no more justified in creating a tort action
to lie against small employers than we would be to create a tort
action against religious organizations or associations, which are
also expressly exempted from the provisions of the UADA. The
dissent charges that our decision opens the door for small
employers in Utah to discriminate not only on the basis of age,
but on the basis of sex, race, religion, and disability. Suffice
it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may
present different considerations and a public policy against
discrimination on those grounds might conceivably be found in
other statutes of this state. That question is not before us and
we express no opinion on that subject.
118 Lastly, Burton contends that denying him a tort remedy
against his employer violates article I, section 11 of the Utah
Constitution, which provides in part, "All courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law
. . . ." Burton cites no authority that would require us to
create a remedy for him, and we know of no case law that would
require this court to do so under that constitutional provision.
To the contrary, nearly eighty-five years ago this court held
that where no right of action is given or no remedy exists under
sither the common law or statute, this section creates none.
3rown v. Wiahtman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (1915). Thus, there is
10 constitutional violation.
519
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Judgment affirmed.
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120 Justice Zimmerman and Justice Russon concur in Chief
Justice Howe's opinion.

DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
121 I respectfully dissent. While the present case concerns
the limited issue of age discrimination by employers with fewer
than fifteen employees ("small employers'"), the majority's
decision will apply to all kinds of employment discrimination.
Specifically, by determining that Dr. Burton has no cause of
action for age discrimination against his employer because the
employer employs fewer than fifteen employees, the majority has
opened the door to all small employers to discriminate not only
on the basis of age, but also on the basis of the other
categories protected by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("Act"),
Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-5-101 to -108 (1997 and Supp. 1999), l
including race, sex, religion, and disability. In light of the
fact that the vast majority of Utah employers qualify as small
employers, we should not open this door. Instead, this court
should recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful
termination against employers who discriminate on the basis of
age.
122 This court adopted a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine in Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771
P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.).
There, we stated:
[W]e recognize that a public policy exception
is necessarily a threshold issue implicated
in our reexamination of the scope of Utah' s
at-will rule, and we have therefore been
willing to consider and define it. We also
stress that actions for wrongful termination
based on this exception must involve
substantial and important public policies.
To this end, we will construe public policies
narrowly and will generally utilize those
based on prior legislative pronouncements
. . . applying only those principles which

1

At the time the instant case was filed, the Act was
codified at title 34, chapter 35 of the Utah Code. The relevant
sections of the Act were not affected by the subsequent
renumbering and amendments. Unless otherwise noted, all
reference to the Act hereinafter are to the 1994 version.
11

No. 980040

are so substantial and fundamental that there
can be virtually no question as to their
importance for promotion of the public good.
Id. at 1043 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.). The majority
has failed to undertake the careful analysis of public policy
that Berube demands, creating an enormous loophole which Utah
employers may exploit to the detriment of many Utah employees.
Prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of age
constitutes a substantial and important public policy sufficient
to support a common law cause of action.
$23 In the Act, the legislature pronounced that "[i]t is a
discriminatory . . . employment practice . . . for an employer to
. . . discharge [or] . . . terminate any person . . . otherwise
qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions, age, . . . religion, national
origin, or handicap." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1) (a) (i) . The
legislature, in limiting the Act's coverage to employers with
more than fifteen employees, appears to have been balancing two
policies: vigorously opposing discrimination in employment
practices while simultaneously protecting small business from the
burdens of the statutory remedies. The legislature's decision
not to extend the Act's remedies to employees of small employers
in no way undermines the significance of its core policy
principles. It is not in the public interest to permit
discrimination in employment based on age, race, sex, religion,
and disability.
124 The Act creates a substantial bureaucratic system to
implement its aims. It mandates the creation of the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division (the "Division") , as well as the AntiDiscrimination Advisory Committee to that Division (the
"Committee"). See id. §§ 34-35-3, -4.5(1). The governor is
directed to appoint the members of the Committee, including "one
small business representative." Id. § 34-35-4.5(1)(a)(i)
(emphasis added). The Division is given broad powers, including
the authority to "receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon
complaints alleging discrimination in employment . . . or the
existence of a discriminatory.or prohibited employment practice
by a person, [or] an employer." Id. § 34-35-5(1)(c) (emphasis
added). Significantly, the Division is not limited to acting
against "employers" in its fact finding or its passing upon
discrimination complaints; rather, it is also empowered to act
against "persons." Id. § 34-35-5(1) (c) . Repeatedly, the
Division is charged with the ambitious task of fighting
employment discrimination by such means as advising the governor,
recommending legislation, and cooperating with both public and
private groups. See id. § 34-35-5(1)(h), (j), (k). It is even
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given the power to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths and
compel the production of documents and papers. See id.
§ 34-35-5(3)(a)(i) to (iii) - Finally, the legislature has
instructed the Division to "issue publications and reports of
investigations and research that will tend to promote good will
among the various racial, religious, and ethnic groups of the
state, and that will minimize or eliminate discrimination in
employment because of race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, age, or handicap."
Id. § 34-35-5(1)(g) (emphasis
added). Clearly, the legislature believed the Act's purposes
were to have broad and important implications for the welfare of
Utah workers.
525 In addition to this strong statutory support for
recognizing claims for wrongful termination based on age
discrimination, two other policy considerations support the
availabilitw of such a cause of action. First, a significant
majority—69.7%--of the Utah employer population employs fourteen
or fewer employees.2 Thus, the legislature's broad goal of
eliminating employment discrimination is addressed in only a
limited way by the Act, and can in fact be avoided by the
majority of Utah•employers. Second, the way in which a state
regulates relations between employees and employers has a
significant impact on the quality of life for many of its
citizens, and ultimately for the society as a whole. The
"workplace climate'' of a state is an important part of its
opportunities for economic growth and long-term development. It
is an entirely appropriate arena for the operation of policy
choices intended to benefit the public interest, as indeed is
manifest by the legislature's, choice to embody antidiscrimination principles in statute. Utah should not be a place
where workers can be fired, paid less, or otherwise treated less
favorably by nearly 70% of all employers on the basis of their
race, sex, religion, disability, or age.
526 The majority decision undermines Utah's publicly
proclaimed desire to eliminate employment discrimination.
Because there is no reason in logic, history, case law, or policy
why discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and
disability may be distinguished from that based on age, I believe
the majority's decision will apply to all categories protected in
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act and will affect all forms of
invidious discrimination by small employers. It seems strange
indeed that this court should declare that it is not a violation

2

This number is based on data from the second quarter of
1999 and is provided by the Division of Workforce Information and
Payment Services.
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of public policy to discriminate against someone in employment
because of race, sex, religion, disability, or age, no matter the
size of the employer.
527 The issue before us has been addressed by other
jurisdictions. Noteworthy is Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608
(Md. 1996) . In that case, the plaintiff, alleging sex
discrimination against a small employer, also sought to bring an
action based on common law wrongful termination.. Id. at 611-12.
The court was faced with a broad statute including the Maryland
Legislature's intent to prohibit invidious employment
discrimination and a limitation appearing to exempt small
employers. See Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, §§ 14, 15(b) (1999). The
court stated that ''absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of
public policy, there ordinarily is no violation of public policy
by an employer's discharging an at will employee." Molesworth,
672 A.2d at 613 (internal quotation and citations omitted). The
court then analyzed the various enforcement provisions of the
statute including- one creatine an acency called the Commission
on Human Relations, with powers and a mandate similar to the Utah
Division. Id. at 613. While there are differences between the
Maryland statute and case law and our own, they are minor
compared to the similarity of the overall intent exhibited in
both cases: the elimination of the detrimental effects of
employment discrimination on the public interest. The Molesworth
court found that the statutory scheme was not intended to exclude
small employers from employment discrimination policies, but
rather to "provide[] a clear statement of public policy
sufficient to support a common law cause of action for wrongful
discharge against an employer exempted by [having fewer than
fifteen employees]." Id. at 616. The court, in analyzing the
intent of the legislative scheme, found that while small
businesses were excluded from the burdens imposed by the
administrative mechanism, they were not excluded from the
important public policy at the heart of the statute. See id.;
Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733, 735-36
(D. Md. 1992); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 660-61 (Ohio
1995); Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1264-66 (Wash. 1990). I
tfould adopt the reasoning of the Molesworth court as I believe
its holding is in keeping with the legislature's statutory scheme
and with the substantial and important public policy behind that
statutory scheme.
K28 In conclusion, the language of Berube is clear:
"Public policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied
Ln legislative enactments. The legislature, acting in consonance
tfith constitutional principles and expressing the will of the
Deople, determines that which is in the public interest and
serves the public good." Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. I believe
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that the "public good" in this case would be best served by
permitting a common law cause of action for wrongful termination
against employers who discriminate on the basis of age, race,
sex, religion, and disability.

(

I29 Justice Stewart concurs in Associate Chief Justice
Durham's dissenting opinion.
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47 USC Sec. 555a
21 USC Sec. 848
49 USC Sec. 306
7 USC Sec. 2020
2 USC Sec. 1503
2 USC Sec. 1201
2 USC Sec. 658a
12 USC Sec. 3106a
20 USC Sec. 2561-2563
20 USC Sec. 1087tt
28 USC Sec. 1867
22 USC Sec. 2426
15 USC Sec. 3151
15 USC Sec. 3101
48 USC Sec. 1708
15 USC Sec. 1691c
47 USC Sec. 398
18 USC Sec. 3593
42USCSec.290ff-l
5 USC Sec. 3302
20 USC Sec. 1231e
5 USC Sec. 7151 to 7154
29 USC Sec. 1501
10 USC Sec. 1034
12 USC Sec. 3015
12 USC Sec. 1735f-5
20 USC Sec. 1756
20 USC Sec. 1703
20 USC Sec. 1011
31 USC Sec. 6711
29 USC Sec. 633a
31 USC Sec. 6720
12 USC Sec. 1823
12 USC Sec. 1821
20 USC Sec. 7235
20 USC Sec. 7233
20 USC Sec. 7232

01/26/98 Sec. 476. Sex discrimination prohibited
01/05/99 Sec. 775. Sex discrimination; enforcement; other legal remedies
01/05/99 Sec. 1681. Sex
01/05/99 Sec. 1862. Discrimination prohibited
01/05/99 Sec. 602. Employees
01/26/98 Sec. 5808. Restrictions
01/26/98 Sec. 5608. Restrictions
01/26/98 Sec. 4805. Membership
01/05/99 Sec. 3905. Personnel actions
01/26/98 Sec. 435. Procedures
01/26/98 Sec. 151. Purposes of chapter; Federal Communications Commission
01/05/99 Sec. 7204. Other prohibitions
01/05/99 Sec. 1087-2. Student Loan Marketing Association
01/05/99 Sec. 2755. Discrimination prohibited if based on race, religion, natio
01/05/99 Sec. 2314. Furnishing of defense articles or related training or other
01/05/99 Sec. 169 Id. Applicability of other laws
01/05/99 Sec. 2504. Peace Corps volunteers
01/26/98 Sec. 1542. Voting franchise; discrimination prohibited
01/26/98 Sec. 391. Recognition of amateur sports organizations
01/26/98 Sec. 555a. Limitation of franchising authority liability
01/05/99 Sec. 848. Continuing criminal enterprise
01/26/98 Sec. 306. Prohibited discrimination
01/05/99 Sec. 2020. Administration
01/05/99 Sec. 1503. Exclusions
01/05/99 Sec. 1201. Short title; purpose; definition
01/05/99 Sec. 658a. Exclusions
01/05/99 Sec. 3106a. Compliance with State and Federal laws
01/05/99 Sec. 2561 to 2563.
01/05/99 Sec. 1087tt. Discretion of student financial aid administrators
01/05/99 Sec. 1867. Challenging compliance with selection procedures
01/05/99 Sec. 2426. Discrimination against United States personnel
01/05/99 Sec. 3151. Nondiscrimination
01/05/99 Sec. 3101. Congressional findings
01/26/98 Sec. 1708. Discrimination prohibited in rights of access to, and benefits
01/05/99 Sec. 1691c. Administrative enforcement
01/26/98 Sec. 398. Federal interference or control
01/05/99 Sec. 3593. Special hearing to determine whether a sentence of death is
01/26/98 Sec. 290ff-l. Requirements with respect to carrying out purpose
01/05/99 Sec. 3302. Competitive service; rules
01/05/99 Sec. 1231e. Use of funds withheld
01/05/99 (Sec.. 7151 to 7154. Transferred)
01/26/98 Sec. 1501, Statement of purpose
01/05/99 Sec. 1034. Protected communications; prohibition of retaliatory person
01/05/99 Sec. 3015. Eligibility of cooperatives
01/05/99 Sec. 1735f-5. Prohibition against discrimination on account of sex in
01/05/99 Sec. 1756. Remedies with respect to school district lines
01/05/99 Sec. 1703. Denial of equal educational opportunity prohibited
01/05/99 Sec. 1011. Antidiscrimination
01/26/98 Sec. 6711. Prohibited discrimination
01/26/98 Sec. 633a. Nondiscrimination on account of age in Federal Government e
01/26/98 Sec. 6720. Definitions, application, and administration
01/05/99 Sec. 1823. Corporation monies
01/05/99 Sec. 1821. Insurance Funds
01/05/99 Sec. 7235. Criteria and priorities
01/05/99 Sec. 7233. Programs authorized
01/05/99 Sec. 7232. Statement of purposes

20 USC Sec
20 USC Sec
22 USC Sec
20 USC Sec
22 USC Sec
31 USC Sec
10 USC Sec
29 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
29 USC Sec
29 USC Sec
29 USC Sec
29 USC Sec
29 USC Sec
29 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
15 USC Sec
20 USC Sec
22 USC Sec
10 USC Sec
42 USC Sec
20 USC Sec
42 USC Sec

7206
2396
6401
1087-4
2661a
732
1561
1532
2000e-4
10406
13791
2651
1737
1533
1531
1514
1503
3631
708
300x-57
300w-7
290cc-33
5309
9906 01/
8625
1437w
12832
3123
902
6870
10604
10504
1975a
11504
5919
5151
292d
631
5934
262p-4n
481
603
6231
14193

01/05/99 Sec 7206 Applications and requirements
01/05/99 Sec 2396 Federal laws guaranteeing civil rights
01/05/99 Sec 6401 Findings, policy
01/05/99 Sec 1087-4 Discrimination in secondary markets prohibited
01/05/99 Sec 2661a Foreign contracts or arrangements, discrimination
01/26/98 Sec 732 Personnel management system
01/05/99 Sec 1561 Complaints of sexual harassment investigation
01/26/98 Sec 1532 State job training coordinating council
01/26/98 Sec 2000e-4 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
01/26/98 Sec 10406 Discrimination prohibited
01/26/98 Sec 13791 Community schools youth services and supervision grant pro
01/26/98 Sec 2651 Effect on other laws
01/26/98 Sec 1737 Nontraditional employment demonstration program
01/26/98 Sec 1533 State education coordination and grants
01/26/98 Sec 1531 Governor's coordmation and special services plan
01/26/98 Sec 1514 Job training plan
01/26/98 Sec 1503 Definitions
01/26/98 Sec 3631 Violations, penalties
01/26/98 Sec 708 Nondiscrimination provisions
01/26/98 Sec 300x-57 Nondiscrimination
01/26/98 Sec 300w-7 Nondiscrimination provisions
01/26/98 Sec 290cc-33 Nondiscrimination
01/26/98 Sec 5309 Nondiscrimination m programs and activities
26/98 Sec 9906 Nondiscrimination provisions
01/26/98 Sec 8625 Nondiscrimination provisions
01/26/98 Sec 1437w Choice in public housing management
01/26/98 Sec 12832 Nondiscrimination
01/26/98 Sec 3123 Discrimination on basis of sex
01/26/98 Sec 902 Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, other officers
01/26/98 Sec 6870 Prohibition agamst discrimination, notification to funded
01/26/98 Sec 10604 Administrative provisions
01/26/98 Sec 10504 Prohibition of discrimination
01/26/98 Sec 1975a Duties of Commission
01/26/98 Sec 11504 Waiver or modification of housing and community development
01/26/98 Sec 5919 Loan guarantees and commitments for alternative fuel demons
01/26/98 Sec 5151 Nondiscrimination in disaster assistance
01/26/98 Sec 292d Eligibility of borrowers and terms of insured loans
01/05/99 Sec 631 Declaration of policy
01/05/99 Sec 5934 Functions of National Board
01/05/99 Sec 262p-4n Equal employment opportunities
01/05/99 Sec 481 Race relations, gender discrimination, and hate group activi
01/26/98 Sec 603 Grants to States
01/05/99 Sec 6231 Requirements
01/26/98 Sec 14193 Purposes
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Utah

Sex Discrimination Regulations
Code Anno. 11-25-12
Code Anno. 13-7-1,3
Code Anno. 26-8a-501Code Anno. 57-3,5,6,7_

Regulations
R137-1-3
R199-8-3
R277-112-3
R277-911-3
R432-200-7
R432-270-5
R432-550-7
R432-700-8
R432-750-7
R477-1-1
R477-2-4
R477-2-5
R477-15-1
R512-10-3
R547-2-16
R547-4-16
R590-76-6
R590-83
R606-3-2
R606-4-2
R686-103-7
R994-405-107
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E. PAUL WOOD (3537)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorney for Defendant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ANGELA BYERS,
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
AUTHORITY

Plaintiff,
v.
CREATIVE CORNER, INC., and
LYN PELTON,
Defendant.

Case No. 990911231
Judge Tyrone Medley
-00O00-

Defendants' Creative Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton submit their Reply Memorandum
to the Supplemental Authority submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. This Memorandum shall show the Court that the case
law and statutes submitted by Plaintiff as "Supplemental Authority" unequivocally
demonstrates that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
that Defendants are also entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
I.
THE BURTON CASE ENTITLES DEFENDANTS TO JUDGEMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS.
Fundamentally, all legal issues advanced by the Plaintiff against the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim were rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in
the case of Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and Medical Clinic, et.al. 2000 UT 18 (Utah
2000). attached as Exhibit "A". The Burton case is virtually identical to the case now before
the Court, except the Plaintiff in the Burton matter alleged age discrimination. Plaintiff
Burton alleged that his employer, Exam Center and Industrial General Medical Clinic and its
president and chief operating officer, Howard Boulter, terminated him based upon age.
However, since the employer maintained less than 15 employees, no case could be filed
against the employer under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. ("UADA") The Plaintiff took
the legal position that the UADA created a public policy exception to the general employeeat-will rule, allowing employers to terminate employees without cause. The trial court
granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, relying on the case of Retherford v.
AT&T Communication, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992), holding that the UADA pre-empts any
:ommon law cause of action for wrongful termination and since no remedy was available
ander the UADA, Burton's claim for age discrimination must be dismissed. Burton appealed
he grant of summary judgment.
2

The Utah Supreme Court commenced its analysis by indicating that an at-will
employee may overcome the presumption that the employment relationship has no specific
duration by demonstrating, inter alia, that termination of employment constitutes a violation
of a clear and substantial public policy. In deciding that the UADA did not create a "clear
and substantial" public policy against termination of employment based upon age, the Utah
Supreme Court cited the California Supreme Court case of Jennings v. Marralle 8 CAL. 4th
121, 876 P. 2d 1074, 32 CAL. RPTR. 2d 275 (Cal. 1994), which addressed California Fair
Employment and Housing Act. ("FEHA"). The FEHA declared a state public policy of
protecting and safe guarding the right and opportunity to seek and hold employment without
discrimination on various ground, including age, which was defined as being older than 40
years. However, the act applied only to those employers who regularly employed 5 or more
people. The Jennings Court was asked to decide whether wrongful termination based upon
the FEHA prohibited against discrimination violated public policy thereby creating a tort
claim against an employee of less than 5 people. The Jennings Court held:
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on age discrimination
was enacted simultaneously to and is inseparable from the legislative statement
of policy. For that reason, and because no other statute or constitutional
provision bars age discrimination, we conclude that there presently exist no
"fundamental policy" which precludes age discrimination by a small employer.
Thus, there is no independent basis for an action for tortious discharge in
violation of policy. Burton at 7, citing Jennings, 876 P. 2d at 1076.
Reply on Jennings, the Utah Supreme Court then generally rejected the primary
argument advanced by Plaintiff Byers in this case that the UADA creates a public policy of
any nature against discrimination:
3

We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public policy that is "clear
and substantial" with respect to small employers. The California Supreme
Court's reasoning in Jennings that "the exemption of small employers from
[California's] FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to,
and is inseparable from, the legislative statement of policy," is sound and
unanswerable. Our legislature has made a similar decision to prohibit age
discrimination in the termination of employees only by large employers, and
if, as Burton contends, small employers should likewise be prohibited, that is a
matter that the legislature, not the Court, should address. Burton at 7.
The Burton Court also cited Jennings with approval to the effect that laws prohibiting
discrimination should not apply to the employer/employee relationship of small employers
and that the legislature intended to create a redress for discrimination only against larger
employers. Burton at 9.
Finally, the Burton Court again cited the Jennings case for the proposition that the
Utah legislature did not extend liability to small employers for discrimination:
As stated by the Jennings Court: "It would be unreasonable to expect
employers who are expressly exempted from FEHA ban on age discrimination
to nonetheless realize that they must comply with the law from which they are
exempted under pain of possible Court liability. We do not ascribe such a
purpose to the legislature." Jennings, 876 P. 2d at 1083. To that sound
expression, we add that we would be no more justified in creating a tort action
to lie against small employers then we would to create a tort action against
religious organizations or associations, which are also expressly exempted
from the provisions of the UADA. Burton at 10.
The Burton Court's judicial interpretation of the UADA extending an exemption from
liability for discrimination to small employers is particularly applicable to Creative Corner,

4

Inc., and Lyn Pelton, the Defendants in the case before the Court. Creative Corner, Inc.,
employs four (4) people.
The Burton Court decided against the Plaintiff on all significant legal propositions
which are advanced in this case. In the Complaint in this case, the only Utah statute cited is
the UADA in support of Plaintiffs claim that a public policy exists against small employer's
terminating employees based upon sex. However, the Burton Court specifically addressed
that issue holding: "We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public policy which is
"clear and substantial" with respect to small employers. Burton at 7. Therefore, the
Complaint should be dismissed as deficient on its face.
If the Plaintiff desired to go forth under the dictum stated in the Burton case, the
Plaintiff should have sought leave of this Court to amend the Complaint and state in the
Complaint other state statutes creating a public policy exception to the at-will rule. This, the
Plaintiff failed to do and Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleading since the Utah
Supreme Court held in Burton that the UADA generally does not create a "clear and
substantial public policy" relating to small employers.
II.
PLAINTIFF HAS COMPLETELY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A
"VIOLATION OF A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY"
Plaintiffs extraordinarily feeble attempt to capitalize on the dictum in the Burton case
falls catastrophically short of the mark. The Burton Court, in dictum, stated:
5

Suffice it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may present
different considerations and a public policy against discrimination on those
grounds might conceivably be found in other statutes of this state. Burton at
10.
The Plaintiff apparently takes the position that this Court should perform Plaintiff's
work and prove Plaintiffs case for her by researching the 156 federal statutes, 5 Utah State
statutes and 22 Utah regulations cited by Plaintiff to discover whether there is an applicable
public policy which is "clear and substantial" among all of the statutes. No analysis of any
:ited statute to support the public policy exception was performed by Plaintiff in her
Supplemental Authority.
The Plaintiff has remarkably failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a clear and
substantial public policy required under the circumstances by the Utah Supreme Court to
;how an exception to the employee-at-will doctrine. The pubic policy exception was first
:learly ennuniciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Peterson v. Browning 832 P. 2d 1280
Utah 1992). In Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court described the public policy exception as
bllows:
Actions falling within the public policy exception typically involve termination
of employment for (1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, (2)
performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising a legal right or privilege,
(citations omitted) Peterson, 832 P. 2d at 1281.
The Court then stated:
This Court has indicated that it will narrowly construe the public policies on
which a wrongful termination action may be based, (citations omitted) It is
not the purpose of the exception to eliminate employer discretion in
6

discharging at-will employees (citations omitted), or to impose a requirement
of "good cause" for discharge of every employee. Accordingly, we hold that
the public policy exception applies in this state when the statutory language
expressing the public conscience is clear and when the effected interest of
society are substantial. The identification of clear and substantial public
policies will require case-by-case development. Peterson 832 P. 2d 1281 - 82.
The Peterson Court then clearly delineated the requirements a Plaintiff must establish
to provide a showing of a "clear and substantial public policy":
To provide the basis for an action under the public policy exception, a
violation of a state or federal law must contravene the clear and substantial
public policy of the State of Utah. Although many state and federal laws will
reflect Utah pubic policy, and may, in fact, provide a source of Utah public
policy, a Plaintiff must establish the connection between the law violated and
the public policies of Utah. Peterson, 832 P. 2d at 1282.
The Peterson Court then examined a specific statute which allegedly had been violated
and examined how violation of the specific statute contravene public policy holding "based
on the information available to us, it appears that the Utah Public Policy at issue is both clear
and substantial". Peterson, 832 P. 2d at 1282.
In this case, Angela Byers has done nothing more in her "Supplemental Authority"
than request a search engine in a computer to search state and federal statutes for the words
"sex discrimination" and regurgitate the computer's response. The Supplemental Authority
contains virtually no required showing of any statute which has been violated. There is no
statute which is cited that prohibits discrimination based upon sex in private employment.
The Supplemental Authority contains no demonstration of violation of a "clear and substantial
public policy".
7

Each of the Utah statutes and regulations cited by Angela Byers in support of her
claim have been reviewed at length by Defendant's counsel. All of the statutes refer to
either state employment, state funded jobs, or state licensed facilities. There is virtually no
reference to solely private employment. Additionally, many of the statutes and regulations
prohibits discrimination based upon age, which the Burton Court has already held to not
create a clear and substantial public policy against discrimination in the State of Utah.
The Burton Court directly rejected the argument that a statute governing state
employment or involving state action, creates a clear and substantial public policy. The
Burton Court stated:
Amicus ACLU suggests that the legislature additionally has declared a public policy
against age discrimination in employment in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2(4), which was
repealed in 1995 but was in effect at the time of Burton's termination in 1994. In that
statute, the legislature declared that in the state's own employment practices, there
should be equal employment opportunity without regard to age and other
discriminatory practices. Amicus also relies on Utah Administrative Code R606-3-2,
which prohibits age discrimination by persons contracting with the state. "While
arguably a public policy can be found in that statute and code, it obviously has no
application to a private employer. Nor do we find any federal statute that could
provide the basis for a tort action against small employers, citing Leathern v. Research
Found of City Univ. of N.Y., 658 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal
claim under federal statute "cannot service as a basis to expand employees' remedies
under New York State common law of tort"). Burton at 8.
Angela Byers has not, and cannot, cite a statute which creates a clear and substantial
public policy in the State of Utah against private employers with less then 15 employees
liscriminating against employees based upon sex.

8

CONCLUSION
Angela Byer's Complaint has been challenged on its face and is singularly deficient.
After having been provided an opportunity to address the deficiency, Angela Byers has failed
in her burden to demonstrate an exception to the at-will employment policy in the State of
Utah where she is employed by an employer having less then 15 employees. The state
legislature his not provided a remedy for the allegation nor is there any statute which Angela
Byers has demonstrated creates a clear and substantial public policy. Angela Byers claims
should be dismissed both on the face of the pleading and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
DATED this ^ d a y of February, 2000.

LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

Paul Wood
Attorneys for Defendants

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this _//_ day of February, 2000, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
AUTHORITY to be hand delivered, to the following:
Robert H. Wilde
Blake A. Nakamura
Attorneys for Plaintiff
935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
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EXHIBA? A

2000

UT 18

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

[ubert C. Burton, M.D.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 980040

v
xam Center Industrial &
eneral Medical Clinic, Inc.,
nd Howard Boulter,
Defendants and A.ppellees

F I L E D
January 19, 2000

hird District, Salt Lake County
he Honorable Sandra Peuler
trorneys:

Robert H. Wilde, Kevin C. Probasco, Midvale, for
plaintiff
Glen M. Richman, Bart J. Johnsen, Salt Lake City,
for defendants
Lois A. Baar, W. Mark Gavre, Salt Lake City, for
amicus Utah Manufacturers Association
Stephen C. Clark, Salt Lake City, for amicus American
Civil Liberties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc.
Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah
State American Federation of Labor—Congress of
Industrial Organizations

)WE, Chief Justice:
11
Plaintiff Hubert C. Burton, M.D., appeals from the
•ial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants Exam Center
Ldustrial & General Medical Clinic, Inc. (the "Clinic") , and
>ward Boulter in this action wherein Burton alleges that his
iployment with the Clinic was terminated because of his age.
BACKGROUND
i2
In July 1994, Boulter, president and chief operating
ficer of the Clinic, terminated the sixty-nine-year-old Burton,
part-time physician at the Clinic. Boulter told Burton that

the Clinic had hired a full-time physician, eliminating the need
for Burton's services. Boulter explained that the decision to
hire this new physician was made suddenly, out of necessity, and
stated: "I [Boulter] didn't know how much longer you older guys
wanted to work, and I felt that we couldn't pass up this
opportunity to employ a full-time physician."1 Burton
subsequently filed a complaint with the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division ("UADD"), alleging his termination was age related.2
The UADD responded that because the Clinic had fewer than fifteen
employees, under the terms of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
("UADA")3 the Clinic was not under the UADD's jurisdiction. The
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to
634 (1998) ("ADEA"), and many similar state acts typically exempt
small employers from their provisions.
13
Burton then filed this action against the Clinic and
Boulter (collectively, "Exam Center"), alleging that his firing
violated a public policy found in both state and federal statutes
against taking employment actions toward employees because of
their age and asserting that violation of that public policy

1

The parties dispute exactly what was said at that meeting;
however, in reviewing a summary judgment, it is well settled that
we relate the facts of the case and all reasonable inferences
arising therefrom in a light favorable to the nonmoving party,
see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Utah 1994), and we
do so here.
2

Burton alleged that this new doctor was a "much younger"
man. His exact age .is unclear from the record, but he was over
the age of forty.
3

At the time of Dr. Burton's termination, title 34, chapter
35 of the Utah Code embodied the UADA. Unless noted otherwise,
all references herein to the UADA will be to the 1994 statutes.
The UADA contains the following definitions:
(6) "Employee" means any person applying
with or employed by an employer.
(7) "Employer" means the state or any
political subdivision . . . , and every other
person employing 15 or more employees within
the state for each working day in each of 20
calendar weeks or more in the current or
preceding calendar year; but it does not
include religious organizations or
associations . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(6), (7).

gives rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination.4 Exam
Center moved for summary judgment on Burton's tortious wrongful
termination allegation. After a hearing on the motion and the
submission of supplemental briefs, the trial court denied the
summary judgment, citing the existence of a factual dispute.
Upon Exam Center's motion for reconsideration, however, the trial
court reversed its earlier ruling and granted the summary
judgment, based on language from Retherford v. AT&T
Communications, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992), and held that the UADA
preempts any common law cause of action for tortious wrongful
termination. Burton now appeals from rhis grant of summary
judgment.5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
f4
Before granting summary judgment, a court must, after »"•
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, find that no disputed issues of material fact exist and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harnicher v. University of Utah Med.
Ctr. , 962 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 1998). Review of a trial court's
grant of summary judgment includes a determination of whether the
trial court correctly applied governing law, affording no
deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of
Law. See Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213,
L216 (Utah 1999); Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 69.
ANALYSIS
15

The UADA provides:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice:
(a)(i) for an employer to refuse to
hire, or promote, or to discharge,
demote, terminate any person, or to

4

In addition to tortious wrongful termination, Burton's
:omplaint set forth two other causes of action: (1) failure to
>ay wages timely upon termination, and (2) recovery of attorney
ees incurred in pursuing timely payment of those wages.
5

Upon this court's request, the Utah Manufacturers
ssociation P U M A " ) , the Utah State American Federation of Laborongress of Industrial Organizations CxAFL-CIO") , and the
merican Civil Liberties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc.
"ACLU"), provided amicus briefs.
3

retaliate against, harass, o i:
discriminate in matters of compensation
or in terms, privileges, and conditions
of employment against any person
otherwise qualified, because of race,
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions, age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or
older, religion, national origin, or
handicap.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) (1994) (emphasi s added).
Burton contends t.hat In enacting the foregoing st:atute, the
]egislature has recognized and declared a public policy against
age discrimination in employment practices including termination
of employment. He argues that because the UADA covers only
employers with fifteen or more employees, he has no
administrative remedy through the UADD and that this court should
afford him a remedy by recognizing a tort cause of action for
wrongful termination so as to put him on an equal basis with
employees of employers of fifteen or more employees. In sum,
Burton contends that we should create a cause of action to fill
the void left by the enactment: of the UADD. He also asserts that
denying him. a tort remedy would violate the open courts guarantee
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We begin by observing that under our case law, there is
a presumption that an employment relationship which has no
specified term of duration is an at-will relationship, but that
presumption is subject to a number of limitations. See Fox v.
MCI Communications Corp,, 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997). In that
case, we recognized: •
An at -wil 1 employee may overcome that
presumption by demonstrating that (] ) there
is an implied or express agreement that the
employment may be terminated only for cause
or upon satisfaction of another agreed-upon
condition; (2) a statute or regulation
restricts the right of an employer to
terminate an employee under certain
c o n d i t i o n s ; o r ( 3) t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f
e m p l o y m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of a clear
a i i • :i s u b s t a n t j a I p \ I b J i c p o 1 j c y
Id. (citations o m i t t e d ) .
In that casef
we further remarked, that
not every e m p l o y m e n t termination that has the effect of violating
some public policy is a c t i o n a b l e : "A public policy whose
c o n t r a v e n t i o n is achieved by an employment termination must be

' c l e a r and s u b s t a n t i a l " to be actionable.' 7 Id. at 860.
Declarations of p u b l i c p o l i c y can be found in c o n s t i t u t i o n s and
s t a t u t e s , but not a l l statements made in s t a t u t e s are expressions
of public p o l i c y . See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282
(Utah 1992) . We w i l l not repeat the review of cases made in Fox
wherein v i o l a t i o n s of p u b l i c policy have and have not been found.
Suffice i t to observe here t h a t none of them have involved
termination due t o t h e age of the employee.
l7
The t r i a l court granted summary judgment to the Exam
- e n t e r in r e l i a n c e on Retherford's holding t h a t the UADA provided
the employee the e x c l u s i v e remedy for wrongful termination in
violation of the p r o h i b i t e d and discriminatory employment
practices enumerated t h e r e i n . The employee was not allowed to
Dring a t o r t a c t i o n for wrongful discharge. However, in that
:ase the complaining employee was covered by the UADA because her
employer had f i f t e e n or more employees. In the i n s t a n t case, the
Cxam Center has l e s s than fifteen employees, and the UADA affords
3urton no p r o t e c t i o n or remedy. Thus Retherford's holding
irguably did not extend t o small employers who were not within
:he purview of t h e UADA. We must therefore decide whether a
m b l i c policy e x i s t s j u s t i f y i n g the c r e a t i o n of a common law
:ause of a c t i o n for Burton against the Exam Center for allegedly
:iring him due t o h i s age.
f8
In support of h i s position that we should create a
:ommon law cause of a c t i o n t o redress his termination, Burton
e l i e s on Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608
1996) . In t h a t c a s e , t h e court had to decide whether a common
aw cause of a c t i o n for wrongful discharge of a female employee
ased on sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n l i e s against an employer with l e s s
han fifteen employees. Like our UADD, Maryland's Fair
mployment P r a c t i c e s Act p r o h i b i t s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in employment
ased on r a c e , c o l o r , r e l i g i o n , ancestry or n a t i o n a l origin, sex,
ge, marital s t a t u s , and other grounds. The Maryland Act also
xempts from i t s terms employers with l e s s than fifteen
mployees. The c o u r t s u s t a i n e d the p l a i n t i f f s r i g h t to sue her
mployer on the b a s i s of " a t least t h i r t y - f o u r s t a t u t e s , one
xecutive order, and one c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment in Maryland
hat prohibit d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based on sex in c e r t a i n
ircurastances. Together these provisions provide strong evidence
f the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t to end discrimination based on sex in
aryland." Id. a t 613-14. The court noted t h a t the United
t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court for the District of Maryland in Kerrigan v.
aanum Entertainment, I n c . , 804 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1992), had
a r l i e r come t o t h e same conclusion, observing t h a t the
nployer's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Maryland Act would mean that the
General Assembly intended to grant small businesses in Maryland
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a 1 icense to discriminate [on the basis of sex] against their
emp 1 oyees with impunity . " Id . at 7 35 ..
19
11 I r e a c h i n g 11 s d e c i s i o i i, 11: I e M a r y 1 a i I d c o u r t r e 1 i e d
u p o n C o l l i n s v.. R i z k a n a , 73 O h i o St. 3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653
( 1 9 9 5 ) , where t h e O h i o S u p r e m e Court upheld a w r o n g f u l discharge
c l a i m b a s e d on t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y and a statute p r o h i b i t i n g
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in e m p l o y m e n t from w h i c h the e m p l o y e r w a s e x e m p t .
T h e c o u r t also c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l Bennett v. Hardy, 1 1 3 W a s h . 2d
912P 784 P. 2d 1258 ' 19 9 CM
where the Washin^ton Suorerne Court
held that a cause of action for wrongful discharge was available
based on a statute prohibiting age discrimination but providing
i Io remedy. See also Williamson v. Greene, 200 W. Va. 421, 4 90
S.E,2d 23 (1997), where it was held that even though an employer
of less than twelve employees was not an "employer" within the
meaning of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, a discharged atwill employee may maintain a common law action for retaliatory
discharge against her employer based on alleged sex
discrimination or sexual harassment because sex discrirnii latioi I
and sexual harassment in employment contravene the public policy
of the state as articulated in the West Vi rginia Human.Rights
Act.
For a general discussion of these issues, see Kimberly C.
Simmons, Annotation, Preemption of Wrongful Discharge Cause of
Action by Civil Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R.Sth 1 (1994); Cara Yates,
Annotation, Application of State Law to Age Discrimination in
Employment, 51 A.L.R.51h ] (nn°nx .
110 The California Supreme Court reached the opposite
result in Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074 (Cal. 1994). In
that case, the court was considering a provision of California's
Fair Employment: and Housing Act ("FEHA") , which declared a state
pub! ic policy of protecting and safeguarding the right and
opportunity to seek, obtain, and hold employment without
discrimination on various grounds, including age, defined as o i- < *r
forty years. The administrative remedies provided for in the
FEHA, however, were not made available to employees whose
employer did not regularly employ five or more persons. The
court was asked to decide whether an employee to whom the
administrative remedies were not avail able may nonetheless
maintain a common law tort action for damages for wrongful
discharge in violation of the public policy stated in. the FEf I A
The court concluded that permitting such an action would be
inconsistent: with the legislative intent reflected in various
provisions of the FEHA, and particularly that provision which
restricts employer liability for violations of the FEHA age
provision to employer's subject to the FEHA. The court wrote:
Tl lis exemption i of si nail employers from, the
FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted

simultaneously to and is inseparable from the
legislative statement of policy. For that
reason, and because no other statute or
constitutional provision bars age
discrimination, we conclude that there
presently exists no "fundamental policy"
which precludes age discrimination by a small
employer. Thus, there is no independent
basis for an action for tortious discharge in
violation of policy.
[d. at 1076.
ill As we have earlier stated, Burton contends that the
JADA declares a public policy against the termination of
employees who are over the age of forty years and that such
mblic policy applies to all employees, whether employed by an
imployer who has fifteen or more employees ("large employer") or
m employer who has less than fifteen employees ("small
imployer"). He argues that small employers were exempted from
.he UADA because of the administrative burden it would place upon
he UADD if all employers were under its jurisdiction. He points
>ut that nothing in the UADA prohibits legal action againsi: small
mployers who discriminate and that nationwide there are some
leven million workers who are not included within the purview of
ederai and state anti-discrimination employment acts.
512 We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public
olicy which is "clear and substantial" with respect to small
mployers. The California Supreme Court's reasoning in Jennings
hat "the exemption of small employers from [California's] FEHA
an on age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to, and is
nseparable from, the legislative statement of policy," id. , is
ound and unanswerable. Our legislature has made a similar
ecision to prohibit age discrimination in the termination of
mployees only by large employers, and if, as Burton contends,
[nail employers should likewise be prohibited, that is a matter
hat the legislature, not the court, should address. An
bservation we made in Baker v. Matheson, 607 P. 2d 233, 237 (Utah
979), bears repeating here:
Due respect for the legislative prerogative
in lawmaking requires that the judiciary not
interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy
considerations and the legislative scheme
employs reasonable means to effectuate a
legitimate object. In matters not affecting
fundamental rights, the prerogative of the
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legislative branch. Is broad, and must bynecessity be so if government is to be by the
people through their elected, representatives
and not by j 1 idges.
ID 3 Amicus ACLU suggests that the legislature additionally
Iias declared a public policy against age discrimination in
employment in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2(4), which was repealed in
1.995 but was in effect at the time of Burton's termination, in
1994.
In that statute, the legislature declared that I n the
state 7 s own employment practices, there should be equal
employment opportunity without regard to age and other
discriminatory practices,. Amicus also relies on Utah
Administrative Code R606-3-2, which prohibits age discrimination
by persons contracting with the state. While arguably a public
policy can be found in that statute and Code, it obviously has no
application, to a private employer. Nor do we find any federal
statute that could provide the basis for a tort action against
small emplovers. See Leathern v. Research Found, of City Univ. of
N.Y. , 658 ?\ Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal
claim under federal statute "cannot, serve as a basis to expand
employees' remedies under New York State common law of tort 7 ').
Because we can find no constitutional provision or other statute
which declares a clear and substantial public policy against age
uiscriiuiuation in erripxoynient practices, we must decline to create
an exception to the general rule prevailing in this state that
employment, is presumed to be on an at-will basis for both the
employer and, the employee.
114 11 ie ins tant. case car i readi 1 y be dis111 iguished from
Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 608, one of the principal cases upon
which Burton, relies. Molesworth was a, case of sex, discrimination
in employment. The Maryland court found "at least thirty-four
statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional amendment"
t ha t p r ohibi t di s c r irni i ia t i on based on, s ex i n cert a in
circumstances. Id. at 613-14. There is no such constitutional
or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against:
discrimination on account of age in, the termination of employment
of employees of small employers. The dissent in the instant case
relies on Molesworth but fails to note that in finding a public
policy against sex discrimination by smal 1 employers, the court
relied not on, the anti-discrimination' act that exempted them,, but
on "thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one
constitutional a m e n d m e n t / ' In Utah, there is no such basis for
us to find a public policy against age discrimination in
employment. We have found no cases
from other jurisdictions
recognizing a public policy against age discrimination by small
e mp 1 o y e r s in a sta 11 I t e s \ i c h a s o i i r I I£ DA, w h i c h e x p r e s s 1 y e x, e m p t s
sma 11 emp 1 o ye r s

1115 In Jennings, the California court offered an
explanation of the FEHA small employer exception. They suggested
hat the legislature made the exception in the FE^HA because the
"ramers
''believe [d] that discrimination on a small
scale would prove exceedingly difficult to
detect and police. . . .
[I]t was believed
that an employment situation in which there
were less than five employees might involve a
close personal relationship between employer
and employees and that fair employment laws
should not apply where such a relationship
existed. Finally, the framers were
interested primarily in attacking protracted
large-scale discrimination by important
employers and strong unions. Their aim was
not so much to redress each discrete instance
of individual discrimination as to eliminate
the egregious and continued discriminatory
practices of economically powerful
organizations. Thus, they could afford to
exempt the small employer.
innings, 876 P.2d at 1082 (quoting Tobriner, California FEPC
965), 16 Hastings L.J. 333, 342).
516 Several federal courts have expressed the same reasons
r the small employers exemption found in certain federal antiscrimination statutes. See e.g., Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66
3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (legislative history indicates
at xxthe protection of intimate and personal relations existing
small business" was reason for Title VII's small employer
eruption) ; Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587
th Cir. 1993) ("Congress did not want to burden small entities
th the costs
associated with litigating discrimination
aims.").
1117 There is an additional reason why we should not create
tort action against small employers. Under the UADA, a covered
Dloyee alleging age discrimination must assert his claim within
3 days of the alleged discrimination. Utah Code Ann.
34-35-7. 1 (1) (c) (1994). The charge is filed at the UADD and is
idled administratively.
Emphasis in the administrative process
placed on conciliation and voluntary resolution. The UADA
idates that the administrative agency "attempt a settlement
:ween the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion."
ih Code Ann. § 34-35-7. 1 (3) (a) . If the claimant is successful,
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the relief provided n icludes reinstatement, back pay and
benefits, and attorney fees, but no compensatory or punitive
damages may be awarded. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(9). This is
all done without charge by the administrative agency.
In
contrast to that simplified procedure, if a small employer were
subjected to a. tort action in the courts, he would have to hire
his own attorney to defend the action against him, and damages
could be awarded against him. The action presumably could be
brought within four y e a r s , not limited by the 180-day limitation
in the UADA, and a jury trial might be demanded. The dissent
would subject the small employers of this state to those burdens.
As stated by the Jennings court: "It would be unreasonable to
expect employers who are expressly exempted from the F'EHA ban on
age- discrimination to nonetheless realize that they must comply
with the law from which they are exempted under pain of possi b] e
tort liabilityWe do not ascribe such a purpose to the
L e g i s l a t u r e . " 876 P.2d at 1083. To that sound expression, we
add that we would be no more justified in creating a tort action
to lie against small employers than we would be to create a tort
action against religious organizations or associations, which are
also expressly e x e m p t e d from the provisions of the UADA. The
dissent charges that our decision opens the door for small
employers in Utah to discrimii late not only on the basis of age,
but on the basis of sex, race, religion, and. disability.
Suffice
it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may
present different considerations and a public policy against•
discrimination on those grounds might: conceivably be found in
other statutes of this state. That question is not: before us and
we express no o p i n i o n on that: subject.
118 Lastly, Burton contends that denying him. a. tort remedy
against his e m p l o y e r violates article 1, section 11 of the Utah
Constitution, w h i c h provides in part, XXA1 1 courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or r e p u t a t i o n , shall have remedy by due course of law
. . . ." Burton cites no authority that would require us to
create a remedy for him, and we know of no case law that would.
require this court to do so under that constitutional provision.
To the contrary, nearly eighty-five years ago this court held
that where no right of action is given or no remedy exists und*-r
either the common law or statute, this section creates none.
Brown v. Wiqhtman, 4 7 Utah. 31, 1.5] P 3 66 (1 91,5). Thus, there is
no constitut i ona] vi o..] a,t i on .
i 19

Judgme n. t a f f i rmed.

120 Justice Zimmerman and Justice Russon concur in Chief
Justice Howe's opinion.

DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
121 I respectfully dissent. While the present case concerns
:he limited issue of age discrimination by employers with fewer
:han fifteen employees ("small employers"), the majority's
iecision will apply to all kinds of employment discrimination.
Specifically, by determining that Dr. Burton has no cause of
iction for age discrimination against his employer because the
employer employs fewer than fifteen employees, the majority has
>pened the door to all small employers to discriminate not only
>n the basis of age, but also on the basis of the other
:ategories protected by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("Act"),
ftah Code Ann. §§ 34A-5-101 to -108 (1997 and Supp. 1999) /
.ncluding race, sex, religion, and disability. In light of the
:act that the vast majority of Utah employers qualify as small
employers, we should not open this door. Instead, this court
;hould recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful
ermination against employers who discriminate on the basis of
ge.
122 This, court adopted a public policy exception to the
mployment-at-will doctrine in Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771
.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J . ) ,
here, we stated:
[W]e recognize that a public policy exception
is necessarily a threshold issue implicated
in our reexamination of the scope of Utah's
at-will rule, and we have therefore been
willing to consider and define it. We also
stress that actions for wrongful termination
based on this exception must involve
substantial and important public policies.
To this end, we will construe public policies
narrowly and will generally utilize those
based on prior legislative pronouncements
. . . applying only those principles which

1

At the time the instant case was filed, the Act was
odified at title 34, chapter 35 of the Utah Code. The relevant
ections of the Act were not affected by the subsequent
enumbering and amendments. Unless otherwise noted, all
eference to the Act hereinafter are to the 1994 version.
11
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are so substantial and fundamental that there
can be virtua 1 Ly ' no question as to their
importance for promotion of the public good.
Id. at 10 4 3 (Durham, ] , joined by Stewart, > J ) . rhe majority
has failed to undertake the careful analysis of public, policy
that Berube demands, creating an enormous loophole which Utah
employers may exploit to the detriment of many Utah employees.
Prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of age
constitutes a substantial and important public policy sufficient
to support a common law cause of action.
123 In the Act, the legislature pronounced that "[i]t is a
discriminatory
employment practice .. . . for an employer to
. . . discharge [or] . . . terminate any person . . . otherwise,
qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions, ag'
religion, national
origin, or handicap." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) . The
legislature, in limiting the Act's coverage to employers with
more than fifteen employees, appears to have been balancing two
policies: vigorously opposing discrimination in employment
practices while simultaneously protecting small business from the
burdens of the statutory remedies. The legislature's decision
not to extend the Act's remedies to employees of small employers
in no way undermines the significance of its core policy
principles. It is not in the public interest: to permit
discrimination in employment based on age, race, sex, religion,,,
and disability.
124 The Av-._ ^.cutes u substantial buj^au^i.a^. .//s;-:., ...
implement its aims.
It mandates the creation of the Utah Ant i Discrimination Division (the "Division"), a-> w< ]] as the Ant i
Discrimination Advisory Committee to that Division (the
"Committee") . See id. §§ 34-35-3, -4.5(1). The governor is
directed to appoint the members of the Committee, I nc 1 uding "on e
small business representative." Id. § 34-35-4. 5(1) •(a) (i)
(emphasis added) , The Division is given broad powers, includi i: ig
the authority to "receive, reject, Investigate, and pass upon
comp 1 a in t s a 11 eg i ng di s c r imi na t ion I n emp 1 oyme nt:
• ::«i: t: h e
existence of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
by a person, [or] an employer." Id. § 34-35-5(1) (c) (emphasis
added) . Significantly, the Division is i lot limited to acting
against v "employers" in its fact finding or its passing upon
discrimination complaints; rather, It: is also empowered to act
against "persons." Id. § 34-35-5(1)(c). Repeatedly, the
Division is charged with the ambitious task: of fighting
employment discrimination by such means as advising the governor,
recommending legislation, and cooperating with both public and
private groups. See id. § 34-35-5(1) (h) , (j), (k). It is even

i v e n t h e power t o s u b p o e n a w i t n e s s e s , a d m i n i s t e r o a t h s and
ompel t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f documents and p a p e r s .
S'>ee i d .
3 4 - 3 5 - 5 ( 3 ) (a) ( i ) t o ( i i i ) .
F i n a l l y , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has
n s t r u c t e d t h e D i v i s i o n t o " i s s u e p u b l i c a t i o n s a n d r e p o r t s of
n v e s t i g a t i o n s a n d r e s e a r c h t h a t w i l l t e n d t o p r o m o t e good w i l l
mong t h e v a r i o u s r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s , and e t h n i c g r o u p s of t h e
t a t e , and t h a t w i l l m i n i m i z e o r e l i m i n a t e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n
mployment b e c a u s e o f r a c e , c o l o r , s e x , r e l i g i o n , n a t i o n a l
r i q i n , age, or h a n d i c a p . "
Id.
§ 3 4 - 3 5 - 5 (1) (g) ( e m p h a s i s
dded) . C l e a r l y , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e b e l i e v e d t h e A c t ' s purposes
e r e t o have b r o a d a n d i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e w e l f a r e of
tah workers.
125 In a d d i t i o n t o t h i s s t r o n g s t a t u t o r y s u p p o r t for
e c o g n i z i n g c l a i m s f o r w r o n g f u l t e r m i n a t i o n b a s e d on a g e
i s c r i m i n a t i o n , two o t h e r p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t the
v a i l a b i l i t y of s u c h a c a u s e of a c t i o n .
First, a significant
a j o r i t y — 6 9 . 7 % — o f t h e U t a h employer p o p u l a t i o n e m p l o y s f o u r t e e n
r fewer employees.2
T h u s , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s b r o a d g o a l of
Liminating employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s a d d r e s s e d i n only a
Lmited way by t h e A c t , a n d can in f a c t be a v o i d e d by t h e
a j o r i t y of Utah - e m p l o y e r s .
Second, t h e way i n w h i c h a s t a t e
^ g u l a t e s r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n employees and e m p l o y e r s h a s a
L g n i f i c a n t i m p a c t on t h e q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r many of i t s
L t i z e n s , and u l t i m a t e l y f o r t h e s o c i e t y a s a w h o l e .
The
w o r k p l a c e c l i m a t e " o f a s t a t e i s an i m p o r t a n t p a r t of i t s
} p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e c o n o m i c g r o w t h and l o n g - t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t .
It
> a n e n t i r e l y a p p r o p r i a t e a r e n a f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n of p o l i c y
l o i c e s i n t e n d e d t o b e n e f i t t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , as i n d e e d i s
m i f e s t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s , c h o i c e t o embody a n t i .scrimination p r i n c i p l e s in statute.
Utah s h o u l d n o t be a p l a c e
iere workers can be f i r e d , * p a i d l e s s , or o t h e r w i s e t r e a t e d l e s s
t v o r a b l y by n e a r l y 70% o f a l l e m p l o y e r s on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r
t e e , s e x , r e l i g i o n , d i s a b i l i t y , or a g e .
126 The m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n u n d e r m i n e s U t a h ' s p u b l i c l y
" o c l a i m e d d e s i r e t o e l i m i n a t e employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
i c a u s e t h e r e i s no r e a s o n i n l o g i c , h i s t o r y , case l a w , or p o l i c y
iy d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o n t h e b a s i s of r a c e , s e x , r e l i g i o n , and
s a b i l i t y may b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h a t b a s e d on a g e , I b e l i e v e
.e m a j o r i t y ' s d e c i s i o n w i l l a p p l y t o a l l c a t e g o r i e s p r o t e c t e d i n
e U t a h A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Act and w i l l a f f e c t a l l forms of
v i d i o u s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n by small e m p l o y e r s .
I t seems s t r a n g e
deed t h a t t h i s c o u r t s h o u l d declare t h a t i t i s not a v i o l a t i o n
2

T h i s number i s b a s e d on d a t a from t h e s e c o n d q u a r t e r of
99 a n d i s p r o v i d e d b y t h e D i v i s i o n of W o r k f o r c e I n f o r m a t i o n and
yment S e r v i c e s .
13

of public policy to d iscriminate against: someone in employment:
because of race, sex, religion, disability, or age, no matter the
size of the employer.
C

I27 The issue before us has been addressed by otl ler
jurisdictions. Noteworthy is Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608
(Md. 1996) . In that case, the plaintiff, alleging- sex
discrimination against a small employer, also sought to bring ai i
action based on common law wrongful termination. Id. at 611-12.
The court was faced wi th a broad statute including the Maryland
Legislature's Intent to prohibit invidious employment
discrimination and a limitation appearing to exempt small
employers. See Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, §§ 14, 15(b) (1999). The
court stated that "absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of
public policy, there ordinarily is no violation of public policy
by an employer's discharging an at will employee." Molesworth, '672 A.2d at 613 (internal quotation and citations omitted). The
court then analyzed the various enforcement provisions of the
Sfafnf o
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on Human Relations, with powers and a mandate similar to the Utah
Division. Id. at 613. Whi] e there are differences between the
Maryland statute and case law and our own, they are minor
compared to the similarity of the overall intent exhibited in
both cases: the elimination of the detrimental effects of
empIoyment discrimina11on on the pub 1 ic i nterest... The Molesworth
court found that" the statutory scheme was not intended to exclude
small employers from employment discrimination policies, biit
rather to "provide [] a clear statement of public policy
sufficient to support a common law cause of action for wrongful
discharge against an employer exempted by [having fewer than
fifteen employees]." Id. at 616. The court., in analyzing the
:m;"nt of ti le ] egislative scheme, found, that while small.
•messes were excluded from the burdens imposed by the
-.uministrative mechanism, they were not excluded from the
important public policy at the heart of the statute. See id. ;
Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733, 735-36
(D. Md. 1992); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 660-61 (Ohio
1995); Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1264-66 (Wash. 1990). I
would adopt the reasoning of the Molesworth court as I believe
its holding is in keeping with the legislature's statutory scheme
and with the substantia.] and i mportant pi ibl.,i c policy behi nd that
statutory scheme.
128 Ii i conclusion, the language of Berube is clear:
"Public policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied
i n legislative enactments. The legislature, acting in. consonance
with constitutional principles and expressing the will of the
people, determines that which is in the public interest and
serves the public good." Berube, 771 P..2d at 1 04.3. I be ] i eve

that the "public good" in this case would be best served by
permitting a common, law cause of action for wrongful termination
against employers who discriminate on the basis of age, race,
sex, religion, and disability.

H29 Justice Stewart concurs in Associate Chief Justice
Durham's dissenting opinion.
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ORDER GRANTING
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Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton were represented by their attorney of record, E. Paul Wood.
The Court, having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by Plaintiff and Defendants and
having considered oral argument on the matter herewith

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion lo Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim is granted. The Complaint and causes of action thereunder are dismissed.
DATED this

day of April, 2000.

^

JY THE COURFfe

Tyrone E. MedleW^r""'"~//
District Court Judge
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ROBERT H. WILDE #3466
BLAKE A. NAKAMURA #62 88
ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
935 East South Union Avenue Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-4774
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo
RULE 59 MOTION

ANGELA BYERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.
CREATIVE CORNER, INC. AND LYN
PELTON,
Defendants.

990911231

Judge Tyrone Medley
ooOoo

Pursuant to Rule 59(a) (7), Utah R. Civ. P. Plaintiff moves
this court for a new trial on the grounds that the court
committed an error of law when it dismissed Plaintiff's
complaint
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 59 provides, in relevant part;
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion
for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
L:\D\11735\Rule 59 motion

-1-

court may open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, ameadfindings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new finHirrgs-^and
conclusions, and direct the erTtry^bt a 'new judgment:
(7) Error in law.
BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT
The court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds
that there does not exist a clear and substantial public policy
in Utah against terminating an employee of a small employer (an
employer with fewer than 15 employees) because of her sex.

In so

doing the court overlooked the fact that the Utah Supreme Court
has said that Utah courts should look to either Utah or Federal
statutes or regulations to find such policies.
AT&T, 844 P.2d 949, 968-969 (Utah 1992).

Retherford

v.

The Utah Supreme Court

has also given credence to executive orders in determining
whether a public policy was clear and substantial.

Burton

v.

Exam Center, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT 18 (Utah 2000) at
2000 UT Kl4.
In Burton the court examined the plaintiff's age
discrimination case under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA)
and determined held that statute did not provide a clear and
substantial public policy against age discrimination.

There the

court specifically said its decision did not preclude an

L:\D\ll735\Rule 59 motion
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examination of other statutes to determine whether there was a
clear and substantial public policy against sex, race, or
religious or disability discrimination.

Burton

at 2000 UT 18

1Jl7. The court's major emphasis was on the UADA' s simplified and
expedited resolution procedure.
In this matter Plaintiff has asked the court to find that a
clear and substantial public policy against termination on the
basis of sex is found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (as amended).
VII.

The Burton

analysis does not apply to Title

While sex discrimination claims brought under Title VII are

investigated by the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division
(UALD) unlike UADA claims are they are not tried in the UALD
venue.

If a negotiated resolution is not reached within the UALD

a Notice of Right to Sue is issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the claimant then becomes a
plaintiff in a law suit brought in state or federal court.

In

short, a Title VII sex discrimination claim does not have the
benefit of the expedited procedures a UADA claim does and the
Burton

holding does not apply to Title VII claims. { Further, the

legislative history of Title VII shows that the purpose for
excluding small employers was to reduce the case load of the EEOC
and not to provide some alternative to litigation as the court
L:\D\11735\Rule 59 motion
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found in Burton.

In short, the Burton analysis does not apply to

Title VII and Title VII provides a clear and substantial public
policy against termination because of sex.
Title VII is not alone as a federal statutory basis for the
clear and substantial public policy against termination because
of sex. At 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) congress prohibited discrimination
in compensation based on sex, regardless of the number of
employees, so long as the employer meets the other requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

It goes without saying that if

an employer may not discriminate in the amount of compensation it
cannot discrimination in whether to pay any compensation at all,
i.e., whether to fire on the basis of sex.
42 U.S.C. §5057 makes it illegal to for an employer,
regardless of size, to discriminate based on sex among certain
volunteers, i.e., people who do not get paid.

If clear and

substantial public policy prevents sex discrimination among
volunteers clearly there is such a policy preventing the
termination, based on sex, from employment upon which a woman
relies for her livelihood.
The Utah Supreme Court has analyzed government regulations
in determining whether a public policy is clear and substantial.
See Ryan v. Dan's
L:\D\11735\Rule 59 motion

Food Stores, Inc.,
- 4 -

972 P.2d 395, 406 (Utah

1998).

Specific regulations of the federal government show a

clear and substantial public policy against sex discrimination,
regardless of the size of the employer.

Businesses who contract

with the Federal Railroad Administration1, the Federal Highway
Administration2, the Federal Communications Commission3
specifically, and the government generally4 may not discriminate
based on sex no matter how few employees they have.

In analyzing

regulations and statutes we must remember that the Peterson v.
Browning,

did not create a cause of action for the violation of

individual statutes or regulations.

It merely held that the

statutes or regulations must be analyzed to see whether their
policy is clear and substantial.

If there is a clear and

substantial public policy against sex discrimination for small
firms who contract with the federal government to perform
janitorial services the policy remains clear and substantial
against sex discrimination for small firms who contract with the
state or a private firm to perform those same janitorial

x

49 CFR §265.7(a) (1) (i)

2

23 CFR §230.113

3

4

47 CFR §73.2080

41 CFR §60-1.4

L:\D\11735\Rule 59 motion
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services.

If there is a clear and substantial public policy

against sex discrimination for small firms who perform janitorial
services the policy remains clear and substantial against sex
discrimination for small firms who do anything else.
For many years neither congress nor the president were
prohibited in any fashion from discriminating against their
employees on the basis of sex.

As of 1996 both of these

employers are required to treat women employees no differently
than they treat men, including in firing decisions.

See 2 U.S.C.

§1311, 3 U.S.C. §411. When both of these employers who have
previously been able to do as they wish are now restricted in
their ability to fire a woman because of her sex it is clear that
the national public policy is clearly and substantially against
allowing an employer, of any size, to fire a woman because of her
sex.
CONCLUSION
Burton turned on the Supreme Court's application of the
principals of Peterson
Retherford,

v. Browning,

832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) and

supra, to the UADA's age discrimination provisions.

Plaintiff asks this court to perform that same analysis for Title
VII's sex discrimination provisions.

Plaintiff also asks the

court to analyze the other federal statutes cited above and the
L:\D\11735\Rule 59 motion
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proclamations of Utah's governors5 in this same light.

When that

is done it is evident that Utah does in fact have a clear and
substantial public policy prohibiting defendant from terminating
plaintiff because of her sex.
DATED this

^

day of

Arj^Yll

2000.

ROBERT H. WILDE
Attorney for Plaintiff

5

UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov. Leavitt; UT Exec Order
June 30, 1989 - Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order July 25, 1986 Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order May 28, 1985 - Gov. Bangerter; UT
Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order July
17, 1980 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order May 4, 1979 - Gov.
Matheson; UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec
Order December 6, 1973 - Gov. Rampton; UT Exec Order October 1,
1965 - Gov. Rampton.
L:\D\11735\Rule 59 motion
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Rule 59 Motion was mailed to the following via first class mail,
postage prepaid thereon, this
$T day of April, 2000.

E. Paul Wood
Littlefield & Peterson
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

[MMi \ljfiw
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRYERS, ANGELA
MEMORANDUM
DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 990911231
CREATIVE CORNER INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Judge: Tyrone E. Medley
Date: 08/18/2000

This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59.
Having received and considered memoranda in support and opposition to the Motion, the Court
hereby DENIES the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Plaintiff, Angela Bryers, was an at-will employee of the Defendant, Creative Corner Inc.
2. On October 15, 1999, the Plaintiff alleges she was terminated because she was pregnant.
3. At the time Plaintiff was terminated, the Defendant employed four employees.
4. On November 5, 1999, the Plaintiff sued her former employer Creative Corner, and its
President Lyn Pelton, claiming "wrongful termination in violation of public policy" as set forth
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. This was the
Plaintiffs sole cause of action.
5. On December 9, 1999, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Plaintiffs
cause of action was preempted by the exclusive remedy provision found in the Utah
Discrimination Act (herein UADA)(Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to 8)(1988 as amended 1989).
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States. Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). Second, that
even if the claim was not preempted, there was not a viable cause of action because the
Defendant is are not an "employer" as defined under the UADA. (U.C.A. 34A-5-102(8)(a)(iv)).
Finally, the Defendants argued that the holding in Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus, 2000 UT 18
(Utah 2000), which affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant, in a suit where the
plaintiff alleged that his firing by a small employer violated public policy against age
discrimination, and gave him rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination, is dispositive of
this case.
6. In response, the Plaintiff argued that her termination violated clear public policy against sex
discrimination and that wrongful termination of an employee in violation of public policy is a

tort. The Plaintiff also filed a Supplemental Memorandum providing the court with a list of 156
federal codes, 5 Utah statutes, and 10 Executive Orders. Although the Plaintiff provided no legal
analysis of how these statutes and regulations support her claim, she asked the court to consider
these provisions in finding a public policy exception for her claim.
8. On Febiuary 14, 1999, this court heard Oral Arguments on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and took the matter under advisement.
9. On March 30, 1999 this court signed an Order granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
This court dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint because it was not convinced that the Plaintiff had
identified a clear and substantial public policy against wrongful termination of employment on
account of sex by a small employer.
10. A week later the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59.
RULING
a. Rule 59
This trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of
the circumstances specified in subdivision (a) of Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moon Lake Elec. Assn.' v. Ultra Systems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P2d 125 (Ut. App. 1988).
Here the Plaintiff seeks relief under URCP 59 (a)(7), alleging that the trial court committed an
"error of law" by not considering the federal codes, case statutes and executive orders the
Plaintiff provided in her Supplemental Memorandum to find a "public policy exception" for the
Plaintiffs claim.
In her Memorandum Opposing the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff cited
Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A. 2d 608 (1996). In that case the Court of Appeals of Maryland
had to decide whether a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a female
employee based on sex discrimination could be made against an employer with less than 15
employees. Maryland's Anti-Discrimination Act also exempts employers with less than 15
employees. However, that court sustained the plaintiffs right to sue her employer on the basis of
that "section 14 is one of at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional
amendment in Maryland that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances."
Molesworth at 632.
In an attempt to mirror Molesworth, the Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum
with an attachment listing 156 federal codes, 5 Utah statutes and 22 Utah regulations which

prohibit sex discrimination under various circumstances. The Plaintiff stated that the list was
provided "as additional sources of the public policy against sex discrimination, in addition to the
UADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act..." Supplemental Memorandum Authority p.2.
However, the Plaintiff provided no copies of these to the Court, nor any legal analysis which
explains how the latter provisions provide a clear and substantial public policy against sex
discrimination in the state of Utah.
In her Rule 59 Motion the Plaintiff provided additional statutes and executive orders it
would like this court to "analyze" as well. Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion p.6. However, these latter
statutes and executive orders are outside the pleadings, could not have been considered by this
court in its ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and cannot be considered now to find
an error of law in the previous proceeding. Therefore this Court will not consider the additional
statutes and executive orders in this decision.
For the first time, in her Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff also argues that the Burton
decision does not apply to Title VII actions. However, on page one of her Supplemental
Memorandum the Plaintiff stated: "Burton addresses virtually all of the issues addressed in this
matter. The distinguishing factor is that Burton is a case based on age-discrimination, while this
action is based on sex discrimination." This Court may not consider a legal theory first
mentioned in a post-trial motion, as a basis for a finding of an "error of law." Estate of Justhein
824 P.2d 432, 434. Therefore this Court will not address this allegation either. The only issue
this court will review is whether the court committed an error of law by not finding a clear and
substantial policy exception for sex discrimination by small employers based on the list of codes,
statutes and regulations attached by the Plaintiff in her Supplemental Memorandum.
b. Rule 12 (b)(6)
When ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under URCP 12 (b)(6), this Court may only consider
the allegations made in the Complaint. Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P2d 622, 623
(Utah 1990). In her complaint the Plaintiff only cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis of her
claim. Under the Colman decision, this Court did not have the burden of finding, reviewing and
analyzing the numerous list of codes, statutes and regulations attached to the Plaintiffs
Supplemental Authority to reach a decision on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Furthermore, while analyzing Title VII and the UADA, this court is guided by the rule

that in absence of an ambiguity, a statute should be construed according to its plain language.
Johnson v. State Retirement Office. 755 P.2d 161. This is because the best indication of
legislative intent is the statute's plain language. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 679
P.2d903,906(Utahl984).
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII considers it an unlawful employment practice for "an employer to fail or refuse
to hire or discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C.S.§ 2000e-2. However,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce, who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." See 42 U.S.C.S. §200e et. seq.
The Defendant, Creative Corners does not meet this definition of "employer;" therefore the
Defendant is exempted from Title VII.
2. UADA
The UADA clearly states that "an employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge,
demote or terminate any person ...because of (D) pregnancy; childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions." See U.C.A. 34A-5-106 (l)(a)(I)(D). However the UADA applies only to
"employer(s)" as defined under the Act. The UADA defines "employer" as:
(I) the state;
(ii) any political subdivision;
(iii) a board, commission ...or agent of the state;
(iv) a person employing 15 or more employees within the state for each working day in
each of 20 calendar weeks or more in the current or preceding calendar year."
See U.C.A. 34A-5-102 (8)(a).
Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, the Defendant also does not fall under the UADA's definitions of
"employer." Therefore the Defendant is also not regulated by the UADA. Furthermore, the
UADA also provides that "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based on...sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth,
or pregnancy related conditions..." See U.C.A. 34A-5-107(15). By its plain language the UADA
provides the only remedy available for the Plaintiffs claim. Nevertheless, Utah recognizes a

public policy exception to the at-will doctrine which does not insulate an employer from liability
where the employee is fired in a manner or for a reason that contravenes clear and substantial
public policy. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah 1991). Therefore this
court will provide a historical review of this public policy exception below.
c. Public Policy Exception
Generally actions within the public policy exception involve termination of employment
for 1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, 2) performing a public obligation, or 3)
exercising a legal right or privilege. Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1992). In
trying to explain the "public policy exception" the Utah Supreme Court has tried to identify
proper sources of "public policy." In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., the court said, "public
policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied in legislative enactments...Not every
legislative enactment, of course, embodies public policy; only those which protect the public or
promote public interest qualify." 771 P2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989). The court in Berube
explained that the legislature is not the only source of public policy; "judicial decisions can also
enunciate substantial principles of public policy in areas which the legislature has not treated."
Id. The court also warned that:
"actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must involve substantial
and important public policies. To this end we will construe public policies narrowly
and will generally utilize those based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial
decisions, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental
that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the
public good." Id
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently clear and substantial to support a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the Utah Supreme Court has
suggested that trial courts examine the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it
affects the public as a whole. "The following questions are relevant in determining whether a
statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy:
1) whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as
opposed to only the parties only; and
2) whether the public interest is so strong, and the policy so clear and weighty that we
should place the policy beyond the reach of contract."
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 966 (Utah 1992).

This court finds that question one can be answered in the affirmative under the circumstances of
this case. Clearly the wrongful termination of pregnant women by any employer is a question of
overarching importance to the public, and society as a whole. However, at this time, this court
cannot answer question two in the affirmative for the reasons set forth below.
In Peterson v. Browning, the Utah Supreme Court held that when an employee is
discharged in violation of a public policy exception he has a tort action against the employer. 832
P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). The court admitted that due to the open-ended nature of the "public
policy exception" the identification of clear and substantial public policies require case-by-case
development." Id- at 1282. Again the court reiterated that "to provide a basis for an action under
the public policy exception, a violation of a state or federal law must contravene the clear and
substantial public policy of the state of Utah." Id- 1283. But this time the court added that
"[ajlthough many state and federal laws will reflect Utah public policy, and may in fact, provide
a source of public policy, a plaintiff must establish the connection between the law violated
and the public policies of Utah." IdL Here the Plaintiff has not met this burden.
In her complaint the Plaintiff cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis for her claim of
"wrongful termination against public policy." The Defendants argued in their Motion to Dismiss
that the UADA preempts the plaintiffs common law cause of action. This was the same
argument made by the defendants in Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). The latter case involved an appeal from a granl of summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint. The plaintiff had sued her employer alleging among other
things that AT&T fired her in retaliation for complaining of being sexually harassed by her coworkers, and that such a discharge violated Utah public policy barring reprisals for sexual
harassment reports. On this issue, the Utah Supreme Court held that the UADA provided the
exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs claim of discharge in violation of public policy. Retherford
at 954.
The Retherford court began its analysis of this issue by looking at the statute itself.
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(15) reads, "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation,
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy- related conditions, age, relation, national origin, or
handicap." The court concluded that the plain text of the statute preempted common law causes

of action for retaliation in complaints of employment discrimination. The court said," as a
matter of statutory construction, we find that the version of the UADA at the time of
Retherford's firing was the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an employee who
complained of sexual harassment." Retherford at 962.
The Utah Supreme Court then reviewed whether Retherford's tort and contract claims also
came within the scope of the UADA's preemptive effect. The court admitted that "we have yet to
propound a generic test for determining when a statutory cause of action functions as the
exclusive remedy for the wrong...[therefore] we have looked to law outside our jurisdiction [and]
have adopted a test that inquires whether the statutory scheme supplies an indispensable element
of the tort claim." Id. at 962-963. The court went on to explain that "the indispensable element
test relies neither on timing nor conduct to determine preemption. Instead under this test,
preemption depends on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim, not the
nature of the defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury."
Id at 965-966.
Applying this test, the court again looked to the language of the UADA to determine the
type of injuries the UADA is designed to address. From the plain language of the UADA the
Retherford court concluded that "the legislature intended the UADA to address all manner of
employment discrimination against any member of the specified protected groups." IcL at
966. The court also stated that in order for Retherford to prove the tort of wrongful termination
in violation of public policy, Retherford would need to show that AT&T discharged her in a
manner or for reason that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy of the state of Utah, a
public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes." Id at 966. (citing Peterson 832 P.2d at
1281; Berube 771 P.2d at 1051). The court concluded:
"the only possible source in Utah's statues or constitution for a clear and substantial
public policy allegedly violated by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition
of retaliation for good faith complaints of employment discrimination...in absence of
this public policy declaration, Retherford would be unable even to allege an action for
this tort...it is plain that the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable element in
Retherford's tort cause of action; therefore the UADA must preempt this claim." Id.
Here, as in Retherford's case, one of the harms the UADA addresses, pregnancy, is also
an indispensable element in the Plaintiffs cause of action. This court following the Retherford

holding ruled that the UADA is also the exclusive remedy for the Plaintiffs cause of action. In
her Memorandum in Opposition, the Plaintiff argued that the Retherford holding does not apply
to her case because in Retherford the plaintiff had alternative relief under a collective bargaining
agreement and was also allowed to proceed with her claims for breach of implied contract,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment; while here the Plaintiff
would not have any alternative relief. However the holding in Retherford does not state that to
preempt a claim a statute must offer alternative relief; in fact the dismissal of Retherford's claim
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was affirmed as discussed above.
Finally there is the case of Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus., 2000 UT 18 (Utah 2000). In
Burton the plaintiff appealed from the grant of summary judgment to defendant employers in a
suit alleging a common law claim for tortious wrongful termination on the ground that firing the
plaintiff due to his age violated public policy. The plaintiff in Burton argued that because the
UADA covers only employers with 15 or more employees, he had no administrative remedy
through the UADA; therefore that the Utah Supreme Court should recognize a tort cause of action
for wrongful termination against public policy for small employers. B»urton also relied on
Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996). But the Utah Supreme Court
declined this argument. It held:
"we can find no constitutional provision or other statute which declares a clear and
substantial public policy against age discrimination in employment practices...in
Molesworth the Maryland court found 'at least 34 statutes..etc' [here] there is no such
constitutional or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against discrimination
on account of age in the termination of employment of employees by small
employers...We have found no case from other jurisdictions recognizing a public
policy against age discrimination by small employers in a statute such as our
UADA which expressly exempts small employers." Burton at 13-14.
The Burton holding cited some of the reasons why small employers should be exempt.
For example, "if a small employer were subjected to a tort action in the courts, he would have to
hire his own attorney, ...and damages could be awarded against him. The action could be
presumably brought within four years, not limited by the 180-day limitation." Burton at 17. The
court continued,
"As stated by the Jennings court 'it would be unreasonable to expect small employers
who are expressly exempted from the FEHA (California's Anti-Discrimination Act)
ban on age discrimination to nonetheless realize they that they must comply with the

law from which they are exempted ...we do not ascribe such a purpose to the
legislature.'" IcL
Here the Plaintiff has provided an extensive list of codes, statutes and regulations in an
effort to establish that under Utah law there is a clear and substantial public policy against sex
discrimination. However the Utah statutes cited by the Plaintiff apply only to entities or
professions regulated by the state, not to small private employers. In Molesworthu the court also
recognized that "absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy, there ordinarily is no
violation of public policy by an employer's discharging an at-will employee." Molesworth v.
Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 630 (Md. App. 1996) (citing Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467,
478 (1991). However the plaintiff in Molesworth argued that her termination violated the public
policy announced in §14 of the Fair Employment Act, Maryland Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995
Supp) Art. 49B which states:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland, in the exercise
of its police power for the protection of the public safety...to assure all persons
equal opportunity in receiving employment...regardless of race, color, religion...
sex, age...and to that end to prohibit discrimination in employment by any person,
group, labor organization, organization, or ANY employer or his agents." Id. at 628.
The defendant, argued that §14 did not apply to employers with less than 15 employees. However
the Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed. The court explained,
" by its own language [§14] proscribes discrimination in employment by 'any
small employer.' If the term 'employer' in §14 were meant to refer only to employers
as defined in § 15(b), the term 'any' would be unnecessary...the language of the statute
indicates that the legislature intended to prohibit sex discrimination by 'any employer.'"
IcL at 632.
Although the codes, statues and regulations provided by the Plaintiff prohibit
discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances, none indicate that the Utah legislature
intended to prohibit sex discrimination by "any employer." Without a statute with the express
language of Maryland's §14, it is difficult for this court to simply conclude that together these
provisions provide strong evidence of a legislative intent to create a clear and substantial public
policy against sex discrimination by any employer in Utah. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has failed
to "establish a connection between the law violated and the public policies of Utah." Peterson at
1283. In addition, the Retherford holding clearly established that the UADA provides the

exclusive remedy for a claim for "wrongful termination against public policy." Finally, in Burton
the Utah Supreme Court clearly declined to create a cause of action for small employers who
discriminate against employees based upon age, a specified group protected under the UADA.
CONCLUSION
It seems odd, repugnant and disheartening to have concluded that the State of Utah is a
place where a pregnant woman can be terminated from employment by a small employer because
of her pregnancy, and that she is precluded from maintaining a wrongful termination cause of
action under a public policy exception. The policy considerations which support the exemption of
small employers from the reach of the Title VII and the UADA seem to pale in comparison to the
harm caused by maintaining discriminatory employment practices which wrongfully deny
economic opportunities, and reduce the quality of life for all of us. However, this court has its
limitations; it must follow the plain text of the statutes of this state, and the controlling precedent
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. Based on the case law and analysis provided above, this
court concludes that it did not commit an error of law by granting the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. Therefore the Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59 is DENIED. This
Memorandum Decision shall constitute the final order of this court in resolving the matters
referenced herein.
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